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Preface 
As a trained psychologist with a passionate interest for any scientific inquiries that combine topics 
relating both to psychology and business, I found the task of deciding on a single topic for a PhD 
dissertation excruciatingly difficult. The decision to explore psychological variables in a CSR 
communication setting arose from three related factors. Firstly, the field of moral psychology gained 
popularity in the years preceding my PhD period. While moral psychology is mainly concerned with 
basic questions regarding human nature, I felt that the conclusions from many of the findings in 
moral psychology could hold promise for applied knowledge. Secondly, as a PhD student, I gained 
knowledge about CSR research. I found that while the field was steadily growing, the CSR literature 
was fragmented, and several gaps were identifiable. Moral and social psychology seemed to offer 
some insights that could carry theoretical and managerial implications for CSR. Lastly, through 
countless discussions with colleagues and friends about CSR, I realized that my attitudes towards the 
idea were characterized by elevated levels of skepticism and cynicism. Many of the research ideas 
that led up to the making of this dissertation can thus be said to have arisen from my cynical attitude 
towards CSR, combined with hypothetical thinking about how cynics such as myself could become 
persuaded to support and even engage with CSR.   
Many individuals have contributed to my work on the dissertation, and made it possible for me to 
contribute to the research community. I therefore would like to express the following gratitude: 
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my main supervisor Marcus Selart. I find it hard to 
imagine how this dissertation could have gotten made without his supervision, positive attitude, and 
trust. Apart from being my main supervisor, Marcus is also co-author on Paper 1 in the present 
dissertation.     
I would also like to give my most sincere gratitude to my co-supervisors Helge Thorbjørnsen (NHH) 
and Elisabeth Norman (UiB). Their helpful guidance has proven extremely important throughout the 
entire research process.  
I would also like to thank all of my colleagues at the department of Strategy and Management for 
continually supporting my efforts, both academically and morally. Siv Skard, Hallgeir Sjåstad, Kjell 
Grønhaug, Sigurd Villads Troye, Einar Breivik, Therese Sverdrup and Paal Fennell are only some of the 
people who deserve my sincere gratitude.  
I would also like to thank the Centre for Ethics and Economics for funding parts of the research in this 
dissertation. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for being kind, curious and understanding 
throughout my PhD period. My fiancé, Ingrid Arnestad, is particularly deserving of praise and 
gratitude, for continuing to put up with me.  
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Abstract 
The overarching topic in this dissertation is psychological mechanisms involved in the perceptions of 
sincerity in CSR communication. The dissertation consist of three papers, all revolving around 
sincerity-perceptions in different types of CSR communications. The first paper presents an 
experiment exploring the effects of positive and negative framing on persuasion and persuasion 
knowledge in CSR communication. The conclusion of that paper is that negativity bias affects the 
processing of negative CSR communication, which makes the number and quality of claims less 
important, and elevates the level of persuasion knowledge. The second paper presents two 
experiments demonstrating that a decision maker can come across as more motivated by intrinsic 
values, and less by extrinsic factors, if she seems particularly aware of her own mortality at the time 
she makes the decision. The third paper explores the role of cognitive decision style as signal of 
sincerity in CSR communication. The experiment demonstrates that a leader who claims to have 
made a CSR decision in a partially spontaneous manner is perceived as having less persuasive intent 
than a leader who made the same decision through willful deliberation. The reduction in persuasion 
knowledge associated with a somewhat spontaneous decision style is found to be indirectly 
associated with sincerity in motivational attribution, and positive evaluation of the leader. However, 
the third paper also demonstrates that claiming complete cognitive spontaneity as decision style 
leads to unfortunate results in terms of persuasive appeal and motivational attribution. All in all, the 
three papers represent attempts at combining novel findings from social and moral psychology into 
the applied setting of CSR communication. A common conclusion from all three papers is that 
attributions, both regarding communicative intention and behavioral motives, are the mechanisms 
through which CSR communication is processed. Aside from increasing our general understanding of 
persuasion mechanisms, the results carry managerial implications for individuals and organizations 
who wish to portray themselves as socially responsible and morally virtuous.  
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Part I: Dissertation summary 
 
1. Research question and purpose 
The ethical claim that corporations have responsibilities beyond value-creation has been somewhat 
contested (Jørgensen & Tynes Pedersen, 2012). Free-market libertarian scholars have argued that 
the clear and limited responsibility of businesses is to conduct profitable operations within the 
framework of the law, in order to create value that benefits society (e.g. Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 
2001). At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, academics have argued that businesses have 
an unreserved and unrestricted responsibility to conduct their operations in a way that is consistent 
with sustainable social and ecological systems (e.g. Zsolnai & Ims, 2006). The more moderate ethical 
stance, that businesses have a substantial responsibility to take care of all legitimate stakeholders 
that are affected by business operations (i.e. Freeman, 1984), has become common in organizational 
theory and practice (Moir, 2001). Although these discussions seem far from over, a prevailing notion 
is that although the academic community has failed to achieve consensus regarding the definition of 
corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) (Lindgreen, Swaen, & Maon, 2009), corporations are 
commonly considered to have social responsibility to serve individuals, communities, society and the 
environment above and beyond what is legally required (Lockett, Moon, & Visser, 2006; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001; Wood, 1991).  
The concept of CSR has received increasing attention from researchers (Serenko & Bontis, 2009). The 
CSR literature ranges across multiple levels of analysis, and multiple research disciplines. As such, it’s 
current state is one of fragmentation (Waddock, 2004). Aguinis and Glavas (2012) divide the CSR 
literature into three levels of analysis; institutional, organizational, and individual. CSR research 
which focuses on the institutional level is primarily concerned with forces external to the 
organizations, such as laws, standards and other normative and regulatory elements (Scott, 1995). 
CSR research targeting the organizational level is primarily concerned with predictors of which 
companies will engage in what kinds of CSR practices, and what the outcomes of those practices are. 
The unit of analysis in this stream of research is typically treated conceptually at a macro level. The 
focus of the present dissertation can be said to be on the individual level of analysis, more 
specifically, in the intersection where CSR meets social marketing and organizational behavior. The 
field of social marketing has specialized in the contribution of marketing activities to socially 
desirable behaviors and goals (Andreasen, 1994), while the limited CSR literature in organizational 
behavior has been concerned with the link between CSR activities and employee attraction, 
engagement, commitment and retention (Aguinis, 2011; Morgeson, Aguinis, Waldman, & Siegel, 
2013). The common goal of both social marketing research and CSR research in the domain of 
organizational behavior is to better understand how CSR initiatives can attract and retain the support 
of consumers and employees (Enderle & Murphy, 2009). This is not peripheral to the general CSR 
literature, as the fundamental goal of most CSR initiatives is to achieve sustained competitive 
advantage by attracting and retaining support from consumers and other stakeholders (Devinney, 
2009; McShane & Cunningham, 2012; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Waddock, 2008). Most people want 
corporations to act as good corporate citizens, but research shows that people are also quite 
skeptical of corporations who promote their social responsibility (Brønn & Vrioni, 2001; Lii & Lee, 
2012; Webb & Mohr, 1998). An important source of skepticism may be that all CSR activities are 
motivated by both a corporate logic and a socially responsible logic. CSR initiatives often involve 
activities and goals that appear to be motivated by a socially responsible logic, such as philanthropy, 
community development, environmental conservation or social justice (Van Marrewijk, 2003). Other 
aspects of CSR are more in line with ordinary corporate logic, such as saving resources, limiting 
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waste, and evoking positive associations among employees and consumers. This tension between 
corporate and social logic is central to the present dissertation. 
The overarching research aim was to obtain more knowledge about variables that may influence the 
extent to which CSR communication is perceived as sincere. In our modern society, it seems more 
important than ever before for companies to be perceived as respectable and socially responsible 
organizations in modern society, i.e. to build a corporate reputation of social commitment (Fombrun 
& van Riel, 2003; Hooghiemstra, 2000). Nevertheless, companies that communicate their social 
responsible position face increased scrutiny and cynicism from observers (Morsing, Schultz, & 
Nielsen, 2008). Research indicates that the companies who communicate most about their social 
responsibility are also more prone to criticism of social irresponsibility, whereas companies who 
refrain from portraying themselves as socially responsible are correspondingly less criticized 
(Valentin, 2003). One of the reasons why increased attention to an organization’s social responsibility 
represents an increased  risk of public criticism may be that people respond very negatively to 
organizations who come across as deliberately false in their self-portrayal (Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 
2006; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). However, by refraining to communicate their socially 
responsible endeavors, a company faces the risk of consumers never learning about them, and 
possibly also assuming that no such efforts have been made. This represents a substantial 
opportunity cost for socially responsible organizations. A key challenge is to make it known, and 
acknowledged by the public, that the company is dedicated to a path of social responsibility, and that 
this dedication is really felt by the members of the organization, rather than just being a marketing 
tactic. Put differently, the challenge of CSR communication is to come across as sincere. 
Past research has indicated that perceptions of sincerity are among the most important factors that 
mediate the relationship between CSR initiatives and the public’s response to them (Du, 
Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010). Nevertheless, the research on how perceptions of sincerity can be 
elicited in CSR communication settings is very limited (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Andreasen, 1994). The 
present dissertation does not attempt to provide a comprehensive list of all antecedents to 
perceptions of sincerity in CSR communication. Rather, it explores three selected variables 
hypothesised to be relevant to perceptions of sincerity but which are yet underexplored in research 
on CSR communication and persuasion. One of these variables relates to the message itself (i.e., 
“framing and numerosity and quality of claims”, Paper 1), one relates to the life circumstances of the 
leader (i.e., “mortality awareness”, Paper 2), and one relates to the perceived decision style of the 
leader (i.e., “cognitive decision style”, Paper 3).  
The main research question was:  
• How is the perception of CSR initiatives influenced by variables relating to properties of the 
message itself, the life circumstances of the leader, and the perceived decision style of the leader? 
The three research questions explored in the three respective papers were: 
1. How is the perception of CSR initiatives influenced by framing and numerosity and quality of 
claims? (Paper 1) 
2. How is the perception of CSR initiatives influenced by the perceived motive of the leader, when 
this is presented as being related to mortality awareness? (Paper 2) 
3. How is the perception of CSR initiatives influenced by the extent to which the decision style of the 
leader is presented as being characterized by different levels of cognitive spontaneity? (Paper 3) 
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The main purpose was to test whether and how each of the selected variables can increase or 
decrease perceptions of sincerity in CSR communication, and thus improve or deteriorate the general 
impression of the CSR initiatives, and the organization that implements them. The most important 
common message from all three studies is that perceived motives are key psychological mechanisms 
through which CSR communication is processed. Both attributions regarding communicative 
intentions (i.e. ‘why is this person telling me this’) and organizational motives (i.e. ‘why are they 
doing this’), play an important role in the relationship between communicated CSR initiatives and 
people’s reception of them. However, the known metaphorical ‘toolkit’ for adjusting people’s 
attributions is very limited. While it seems fair to conclude that these attributions matter (Ellen, et 
al., 2006), less is known about how negative attributions can be avoided, and positive attributions 
can be achieved. Each of the papers in this dissertation present a mechanism for adjusting people’s 
attributions of communicated CSR initiatives.  
The three papers draw on literature from both social, - and moral psychology, as well from the areas 
of marketing and management. Including research from psychology in CSR communication does not 
only result in improved knowledge about how to successfully communicate CSR initiatives, it also 
allows for testing of psychological theories in novel settings. The three psychological variables that 
are tested in this dissertation have not yet been fully explored in persuasion settings. The first paper 
that makes up this dissertation explores the role of positively versus negatively framed arguments 
about CSR. While the difference between positively and negatively framed information has been 
studied extensively within the judgement and decision making tradition (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), the implications of this knowledge in persuasion settings are not fully 
understood. Paper 2 is concerned with how presenting oneself as acutely aware of one’s mortality 
may increase sincerity perceptions. While a substantial literature has explored how reminders of 
mortality and death affects human beings (see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), less is known 
about how we perceive and interpret the decisions of others, in cases where we believe that the 
person we are observing is acutely aware of her own mortality. Put differently, even though the 
effects of mortality primes are fairly well understood, people’s lay theories about the relationship 
between mortality and motivation have received less attention. Paper 3 explores how claiming to 
have reached a decision through different cognitive styles may affect sincerity perceptions. While 
some recent studies suggest that we perceive spontaneous thoughts to be more revealing of 
sincerely held values and beliefs, relative to deliberate thoughts (see Morewedge, Giblin, & Norton, 
2014), the persuasive appeal generated by a leader who makes decisions in a cognitively 
spontaneous manner is underexplored. Thus, a secondary purpose of the dissertation was to 
increase our theoretical understanding of these psychological constructs from the point of view of 
persuasion research. However, the most important contribution of all the papers is to include 
findings from social and moral psychology into our understanding of how perceptions of sincerity can 
be elicited in CSR communication. This is not merely an academic endeavor. As companies are 
investing more and more in CSR activities (Olsen, Slotegraaf, & Chandukala, 2014), combined with 
the fact that sincerity perceptions have been established as a key condition for success with such 
activities (Beckman, Colwell, & Cunningham, 2009; Fassin & Buelens, 2011), it is important to explore 
how CSR communication can be conducted in a manner that evokes sincerity perceptions. The 
present dissertation combines the lessons from three such explorations.  
2. Conceptual framework 
Figure 1 displays the conceptual framework that visualizes the different variables and their 
relationships in this dissertation. This framework consists of all the variables included across all three 
papers. As such, it is not to be interpreted as a directly testable, statistical model, but rather a 
descriptive visualization of the overall contribution of the dissertation. On the very left in the 
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framework are the manipulated variables that were explored in the three papers. On the very right 
are the ultimate outcome variables, namely the ones that relate directly to the concept of attracting 
and retaining support from consumers and other stakeholders. In the lower part of the middle are 
the two attribution concepts; perceived communicative intention and motivational attribution. As 
mentioned, the three papers present evidence suggesting that these attributions are the 
psychological mechanisms through which the differently communicated CSR initiatives are 
processed. In the top middle of the figure are the proposed moderators. As the proposed 
communicative tactics (i.e. manipulated variables) were expected to produce effects conditional on 
the personality traits of the observers, two dispositional traits are positioned as moderators between 
the manipulated variables and the ultimate outcome variables. The conceptual framework of this 
dissertation is represented in figure 1.  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework displays all the central concepts/variables addressed in this dissertation, 
and the proposed relationship between them. In the following I present and explain these concepts, 
as well as their role in the conceptual framework. The constructs will be explained from right to left, 
starting with ultimate outcome variables, mediating psychological mechanisms, moderating 
dispositional traits, and finally, the manipulated variables.  
3. Ultimate outcome variables:  
The ultimate outcome variables are highlighted by the green square in Figure 1. The ultimate 
outcome variables in all three experiments were different varieties of persuasion. Persuasion, and 
the related concept of compliance gaining, refers to the process whereby one person attempts to 
alter the thoughts, feelings, attitudes and/behavior of another person. Historically, the literature on 
persuasion has focused mostly on mass-communications, such as advertising and propaganda, 
whereas the compliance-gaining literature has explored the same phenomenon within a smaller-
scale interpersonal setting. Historically, many researchers have agreed that the compliance gaining 
literature in psychology started with the pioneering work of Gerald Miller (Wilson & Greene, 1997). 
Other infamous researchers, such as Stanley Milgram, Solomon Asch and Robert Cialdini has 
furthered this line of inquiry into the dynamics of interpersonal influence (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 
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2012). The essence of compliance gaining is to make other people perform or reject certain 
behaviors by using different behavioral, social or strategic tactics (Wheeless, Barraclough, Stewart, & 
Bostrom, 1983). Focusing more on mass-communications, the persuasion literature has been more 
concerned with how different characteristics of the message, the sender, the channel, and the 
receivers of the message interact to produce different evaluative outcomes (Perloff, 2010). This 
dissertation can be placed partly within the fields of compliance gaining and persuasion, as Paper 1 
explores evaluative artifacts in a hypothetical one-on-one interaction. However, it can also be placed 
within the general persuasion tradition, as Papers 2 and 3 use fictitious interview settings as the 
backdrop. According to Elsbach and Sutton (1992), organizations use a variety of impression 
management techniques to project images, and to reinforce and build reputations and identities to 
create an impression of social responsibility towards social groups and stakeholders to legitimize 
their actions. These techniques include verbal accounts, categorizations, symbolic behavior and 
physical markers (Elsbach, 2003). This dissertation aims to add a further contribution to our 
understanding of how psychological variables influences the efficacy of such verbal accounts and 
symbolic behaviors. 
4. Perceived sincerity 
It has long been established that human beings have an innate and automatic tendency to interpret 
and attempt to understand the cause of behavior, both that of others and our own (Bem, 1967; 
Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1985). This kind of causal ascription, termed 
attribution, is central to this dissertation. Specifically, attributions regarding communicative 
intentions and attributions regarding motivation for the CSR initiatives themselves, were 
hypothesized to be the central mechanisms through which CSR initiatives would lead to different 
evaluations. I have labeled the combination of these two sets of attributions; perceived sincerity. The 
content of the green square in Figure 2 is a visual representation of the combined construct of 
perceived sincerity in this dissertation. 
Figure 2. Communicative intention and perceived motive make up the concept of perceived sincerity 
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There are several definitions of sincerity. According to the Oxford Dictionary, sincere can be defined 
as; “free from pretense or deceit; proceeding from genuine feelings”, or, when stated of a person; 
“saying what they genuinely feel or believe; not dishonest or hypocritical”. Merriam-Webster defines 
sincere as; “free of dissimulation (honest); free from adulteration (pure), marked by genuineness 
(true)”. Trilling (1972, p. 2) defines it as “congruence between avowal and actual feeling”. The 
common denominator in all these definitions is the notion of being genuine, true, and pure of mind. 
Sincerity, and the related concept of authenticity, have become widely used concepts in the 
marketing literature. Although consensus regarding definition remains absent, both constructs relate 
to the perception that an object, person, message or action is real, genuine or true. Attempts have 
been made to define and measure authenticity in communication (Molleda, 2010). Perceptions of 
sincerity entail believing that a persons’ behavior is in accordance with their actual belief system. 
Popular culture is replete with tropes relating to the concept of sincerity, such as saying what you 
believe and believing what you say, being/keeping it real, and the ubiquitous ‘we care’. A vast 
literature, stretching across philosophy (C. Taylor, 1991), literature (Trilling, 1972), folk-lore studies 
(Bendix, 2009), social anthropology (Lindholm, 2008) and moral and social psychology (Baumeister, 
1982; Gecas, 1986), suggests that human beings have a natural tendency to favor people who act in 
accordance with their own values, and distrust people who display inconsistencies between values 
and behavior, or whose values can be easily bent or usurped by external forces.  
As mentioned, our knowledge regarding the mechanisms through which CSR initiatives lead to 
different outcomes for the organization is still quite limited (Enderle & Murphy, 2009; Maignan & 
Ferrell, 2004; Peloza, 2009; Peloza & Shang, 2011). Perceptions of sincerity is arguably one of the few 
known mediators between CSR initiatives and public reactions (Du, et al., 2010; Fassin & Buelens, 
2011; Kim & Lee, 2012; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). An increasing number of research 
findings indicate that CSR initiatives that are seen as insincere are reacted upon negatively, while 
those that appear to stem from sincere caring produce positive reactions. The literature on CSR 
perception has identified some of the key drivers of sincerity perceptions. Two of the major drivers 
are company reputation, and the quality of fit between the company and the CSR activities (Becker-
Olsen, Cudmore, & Hill, 2006; Elving, 2013; Simmons & Becker-Olsen, 2006). In general, CSR activities 
that are perceived as congruent with the company values, and centered within the company sphere 
of interests, are seen as more sincere, and evaluated more favorably than incongruent CSR platforms 
(Ellen, et al., 2006). Furthermore, companies with good corporate reputations are perceived as more 
sincere in their CSR endeavors than companies with bad reputations, and/or companies in so-called 
‘sinful industries’ such as weapons and tobacco (Frynas, 2005; Palazzo & Richter, 2005; Yoon, et al., 
2006). Conditioned on the presence of available informational cues, low resource-commitment, low 
emotional engagement and lack of embeddedness of CSR perspective in the day to day operations of 
the company are all known antecedents of negative evaluations of CSR, presumably because these 
factors indicate that the CSR initiatives are not sincerely believed in by the company (McShane & 
Cunningham, 2012). Acquiring or imitating best practice CSR measures from other actors may also 
lead to perceptions of insincerity, especially at the early stages of implementation (Debeljak, Krkac, & 
Bušljeta Banks, 2011; Windsor, 2013). Focusing on cultivating positive CSR attitudes among 
employees in order to ensure that the corporation comes across as unified in their CSR approach, is 
another way to potentially increase perceptions of sincerity among observers in the general public 
(Morsing, et al., 2008). Similarly, organizational behavior studies have demonstrated that 
commitment from supervisors to CSR is an important predictor of CSR engagement (Greening & Gray, 
1994; Muller & Kolk, 2010). One of the reasons why CSR fails to produce engagement in cases where 
managers seem uncommitted to the CSR platform may be that the employing organization comes 
across as insincere in their CSR communication. Reactive CSR initiatives, that is initiatives that seem 
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to be motivated by external forces and expectations rather than intrinsic values, do not lead to 
positive evaluation (Groza, Pronschinske, & Walker, 2011). Similarly, CSR initiatives that seem to be 
profit-motivated receive negative evaluation (Becker-Olsen, et al., 2006). Corporations who 
communicate environmentally friendly CSR policies that come across as mainly profit-motivated also 
face the risk of coming across as less sincere, and thus receive negative reactions (de Vries, Terwel, 
Ellemers, & Daamen, 2013).  
In this dissertation, sincerity is operationalized specifically to perceptions of CSR communication. The 
combined construct consists of two sets of attributions made by the receivers of CSR communication. 
The first set of attributions pertains to perceived communicative intention. Put in plain terms, this 
attribution is represented by the implicit question ‘why are they telling us this?’, or ‘why is she telling 
me this?’, depending on context. When faced with a corporate communication, people will often 
attempt to understand whether or not the deliberate intention of the communicator is to persuade 
them in any direction (Friestad & Wright, 1994). In some cases, receivers of CSR communication may 
realize that the communicators’ intention is to persuade them. That realization is typically referred to 
as persuasion knowledge. In other cases, the receivers may perceive that the intention of the 
communicator is merely to inform. These evaluations, i.e. persuasion knowledge and perceived 
informational intent, are strongly associated with different overall evaluations (Campbell & Kirmani, 
2008). The second set of attributions pertain to perception of motive, with regards to the CSR 
decision itself. Put in plain terms, this set of possible attributions is represented by the implicit 
question ‘why are they doing this?’. When a leader makes a decision that serves multiple ends, 
aspects pertaining to the leader, setting, medium and style of communication may affect the saliency 
of different motivations. Sincerity of motivation will in this sense entail that followers believe that 
the managerial decision is primarily motivated by the socially responsible logic that the leader 
communicates. Perceptions of insincerity, on the other hand, is manifest when followers attribute 
the decision to ulterior motives. The next two sections provide a presentation of the past theoretical 
and empirical work that describes the two sets of attributions that make up the concept of sincerity 
perceptions according to the theoretical perspective presented here.   
4.1 Perception of communicative intention  
The first psychological mechanism described in this dissertation is perception of communicative 
intention. In order to convey a sense of sincerity when communicating about CSR, the individual 
needs to be adept at psychologically strategic communication. The ability to communicate 
strategically is a significant social-cognitive skill. In order to successfully engage in strategic 
communication, individuals not only need access to the information that is to be communicated, but 
also access to ideas regarding how others will perceive this information, and how different 
presentations of the information may elicit different impressions in others. Developmental 
psychologists refer to this meta-representational capacity as ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985). As children grow older, they develop their ability to understand the workings of other 
people’s minds in a more sophisticated manner. As a consequence, they acquire the ability to 
deceive and lie, as well as the understanding that others may lie or misrepresent the truth (McAlister 
& Cornwell, 2009; Sodian, 1991; Wright, Friestad, & Boush, 2005). Understanding deception, both in 
terms of using it and realizing that others may have deceptive intentions, is one of the important 
factors when learning to communicate persuasively and strategically (Slaughter, Peterson, & Moore, 
2013). It should be noted that although in this dissertation, the antecedents and consequences of 
different strategic communications are studied through carefully executed experiments, real-life 
development and maintenance of strategic communication skills presumably comes about through 
experience and mental simulation, to the point that it becomes an automatized social skill (Bargh & 
Williams, 2006). 
13 
 
A natural consequence of learning that other people are able to deliberately hide or misrepresent 
their true mental content, is skepticism (Boush, Friestad, & Rose, 1994). Skepticism entails the 
tendency to doubt the truthfulness of the claims put forth by others. There is substantial variation 
between individuals in how pronounced this tendency is (Calfee & Ringold, 1994; Obermiller & 
Spangenberg, 1998). The degree of skepticism people exhibit also depends on their views of the 
source of the communication. When subjected to traditional marketing, people are especially aware 
of the persuasive intentions of the source of the message, and they therefore attempt to include 
their knowledge of this intention in their overall evaluation of the object (Friestad & Wright, 1994). 
According to the persuasion knowledge model, people attempt to hold valid attitudes towards all 
evaluated objects. When the source of a message is perceived as having persuasive intentions, 
people attempt to cope with the persuasive content by adjusting their impression accordingly. This 
type of psychological coping reaction is simply formulated by Campbell and Kirmani (2008, p. 549) as 
“I know what you’re doing and why you are doing it”.  A more exhaustive list of factors pertaining to 
persuasion knowledge can be paraphrased from Friestad and Wright (1994). According to the 
authors, persuasion knowledge can be surmised as a set interrelated beliefs about; (a) the causes 
and effects of psychological events that are instrumental to persuasion, (b) the importance of those 
events, (c) the extent to which people believe they can control their responses, (d) the temporal 
course of the persuasion episode, and (e) the perceived effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
particular persuasion tactic. Friestad and Wright (1994) highlight that a complete theory of 
persuasion is one that takes into account aspects of a persuasion tactic that reveals or hides the 
persuasive intentions of the agent. So far, marketing research has identified several factors in the 
execution of a persuasion attempt that may make the effort seem heavy-handed or transparent, and 
thus elicit and increase persuasion knowledge and coping. For instance, prevention-focus or 
regulation focus in the framing of the message (Kirmani & Zhu, 2007), forced exposure (Edwards, Li, 
& Lee, 2002), attention-getting tactics (Campbell, 1995), advertising repetition (Kirmani, 1997), 
overly personalized solicitations (White, Zahay, Thorbjørnsen, & Shavitt, 2008) among others, have 
all been identified as factors that increase persuasion knowledge in targets. In CSR communication as 
well, several lessons from the persuasion knowledge literature have been adopted. For instance, 
relying on an objective third party to communicate the efforts to be socially responsible is more 
effective than having the corporation communicate the efforts directly (Doh, Howton, Howton, & 
Siegel, 2010). Part of the benefit from this approach is that the third party endorsement evokes less 
persuasion knowledge and more perceived informational intent among the observers. Another 
benefit with the endorsement model of CSR communication is that the general public may view the 
third party endorsement as stemming from an ‘elite reader’, with privileged access to information 
regarding the company’s activities, and special knowledge regarding the efficacy of different 
environmentally oriented CSR policies (Morsing & Schultz, 2006).  
4.2 Perception of motive 
The second part of the two-fold concept of sincerity is perception of organizational motives, i.e. 
perceptions of what the organization is hoping to achieve by implementing the CSR initiatives. In 
many cases, there are multiple potential motivations underlying an observed behavior. General 
management literature has noted that leaders often make decisions where the guiding motivation 
may seem ambiguous or mixed (Calder, 1977; Di Norcia & Larkins, 2000). When evaluating an 
observed decision or behavior, people not only care about what people do, but also the reasons for 
why they are doing it (Reeder, 2009; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004). Past research has 
demonstrated that employees and consumers often scrutinize the way managerial decisions are 
communicated, in order to understand what the real purpose of the decision may be (Weick, 1995). 
In some cases, peripheral cues related to how the decision is communicated may affect this 
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attribution process. Recent research within social and moral psychological has demonstrated that 
peripheral cues related to the decision maker’s behavior may signify different motives, and thus elicit 
different evaluations of a decision. A common finding is that for a behavior to be considered morally 
praiseworthy, the agent must not only have intended and brought about the action and its 
consequence, she must also have performed the act for reasons that are in themselves praiseworthy 
(Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). One colorful example of this tendency can be found in research on the 
ethical thought experiment called the “trolley problem” (see Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, 
& Mikhail, 2007), wherein people are asked to make a choice as to whether or not to kill one person 
in order to save five people who would otherwise die. In general, most people sympathize with the 
decision to sacrifice one in order to save five. However, if the decision maker states that he did not 
care about the five people he saved, he simply wanted to kill the one person, people’s approval of 
the same decision can be expected to drop substantially (Thaler, 2015). Critcher, Helzer, Tannebaum 
and Pizarro (in prep) proposed a mindreading moral principles account of evaluating moral character. 
The authors demonstrated that people attempt to mind-read agents’ moral principles by evaluating 
the mental antecedents that precede a morally motivated action. In their study, the amount of praise 
the agents received for their decisions was dependent on the extent to which the agents were 
assumed to appreciate the moral principle that would justify their decision. The task of identifying 
people’s underlying reasons and motives for their decisions is neither easy nor exact in nature. The 
contents of another person’s mind are not directly observable to us, and as a consequence, we tend 
to rely on external, observable cues when trying to infer motives (Pronin, 2008). Although individuals 
and organizations sometimes make their reasons for acting explicit and clear (i.e. “We use energy-
efficient airplanes in order to combat climate change”), such explicit statements do not necessarily 
aid the attributional process of employees and consumers, because the source of the statement may 
be considered to have a strong persuasive intention (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). As such observers 
must engage in mindreading (Critcher, et al., in prep) to make sense of why a person behaved as she 
did.  
The same processes that guide motivational attribution in social and moral situations are relevant 
when people observe CSR communication. CSR initiatives are often, by their very nature, 
ambiguously motivated (Morsing, et al., 2008), as they may bring about positive consequences to 
both the company and external parties. In some cases, spectators will see the initiatives as 
indications of authentic and underlying values (see Beckman, et al., 2009). In other cases, people 
might interpret the initiatives as financially motivated strategic policies, cloaked in an insincere claim 
of social responsibility (Laufer, 2003; Vos, 2009). Attribution to ordinary corporate motives 
represents a problem for any individual or organization wanting to promote the impression that they 
are motivated by moral values, if and when such behavior also leads to financial gain. In a capitalist 
society facing the challenge of global warming caused by CO2 emissions, and the corresponding 
regulatory consequences, the first measures that organizations can, will and should implement, are 
measures that are both financially and environmentally beneficial (Jørgensen & Pedersen, 2013). 
However, in all CSR communication, observers are left with the challenge of motivational attribution, 
i.e. ascribing the real reason why these initiatives are made. A main finding from CSR research thus 
far is that both the public as well as employees, prefer endeavors that seemingly stem from sincere, 
appreciation of the logic of social responsibility (Beckman, et al., 2009; Debeljak, et al., 2011; 
McShane & Cunningham, 2012).  
 
5. Moderators: Dispositional cynicism and reactance 
Aside from measuring the perceptions of sincerity, all three papers included measures of individual 
difference variables, that were hypothesized to be relevant. As people are known to differ in their 
propensity for different thoughts and behaviors, the inclusion of personality constructs is an 
important part of a complete psychological theory (Lewin, 1939). It follows from this assertion that 
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any study of psychological phenomena may benefit from the inclusion of measurement of 
personality traits. The traits measured in the experiments that make up this dissertation were 
expected to function as moderators. In other words, I hypothesized that certain manipulations would 
make people with a high score on a trait measure more prone to certain outcomes, while people 
with a low score on the same trait measure would be prone to the opposite outcome. This general 
assertion is in line with past research, suggesting that differences in psychological needs determine 
individual engagement in CSR (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007). The next two sections 
provide a description of the traits that were presumed to act as moderators of the relationship 
between differently communicated CSR initiatives and subsequent reactions and evaluations. 
5.1 Dispositional reactance 
In Paper 1, the outcome measures could be seen as falling within the category of compliance gaining. 
As such, we predicted that the different approaches would lead to different outcomes, depending on 
the participants level of dispositional reactance (Hong & Page, 1989). Reactance is defined as a 
motivational drive directed toward the reestablishment of threatened or eliminated personal 
freedoms (Brehm, 1966). Individuals have been found to vary substantially with regards to how 
prone they are to experience such threats, and how strongly they react towards them (Miron & 
Brehm, 2006). We predicted that this individual difference would prove important when 
understanding the mechanisms that lead to successful CSR communication in a compliance gaining 
setting.  
5.2 Dispositional cynicism 
The tendency to attribute seemingly value-oriented behaviors to ulterior motives can be referred to 
as cynicism (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). Cynical attribution styles are characterized by suspecting self-
serving and egocentric motivations to be the cause of seemingly noble and value-oriented behaviors. 
One example of such attributions may be how people think about the motivation of politicians. While 
some might infer that a given politician is motivated by ideological conviction, sense of responsibility 
and a desire to improve society, others may infer that salary, power-hunger, possible fame and a 
subsequent career as a highly paid consultant are the key motivations behind the decision to go into 
politics. A possibly more banal example could be a person donating money to a homeless person on 
the street. While some bystanders may view the behavior as heartfelt altruism, a more cynical 
attribution would be that the giver is merely ‘window-dressing’ her kindness and moral character in 
order to obtain other benefits. Kanter and Mirvis (1989) claim that the tendency to infer such ulterior 
motives varies substantially between individuals and cultures.  
6. Manipulated variables: 
The outcome variables, psychological mechanisms and dispositional traits constitute the common 
factors in the three papers. Lastly, I will present and elaborate on the manipulated variables in the 
dissertation (see Figure 3). As mentioned, the list of manipulated variables was never intended to be 
exhaustive. Rather, it lists three separate variables that have been explored within social psychology, 
but never explored in a CSR communication setting. Each presentation of manipulated variables will 
be followed by a table summarizing the past key findings, and the specific research questions that 
were addressed and answered.  
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Figure 3. The manipulated variables 
 
 
6.1. Framing, number, and quality of claims 
The manipulated variable in Paper 1 was framing, i.e. positive vs. negative persuasion. Positive 
persuasion, was defined as endeavors to make someone or something appear good or virtuous. 
Conversely, negative persuasion was defined as attempting to make other people believe that 
someone or something is bad or immoral. In the first paper, we explored how the numbers of claims 
(i.e. the number of arguments, claims or pieces of relevant information), plays different roles in 
positively and negatively framed persuasion attempts. We also explored the persuasion effects of 
different qualities of claims in positive and negative persuasion.  
A large number of studies have addressed how the number of claims affect the outcome of a 
persuasion attempt. The idea that additional positive information increases liking has been largely 
supported in psychological research impression formation. Stewart (1965) found that when 
participants are presented with a description of a person consisting of one, two, three or four 
positive traits, the liking of the person increased monotonically with each positive trait. This finding 
and others led to the conclusion that the impression of a person becomes more favorable with each 
positive claim. Anderson (1967) referred to this effect as the “set-size effect”. In persuasion research, 
studies of the effect of different amounts of persuasive information has generally confirmed the 
finding made by Stewart (1965) and Anderson (1967). Pelham, Sumatra et al. (1994) refer to the 
positive relationship between amount of persuasive information and persuasion as the numerosity 
effect. The numerosity effect states that as a default, the more persuasive information a message 
contains, up to some reasonable limit, the more persuaded people tend to be (see Calder, 1978; 
Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; Chaiken, 1980; Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Norman, 1976). In Paper 1, 
we referred to this inflection point, after which more information of the same valence no longer 
causes changes in attitude, as the point of “satiety”. The key question in the research on the optimal 
number of claims in persuasion is how many claims are needed before informational satiety is 
achieved. Shu and Carlson (2014) demonstrated that the point of “satiety”, i.e., the optimal amount 
of claims used in persuasion, was three. In all their reported experiments, persuasion attempts that 
consisted of three claims outperformed persuasion attempts consisting of one, two, four, five or six 
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claims. The authors argued that the reason why the point of satiety was found to be at three claims, 
was that three is a psychologically satisfying number. The authors noted that the observed drop in 
persuasiveness that followed the introduction of a fourth claim was due to a corresponding increase 
in persuasion knowledge.  
 
Part of the reason why over-communication can hamper persuasion may be that when more claims 
are added, some of the claims are perceived as relatively weak, or less relevant than the others. 
Including irrelevant information has been proven to reduce the persuasiveness of a message. Nisbett, 
Zukier et al. (1981) refer to this phenomenon as the dilution effect. Dilution effect is defined as: “A 
judgment bias in which the presence of non-diagnostic cues, when processed along with diagnostic 
cues, causes a judge to under-weigh the diagnostic cues” (Waller & Zimbelman, 2003, p. 254). 
Dilution effects have been documented across many disciplines and research-settings (see Ettenson, 
Shanteau, & Jack, 1987; Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002; Smith, Stasson, & Hawkes, 1998; Tetlock & 
Boettger, 1989). Field experiments in economics have documented similar phenomena, referred to 
as “less is better” or “more is less” effects (Hsee, 1998; List, 2002). In these experiments, bundles of 
high-quality objects have been shown to elicit higher willingness to pay than the same bundles are 
presented, but with the addition of some lower quality objects. The use of relatively low-quality/low-
relevance claims in conjunction with high-quality claims may be one factor that makes persuasive 
intent seem more heavy-handed and transparent, which in turn may increase persuasion knowledge, 
and thus reduce overall persuasion. In a CSR communication study, De Vries, Trewel et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that dilution effects were only manifest in positive persuasion, and only when 
combining highly relevant and irrelevant information.  
 
Taken together, the literature on the number and quality of claims in persuasion can be summarized 
in terms of four main findings. Firstly, increasing the number of claims leads to incremental increase 
in persuasion, up to a point of satiety. Secondly, the point of satiety, after which further claims no 
longer increases persuasion, is reached earlier when the target perceives the agent as having 
persuasive intent. Thirdly, increasing the number of claims can increase the likelihood that the agent 
is perceived as having persuasive intent. And finally, adding weak claims to bundles of strong claims 
can dilute the overall persuasiveness of the communication. An important gap in this research is that 
almost all these findings stem from experiments in positive persuasion, i.e. persuading others to 
believe that something or someone is good. Less is known about the effect of different numbers and 
qualities of claims in negatively framed persuasion.  
 
Demonstrations of an asymmetry between positive and negative in perception and judgment has 
long been a topic of interests in psychology (for example Peeters, 1971). The work of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) on this topic was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2002. One of the 
novelties of their Prospect Theory was that it stated an explicit asymmetry in the perception of 
positive and negative events. In human judgement, small losses are perceived as subjectively more 
painful than corresponding gains are perceived as pleasurable, relative to a neutral baseline. This 
general pattern has later been observed in a number of research findings, across a wide range of 
settings (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The tendency to put more emphasis on 
negatively framed stimuli has been dubbed the negativity effect, positive-negative asymmetry and 
negativity bias. Baumeister, Bratslavsky et al. (2001) summarized the findings on the asymmetry 
between positively and negatively framed information as “Bad is stronger than good”. Considering 
the body of research on good vs. bad perception and judgments (for reviews, see  Baumeister, et al., 
2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), there is good reason to suspect that the dynamics of evaluating 
negative claims are different from those of positive claims. In terms of evolutionary psychology, 
individuals who spend less time and require less information in order to classify an event, person or 
object as bad may have an adaptive advantage. The consequences of failing to detect a pattern in the 
negative domain are often more severe than the consequence of type 1 errors perceiving a pattern 
where there is none. For instance, people who required great persuasive efforts to believe certain 
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foods are dangerous would historically have had an adaptive disadvantage, compared to those who 
were more easily persuaded. The consequences of not being persuaded in such a setting could be a 
serious health risk, while the consequences of being persuaded would normally only involve the 
removal of one of many sources of nutrition from the environment. As such, it can be argued that 
evolution has favored the general human tendency to be more easily persuaded by negatively 
framed persuasive appeals than positively framed persuasion. There are also cultural traces of 
negativity bias. In literature-studies, the “tragic flaw”, or Hamartia, has been a familiar concept since 
the Greek dramas. The tragic flaw typically consists of a single failing or moral transgression that 
brings about the demise of the otherwise admirable character (Sherman, 1992). Social 
anthropologists studying notions of purity and contamination in different cultures have noted a 
negativity bias in that purity is conceived of as difficult to reach and maintain, while a single act of 
contagion will instantly render the entire person contaminated (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Research in 
social and moral psychology has demonstrated that evaluative negative information is weighted 
more heavily than positive information in overall evaluations (Kanouse & Hanson, 1971). This effect 
is especially relevant when evaluations entail affective reactions (Lewicka, Czapinski, & Peeters, 
1992). Continuing the general ‘bad is stronger than good’ finding into corporate ethics research, 
Creyer (1997) found that consumers are willing to purchase from unethical companies, but they 
expect a substantial reduction in prices. The willingness to pay for products from unethical, normal 
and ethical companies respectively, correspond to the curve of prospect theory, in which minor 
ethical violations are weighted more heavily than corresponding minor ethical advances. 
 
If humans generally pay more attention to negative events and react with stronger emotion towards 
negative events (both compared to a positive event of the same impact), it stands to reason that the 
role of numbers and quality of claims could be different in positive and negative persuasion. Paper 1 
tests this prediction. The main research question raised in this paper was how the perception of CSR 
initiatives is influenced by framing, amount, and quality of claims. Table 1 displays a summary of the 
key past findings, and the research questions (RQ) that are motivated by this research. 
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Table 1. Key findings and corresponding specific research questions 
Past key findings: 
 
In positive persuasion, messages consisting of 
three claims is more persuasive than messages 
consisting of less or more than three claims. 
 
Shu & Carlson, 2014 
In positive persuasion, persuasion knowledge 
increases when more than three claims are 
used. 
 
Shu & Carlson, 2014 
Negative events are more painful than 
corresponding positive events are pleasurable. 
 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 
People pay more attention to negative 
information than positive information. 
 
Baumeister, et al., 2001 
People place a higher emphasis on negative 
information than positive information. 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001 
  
Specific Research Questions:  
 
1. What are the effects of different numbers of claims in negative persuasion? 
 
2. What are the effects of adding diluting (poor quality) claims in negative persuasion? 
 
 
6.2. Mortality awareness 
In existential psychology, scholars such as May (1999; May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1994) and Yalom 
(1980, 2008) have long promoted the philosophical connection between mortality and authenticity. 
Put crudely, their argument states that as humans are faced with awareness of their own mortality, 
they face ontological anxiety and sense of isolation. The solution to this anxiety is ontological 
freedom, and the search for authenticity in life. This line of thinking has inspired terror management 
theory (TMT), a literature that empirically explores the consequences of thinking about death and 
dying (see Burke, et al., 2010). As sincerity and authenticity can be said to be overlapping constructs 
(Trilling, 1972), and authenticity has been linked to mortality across several fields, Paper 2 represents 
an experimental exploration into how mortality awareness can alter perceptions of sincerity in CSR 
communication.   
Most of the research on mortality salience has been conducted within the framework of terror 
management theory (Burke, et al., 2010). A typical terror management experiment involves 
presenting a mortality salient prime to the participants in the experimental condition, a valid control 
stimulus to the participants in the control condition, and then looking for differences between the 
groups on relevant outcome measures. One of the key goals of terror management theory is to 
identify those defense mechanisms that allow human beings to live most of their lives seemingly 
unaffected by their knowledge of inevitable mortality, both their own and that of others. Put 
differently, terror management theory is less concerned with death-anxiety per se, than with the 
question of why and how most human beings do not succumb to constant death-anxiety. While this 
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theoretical angel may seem backwards at face value, its logic is firmly rooted in evolutionary 
psychology. The most basic tenet in evolutionary psychology is that humans have evolved to fear 
death, and have a strong desire to live. The concept of inclusive fitness (see P. D. Taylor, 1988) 
further states that humans have also evolved to dread the thought of close kin dying. At the same 
time, almost all human beings agree that our current life will end at the point of our biological death. 
The emotion of fear is a natural reaction towards any real or imaginary threat, and it is usually 
alleviated once the threat is removed (Buss, 2016). As our mortality can never be removed, only the 
momentary awareness of it, terror management claims that one or more defense mechanisms must 
be in place in order for us to be able to remove this momentary awareness (Arndt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Terror management theory has uncovered two, semi-related, 
central defense mechanisms. The first is an increased investment in one’s own cultural worldviews. 
Across a vast majority of terror management experiments, an increase in the upholding of one’s own 
cultural worldviews is an observed consequence of a mortality reminder (Greenberg et al., 1990). 
The other observed consequence of mortality reminders is increase in the need for self-esteem 
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). A third typical reaction towards death-cognitions 
observed in terror management experiments is an increase in political and ideological conservativism 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Personality studies in political psychology indicate that a 
high need for order and predictability predicts conservative political attitudes. It is thus theorized 
that the anxiety caused by momentary mortality awareness increases the need for order and 
predictability, causing a stronger embrace of conservative values. 
 
The main prediction of Paper 2 was that a leader who seems aware of her own mortality when she 
decides to impose financially and environmentally beneficial corporate policies, will come across as 
less motivated by the corporate logic associated with CSR, and more motivated by the social 
responsibility logic associated with CSR. The idea that awareness of mortality may be related to 
changes in the priority of financial gains is far from novel. All five major religions present reminders 
of how material riches loose meaning in the face of mortality. The classical literary character 
Ebenezer Scrooge, as described by Charles Dickens, illustrate how materials riches loose value in the 
face of mortality. Terminal patients, and people who have had near-death experiences, typically 
report experiences of devaluating the meaning of material possessions (Kinnier, Tribbensee, Rose, & 
Vaughan, 2001; Ware, 2011). However, while philosophy and literature point solely towards a 
decrease in extrinsic motivation as consequence of mortality reminders, TMT experiments offer 
more complex results. In general, TMT research suggests that mortality primes typically produce an 
amplification in the defense of whatever themes that are considered personally and/or culturally 
important by the person exposed to the mortality prime (Arndt, et al., 1997; Fritsche & Häfner, 2012; 
Fritsche, Jonas, Kayser, & Koranyi, 2010; Vess & Arndt, 2008). Kosloff and Greenberg (2009) found 
that participants exposed to a mortality prime gave higher importance ratings for a high priority 
extrinsic goal. The authors argued that such effects may arise because the affirmation of personally 
important extrinsic goals can lead to higher self-esteem and defense of the sources of meaning in 
life. For people who see extrinsic pursuits are the central theme in their cultural worldview, and/or 
the prominent source of positive self-esteem, mortality primes typically induces an increased 
investment in those extrinsic pursuits (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & Sheldon, 2004).  
 
While some research has focused on the link between mortality salience and the elicitation of 
different motivations, I was able to find no empirical studies of whether and how mortality salience 
can affect the motivational attribution of other people’s behavior. Whereas most TMT research 
focuses on how people respond when primed with reminders of their own mortality, Paper 2 
explored how an CEO is perceived, when that CEO claims to have been made more acutely aware of 
her own mortality. To the very best of my knowledge, people’s attributional tendencies towards 
people with elevated mortality awareness had not previously been described in the literature. 
However, past research has demonstrated that people often infer that the motivational processes 
they experience, mirror the motivational processes that govern the behavior of others (Reeder & 
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Trafimow, 2005). Accordingly, the predictions made in Paper 2 were based on TMT research. The 
main research question raised in this paper was how the perception of CSR initiatives is influenced by 
the life circumstances of the leader, when this is presented as being related to mortality awareness 
vs. not. Table 2 displays a summary of the past key findings and corresponding specific research 
questions that are motivated by this research. 
 
Table 2. Key findings and corresponding specific research questions  
 
Past key findings: 
 
 
When reminded of their own mortality, people 
are more inclined to defend their cultural values 
and self esteem 
 
Pyszczynski, et al., 1999 
When reminded of their own mortality, people 
have a tendency to imbue everyday actions 
with personal meaning 
 
Burke, et al., 2010 
Just after a mortality reminder, people trivialize 
the pusuit of material/financial gains 
 
Kosloff & Greenberg, 2009 
People who place a high priority on 
material/financial goal attainment will increase 
their investments in those pursuits after a 
mortality reminder 
Arndt, et al., 2004 
  
Specific Research Questions:  
 
4. Does mortality awareness make a leader come across as more sincere? 
 
5. Will a leader who seems aware of her mortality come across as more sincere, even if she is 
known to place a high emphasis on financial gains? 
 
 
6.3. Cognitive decision style 
The topic of inquiry in Paper 3 was how different levels of perceived sincerity are elicited by different 
claimed cognitive decision styles. Accumulated evidence from cognitive psychology, developmental 
psychology and social psychology suggests that there must be at least more than one system of 
thought and mental events (Gilbert, 1999). According to Kahnemans (2011) 2-system theory, there 
are two distinct systems of thought, one fast and automated (i.e. System 1), and one slow and 
deliberate (i.e. System 2). Mental processes such as perception, heuristic-based decision-making and 
automated behaviors are typically thought to be governed by System 1, while willful deliberation is 
thought to be governed by System 2. While System 1 usually produces behaviors and decisions that 
are correct and adaptive (Gigerenzer & Dahlem, 2001), it is prone to systematic bias in some cases. 
System 2 is thought to be less prone to unconscious bias, but using this system is resource 
demanding. 
Rational deliberation is typically thought of as the best approach to decision making (Norton, Kupor, 
Tormala, & Rucker, 2013). In traditional economics, the decision maker is expected to carefully weigh 
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all relevant factors, in order to come up with the decision that maximizes utility (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Similarly, in the academic field of law, actors are urged to carefully deliberate 
on the application of a multitude of higher,- and lower order legal principles to the concrete case at 
hand (Frank, 1931). Although some research has been done to explore the potential for making 
better or worse decision through different cognitive styles, little is known about how people perceive 
decisions that stem from different types of cognition. In Paper 3, the manipulated variable was how 
spontaneous or deliberate the thinking that allegedly preceded a decision was claimed to have been. 
The decision in question was the implementation of CSR initiatives that were both financially and 
environmentally beneficial.  
People are generally able to control only a part of their cognitive processes. Willful deliberation is an 
example of a consciously controlled form of cognition. In the opposite end of the perceived 
controllability spectrum, are spontaneous thoughts, dreams, mental content elicited by hypnosis or 
under intoxication, and other forms of seemingly uncontrollable mental events (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006). Spontaneous thoughts occur frequently in everyday life. They are the output of a 
broad category of uncontrolled and inaccessible higher-order mental processes (Morewedge, et al., 
2014). Although they seem to arise randomly, people tend to believe that their random thoughts and 
intuitions reveal more meaningful self-insights than their deliberate thoughts. People also seem to 
trust their spontaneously occurring intuitions and gut feelings to a very high degree (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010), even in cases where there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that these intuitions are wrong (Frederick, 2005; Kruger, Wirtz, & Miller, 2005). History 
provides ample examples of decisions accredited to spontaneous forms of cognition. For instance, 
many important events and discoveries have been accredited to dreams. Examples include, but are 
not limited to, Descartes scientific method, Kekulé’s discovery of the chemical structure of Benzene, 
and James Watsons discovery of the double-helix shape of DNA. Similarly, intuition is allegedly the 
precursor of several events with profound historical ramifications. The first line in the second 
paragraph of the United States’ Declaration of Independence contains what some scholars interpret 
as an admission of relying on intuition, as it details what the authors consider “self-evident” truths 
regarding human rights (Haidt, 2013). So accrediting decisions to other kinds of thinking than willful 
deliberation is not a novel approach. Research demonstrates that people make use of spontaneous 
thoughts in their own judgement and decision making, and that they place a great deal of confidence 
in the decisions that derive from spontaneously arising forms of cognition.  
As spontaneous thoughts are often considered less strategically oriented than willful deliberation, 
people often perceive them as revealing honest and meaningful characteristics (Morewedge, Giblin, 
& Norton, 2014). Morewedge, et al., (2014) demonstrated that people experience a higher degree of 
self-insight from spontaneous thoughts than from deliberate cognition. The authors claimed that it is 
the lack of control over,- and access to the processes by which they arise that leads people to 
perceive spontaneous thoughts as revealing meaningful self-insight. The tendency to see 
spontaneous thoughts as indicative of sincerely held values may work similarly in the perception of 
others as it does in self-perception (Merritt & Monin, 2011). Recent research has demonstrated that 
we think we learn more about other peoples’ preferences from their speedy decisions, relative to 
their slow decisions (Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014). For instance, Critcher, Inbar and 
Pizarro (2013) found that when participants observed decision makers, quick decisions were taken as 
indications of certainty. Perceptions of certainty in decision making led observers to infer that more 
unambiguous motives drove the observed behavior. Similarly, Evans, Dillon and Rand (2014) found 
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fast responses in economic games to be associated with extremes of motivations, whereas slower 
responses were associated with combinations of motivations. Although these studies used decision-
time rather than decision style as the manipulated variable, they still inform the theoretical basis of 
Paper 3.  
 
Based on the presented research, we hypothesized that when a leader presents ambiguously 
motivated CSR initiatives, different claims of cognitive spontaneity may increase or decrease 
followers tendency to attribute the decision to different motivations, and perceive different 
communicative intentions. Although academic work in this area remains limited, it is conceivable 
that people perceive spontaneous thoughts as signaling sincere and unfiltered motivations (Giblin, 
Morewedge, & Norton, 2013; Inbar, Cone, & Gilovich, 2010; Merritt & Monin, 2011; Morewedge, et 
al., 2014). We therefore expected that a decision maker who claimed to have relied on a somewhat 
spontaneous decision style to come across as more sincere. If peoples’ lay theories about the nature 
of different styles of thinking suggests that the social responsibility logic behind CSR is intuitively 
accessible, while the appreciation of the corporate logic behind such initiatives are thought to 
require a more strategic and deliberate kind of thinking, different cognitive decision styles could elicit 
different attributions to the same CSR decision. However, there are inherent limits to the amount of 
cognitive spontaneity a CEO can claim to have preceded her decision, while still coming across as 
credible. For instance, a CEO who claims to have made a big and consequential decision based on a 
‘whim’, may face the risk of coming across as less truthful when presenting the account of her own 
mental processes. Increasing the amount of claimed cognitive spontaneity past a certain point, the 
account of decision style may become unrealistic, which we suspected would induce a general 
suspicion of falsehood. Past this point, furthering the claim of spontaneity would only further the 
perception of insincerity. The main research question raised in Paper 3 was how the perception of 
CSR initiatives is influenced by the extent to which the decision style of the leader is presented as 
being characterized by different levels of cognitive spontaneity. Table 3 displays an overview of the 
past key findings, and the corresponding specific research questions (RQ) that are motivated by this 
research. 
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Table 3. Key findings and corresponding specific research questions 
Past key findings: 
 
 
People perceive higher degree of self-insight in 
their spontaneous vs. deliberate thoughts 
 
People expect that the intuitive choices of 
others reveal meaningful characteristics  
 
Morewedge, et al., 2014 
 
 
Inbar, et al., 2010 
People perceive quick decisions to signal 
sincere, unfiltered motivations 
 
Critcher, et al., 2013 
People attempt to mind-read the extent to 
which a decision maker understands the 
underlying principle guiding a positive behavior. 
 
Critcher, et al., in prep. 
People dislike deliberation when making 
judgements about moral taboos 
Merritt & Monin, 2011 
  
Specific Research Questions:  
 
5. Will using different decision styles make a leader come across as more sincere? 
 
6. Will a more spontaneous decision style always lead to higher perceptions of sincerity? 
 
 
7. Research setting and materials 
We carried out six experiments to explore the six specific research questions outlined above. RQ1 
and 2 were explored in Paper 1, while RQ3 and 4 were explored in Paper 2. Finally, Paper 3 
addressed RQ5 and 6. Table 4 presents a summary of the specific research questions that were posed 
in chapter 6. 
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Table 4. Summary of specific research questions 
Research 
question 
Paper  
RQ1 1 What are the effects of different numbers of claims in negative persuasion? 
 
RQ2 
 
1 
 
What are the effects of adding diluting (poor quality) claims in negative 
persuasion? 
RQ3 2 Does mortality awareness make a leader seem more sincere? 
 
RQ4 
 
2 
 
Will a leader with mortality awareness come across as more sincere, even if 
she is known to place a high emphasis on financial gains? 
 
RQ5 3 Will using different decision styles make a leader come across as more 
sincere? 
 
RQ6 
 
3 
 
Will a more spontaneous decision style always lead to higher perceptions of 
sincerity? 
 
All the research questions are concerned with causal relationships. In order to explore causal 
relationships directly, it is necessary to conduct controlled experiments, wherein the independent 
variable is manipulated, the outcome measures capture the effect in question, and all other factors 
are kept constant. Therefore, all studies that make up this dissertation consist of experiments in 
which participants were randomly allocated to different experimental conditions. However, even 
though an experimental approach can be used to demonstrate causality (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002), a disadvantage is the risk of low external or ecological validity. In order to increase ecological 
validity, the experiments were designed to be as realistic as possible, while attempting to exclude 
potential confounding variables as thoroughly as possible (see C. A. Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 
1999 for a discussion of the issues pertaining to the external validity of psychological experiments). In 
order to explore RQ1 through 6 in with controlled experiments, it was necessary to first come up 
with a set of stimuli that did not violate any concerns pertaining to external and internal validity. The 
process of validating stimuli is too detailed to be presented here, but a comprehensive overview of 
the stimuli, as well as pre-test procedure and results can be found in Appendix A.  
Paper 1 is concerned with positive and negative framing of CSR communication. The research 
question we wanted to explore was how the perception of CSR initiatives is influenced by framing, 
amount, and quality of claims. Our hypotheses made direct claims regarding how effective positively 
and negatively framed CSR related persuasion attempts would be, and how sincere the 
communicator would be perceived, in terms of perceived communicative intention. We wanted to 
test our hypotheses in a hypothetical choice setting, in order to use outcome measures that not only 
capture preferences and general attitudes, but also behavioral attitudes and hypothetical intentions. 
The reasoning behind this choice is that a substantial literature in psychology, organizational 
behavior and consumer behavior indicate that behavioral attitudes and intentions predict actual 
behavior, while measures of general attitudes often fail to make equally accurate predictions (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980; Barden & Tormala, 2014; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As such, 
we decided to instruct participants to envision that they were considering a job opening, and that a 
friend attempted to persuade them to apply or not apply. As the participants in these experiments 
were students, they were presumably able to comply with these instructions.  
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In exploring RQ3 through RQ6, we wanted to make the issue of motivational attribution more salient 
in the conceptual model. This adjustment implied that the communicative setting of the experiments 
had to be changed from the word-of-mouth setting of the first experiment, to a communicative 
setting in which a leader of an organization communicates to a hypothetical audience in a press 
conference. This change in communicative setting was necessary in order to include not only 
perceptions of communicative intentions, but also perceptions of the motivation behind the CSR 
initiatives themselves. The setting of the experiments was therefore a description of a fictitious 
company that had recently decided to implement CSR measures that were not only environmentally 
beneficial, but also cost saving for the company, as the customers would bear the cost of the 
initiatives. In this particular case, the setting was a hotel chain manager who decided to reduce the 
size of plates and glasses at the buffet, install water saving showers, and adopt a more restrictive 
policy regarding changing of towels and linens. These initiatives were all clearly environmentally 
friendly, as they would lead to reduced waste of food and drink, reduced energy consumption, and 
reduced use of detergents and emission of wastewater. They were also certainly financially 
beneficial, as they would reduce costs on behalf of the hotel. The CEO in question claimed that the 
new initiatives were motivated by her sincere appreciation for the importance of environmental care 
and climate change mitigation. However, as all these cost-saving measures were to be ultimately 
carried by the consumer, and directly and positively influencing the company cash flow, the sincerity 
of the CEO’s motivation and communicative intention was clearly questionable. Details pertaining to 
the production and validation of video stimuli used to explore RQ3 through 6 can also be found in 
Appendix A. 
As all the experiments were concerned with scenarios in which the potential outcomes were 
relatively similar, the experiments also made use of similar outcome measures. Appendix B presents 
the outcome measures used, as well as a brief discussion of how well these measures can be said to 
map onto their ontological constructs. One notable aspect of this discussion is the operationalization 
of persuasion knowledge in particular, and perceived sincerity in general, across all six experiments. 
Persuasion knowledge was measured as a form of knowledge, in accordance with past research on 
this construct (Ham, Nelson, & Das, 2015). However, it may be the case that the evaluation that 
someone has persuasive intent is better described as a feeling or intuition. This potential limitation is 
discussed further in chapter 9. All studies that make up this dissertation were carried out in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Research Council of Norway, The National Committee 
for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities, and in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki.    
8. Presentation of procedure and results 
The following section will present the experimental procedure and results on all specific research 
questions that make up the dissertation. The procedure will be presented in accordance with the 
paper that it pertains to, while the results will be presented along the specific research questions.  
Paper 1: Framing and perceived sincerity  
In order to address the first two research questions, 198 students from a large Norwegian business-
school were recruited to the experiment. Participants used their smartphone, tablet or pc/mac to 
read instructions and indicate responses. Web-based experiment-software ensured an even and 
random distribution of participants to either positive or negative persuasion. In the positive 
persuasion setting, participants were exposed to the following vignette (translated by the authors):  
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate environmental care is of great 
importance to you. You consider applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company. A 
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friend of yours already works at the company. In order to convince you that Marine Farming is 
environmentally friendly, your friend presents the following claims:”.  
The software further randomized these participants into three subgroups; One group was exposed to 
two of the strong positive claims, another group to three strong positive claims, and a third group to 
four strong positive claims. The claims were all drawn from the pool of four positive claims presented 
in Appendix A. The software ensured that which claims, and the rank order of presentation of claims, 
was randomized across participants. 
The other half of the sample was randomly allocated to the negative persuasion setting. They were 
firstly presented with the following vignette: 
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate environmental care is of great 
importance to you. You consider applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company. A 
friend of yours works at a competing company. In order to convince you that Marine Farming is 
environmentally harmful, your friend presents the following claims:”.  
The software further randomized these participants into three subgroups, similar to the 
randomization pertaining to the half of the sample that were exposed to a positive persuasion 
attempt. One group was exposed to two of the strong negative claims, another group to three strong 
negative claims, and the third group was exposed to four strong negative claims. The claims were all 
drawn from the pool of four negative claims presented in Appendix A. The software ensured that 
which claims, and the rank order of presentation of claims, was randomized across participants  
After having been exposed to both the vignette and the claims, each participant indicated how much 
they liked the company, how certain they felt about their liking of the company, how believable the 
claims were perceived, and how relevant they felt the claims were. The participants also gave scores 
on persuasion knowledge and perceived informational intent. Additionally, each participant 
completed the 11-item Hong reactance-scale (see Hong & Faedda, 1996; Hong & Page, 1989). Figure 
4 displays the parts of the conceptual framework that was explored by Research Questions 1 and 2. 
Figure 4. Conceptual framework via RQ1 and RQ2 
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RQ1. What are the effects of different numbers of claims in negative persuasion? 
In order to explore this question, we performed planned contrasts between each of the groups in 
positive persuasion, and each of the groups in negative persuasion, with different outcome variables. 
In summary, the answer to RQ1 was that the number of claims play a significant role in CSR 
communication in terms of liking company, certainty and persuasion knowledge. However, different 
numbers of claims only produced differences in positive persuasion. In negative persuasion, the use 
of two, three or four claims produced reactions and evaluations that did not differ significantly from 
each other. 
RQ2. What are the effects of adding diluting (poor quality) claims in negative persuasion? 
We also wanted to explore the role of different quality or subjective strength of claims in positive 
and negative persuasion. 86 students from a large Norwegian business-school were recruited to an 
experiment. Participants were first exposed to either the positive or negative persuasion vignette, 
and were subsequently exposed to the sets of claims. In all conditions, two of the claims were 
randomly collected from the list of four claims used in the previous experiment, and one came from 
the list of diluting claims presented in table 7 in Appendix A. The experimental procedure was 
otherwise identical to the experiment exploring RQ1.  
In order to explore RQ2, we compared the responses of participants exposed to three claims wherein 
one of the claims were weak/diluting, to the responses of participants exposed to three strong 
claims. The results indicated no dilution effects. However, moderation analyses revealed that diluting 
a set of strong claims with one moderate claim led to higher levels of persuasion knowledge, but only 
for high-reactance individuals who were exposed to negative persuasion. Low reactance individuals, 
and individuals subjected to a positive persuasion attempt, did not indicate dilution effects. 
Paper 2: Mortality awareness and perceived sincerity 
Research questions 3 and 4 were both explored in the Paper 2. This paper represents an exploration 
of how lessons from terror management theory (TMT) can be translated into social perception and 
manager-perception. We predicted that mortality awareness would serve as a mind-reading cue, 
highlighting that a demonstrated decision is motivated by moral values such as a sincere appreciation 
for the importance of sustainability and environmental protection, and less by financial gain and 
external expectation. Figure 5 displays the parts of the conceptual model that were explored via RQ3 
and RQ4. 
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Figure 5. The conceptual model via RQ3 and RQ4 
 
 
 
 
Our first prediction, derived from TMT, was that the decision maker who decided to implement an 
ambiguously motivated CSR decision would come across as having less persuasive intent, less 
extrinsic motivation if she came across as aware of her own mortality. Furthermore, we predicted 
that these sets of different attributions would lead to an overall improved evaluation of the CSR 
decision, as well as improved evaluation of the leader. In order to test this prediction, participants 
(N=87) were recruited from a Norwegian university law school. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two experimental groups and one passive control group. The participants were exposed to 
one of three different versions of a video wherein a CEO announced the implementation of 
ambiguously motivated CSR initiatives (see Appendix A for a more detailed description of the video 
stimuli). The independent variable, i.e., the justification for the decision, was introduced at the end 
of the video. Participants in the passive control group (N=27) saw a version of the video that ended 
before justification was asked for. Participants in the active control group (N=29) saw a version of the 
video wherein the CEO attributed her decision to a non-lethal health-scare. Participants in the 
mortality awareness group (N=31) saw a version of the video wherein the CEO attributed her 
decision to a potentially lethal health-scare (see the appendix of Paper 2 for exact wording in these 
videos). Having seen their respective video, all participants were instructed to complete a survey, 
detailing their attitudes towards the decision and the decision maker, as well as perceived 
communicative intention and perceived motivate pertaining to the decision.  
 
We also predicted that in cases where a decision maker is known to place a high private importance 
on financial goal attainment, mortality awareness would lead to increased attributions to extrinsic 
and financial factors, and decreased attribution to intrinsic values. In order to test this prediction, we 
recruited 180 students to participate in an experiment. The experimental procedure differed from 
the previously described mortality awareness experiment only in that all participants were told that 
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the CEO in question was known for placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment. 
Apart from this, the procedure was identical to the previous experiment. The passive control 
condition participants (N=57) saw the video wherein no justification is asked for, and went on to 
complete the survey. The second group saw the active control video (N=55), and continued to give 
their responses on the outcome measures. The third group saw the mortality awareness video 
(N=68), and continued to give their responses on the outcome measures. All participants had to view 
the entire designated video before they could move on in the experiment. Once the video was done, 
the participants provided their responses to a survey. The measures in the survey were identical to 
those used in RQ3. Additionally, in order to better capture the motivational attributions of interest in 
this study, the measurement model in the second experiment was supplemented with more 
attribution measures, and more items detailing evaluation of the decision itself. 
RQ3. Does mortality awareness make a leader seem more sincere? 
We performed planned contrasts of between groups differences, and mediation analyses, in order to 
fully explore RQ3. In summary, the answer to Research Question 3 was found to be that mortality 
awareness makes decision makers come across as significantly more motivated by intrinsic values, 
and less by extrinsic factors. The increase in value-based attribution, caused by mortality awareness, 
was furthermore found to be indirectly associated with positive evaluation of decision maker, as well 
as increased willingness to pay.  
RQ4. Will a leader with mortality awareness come across as more sincere, even if she is known to place 
a high emphasis on financial gains? 
Having demonstrated that mortality awareness can alter attributions, we opted to explore the extent 
to which mortality awareness may serve as an indicator of value-driven motivation in cases where 
the observed decision maker places a high importance on the attainment of financial goals. As 
mentioned, TMT research indicates that mortality primes mainly tend to amplify investments in 
whatever themes are personally and/or culturally important to the decision maker (Burke et al., 
2010). Building on the assumption that people's perceptions of the motivation of other people 
largely parallels their own motivational processes (Reeder & Trafimow, 2005), we wanted to explore 
whether and how social perception would encompass this general amplification tendency. If people 
perceived others in line with relevant results from TMT research, an ambiguously motivated decision 
made by a recently mortality reminded decision maker who is known to place a high priority on 
financial goal attainment should generate the opposite attributional pattern from the one 
demonstrated in RQ3.  
We performed a series of t-tests in order to test our predictions. In summary, the answer to Research 
Question 4 was found to be that the tendency to expect mortality-reminded individuals to be less 
motivated by external factors persisted, even when the decision maker in question was known for 
placing a high priority on financial goal attainment.  
Paper 3: Cognitive decision style and perceived sincerity 
RQ5 and RQ6 were addressed in the Paper 3. Figure 6 displays the parts of the overall conceptual 
model that were explored in this paper. 
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Figure 6. The conceptual model via RQ5 and RQ6 
 
 
 
In order to explore RQ5, we employed an experiment, using the video manipulation described 
earlier. A convenience sample of 81 law school students at a large Norwegian University (46 female, 
mean age 23) were recruited. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions. 
After indicating their responses on dispositional measures, the participants were exposed to one of 
three different versions of the video wherein a CEO announces the implementation of ambiguously 
motivated CSR initiatives (see Appendix A for a description of the video). The manipulated variable 
was the CEO’s response when asked how she got the idea for the new initiatives. This was introduced 
at the very end of the video.  
 
The experiment tested three different conditions. In the willful deliberation condition (N=27), the 
CEO explained that the idea had come about through deliberate and goal-directed cognition. In the 
partial spontaneity condition (N=27), the CEO explained that the idea had come about through a 
spontaneous allegory, whereby the initial idea came about spontaneously, and the consequent 
cognitive work was done deliberately. Finally, participants in the passive control condition (N=27)1  
saw a video that presented the same CEO and CSR initiatives, but contained no account of decision 
style. Having seen their respective video, participants went on to complete the questionnaire. See 
the Appendix in Paper 3 for the exact wording in all conditions, as well as a screenshot of the video. 
 
In the experiment exploring RQ6, we predicted that claiming too much cognitive spontaneity would 
lead to reduced perceived sincerity. We proposed an inverted U-shaped model in the relationship 
between claimed spontaneity and perceived sincerity (see Figure 7). The proposed model depicts the 
degree of claimed spontaneity in cognitive account along the x-axis, and perceived sincerity of the 
leader on the y-axis. Up to a certain point, the more cognitively spontaneous the leader claims to 
have been, the more sincere the leader comes across. However, past a certain point, the account of 
decision style may become unrealistic, which may induce a general suspicion of falsehood. Past this 
                                                          
1 As data collection for multiple studies was conducted simultaneously, and we failed to see the need to run 
these studies with two, identical, passive control groups, this group is the same as the one reported in the first 
mortality awareness experiment, under RQ3. The targeted journal was notified of this.     
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point, we predicted that furthering the claim of spontaneity would only further the experience of 
insincerity. 
 
Figure 7. The predicted relationship between claimed spontaneity and perceived sincerity 
 
 
In order to explore RQ6, we used the video of the hotel-chain CEO announcing ambiguously 
motivated CSR initiatives. The manipulated variable was the CEO’s description of the cognitive 
process that led up to the decision (i.e. her cognitive decision style). The experimental condition in 
this experiment was a CEO reporting to have relied completely on spontaneous thought as decision 
style. In this condition, participants saw the CEO who, upon questioning from the interviewer, replied 
that the idea behind the new plan came to her completely out of nowhere, and in a situation that 
was unrelated to the CSR initiative. It is important to note the difference between the partial 
spontaneity condition tested in RQ5 and complete spontaneity condition tested in RQ6. The claim of 
partial spontaneity is more realistic, as it entails getting the initial idea through a spontaneous 
cognitive process, and then using willful deliberation to come up with the rest of the CSR initiatives. 
By contrast, the complete spontaneity claim entails coming up with an entire set of CSR initiatives, 
which encompass different parts of the day-to-day operations of the organization, completely 
spontaneously. Our main prediction was that the claim of complete spontaneity as decision style 
would come across as implausible, and induce an overall negative effect in terms of persuasive 
appeal. As control condition, we chose willful deliberation rather than no account of decision style 
(i.e. passive control). The willful deliberation condition represents a more valid point of comparison 
than the passive control condition, because it indeed contains a cognitive account, and because this 
ensures that the videos used are similar in length.  
 
The procedure in the experiments designed to answer RQ6 was otherwise identical to the one 
designed to answer RQ5. The willful deliberation group (N=33) saw an account identical to the willful 
deliberation group in the previously reported experiment. The complete spontaneity group (N=34) 
saw the CEO claiming that the idea had come about completely spontaneously (see the Appendix of 
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Paper 3 for a comprehensive description of the video stimuli). Having seen their respective video, 
participants in both conditions moved on to provide answers to the outcome measures.  
 
RQ5. Will using different cognitive decision styles make a leader come across as more sincere? 
In order to explore RQ5, we performed a series of t-tests comparing mean group differences. We also 
conducted mediation and moderation analyses, in order to test the proposed framework. In 
summary, the answer to RQ5 was found to be that a decision style characterized by partial 
spontaneity did increase perceptions of sincerity, in as much as it induced lower levels of persuasion 
knowledge than was elicited when the decision style was not mentioned, or that of willful 
deliberation. This effect was found to be indirectly associated with higher levels of support for the 
decision. Reduced persuasion knowledge was also found to be associated with higher levels of value-
based attribution, the combined effect of which was associated with improved evaluation of the CEO. 
This finding lends support to the overall conceptual framework of this dissertation. We also identified 
that decision styles characterized by partial cognitive spontaneity lead to improved evaluation of the 
CEO, for high-cynicism participants. For low cynicism participants, the opposite was true, partially 
spontaneous decision style led to worse CEO evaluation. 
RQ6. Will a more spontaneous cognitive decision style always lead to higher perceptions of sincerity?  
In order to explore RQ6, we performed a series of t-tests comparing between group means. In order 
to further explore the proposed model, we also performed mediation analyses. In sum, the results 
indicated that claiming complete spontaneity of thought preceding a decision lead to overall less 
perceived sincerity. A significant drop in perceived informational intent associated with the CEO who 
claimed to have come up with the CSR measures from thin air, indicated that the participants may 
have suspected that she was not willing to give correct and valid information. This sense of hiding or 
misrepresenting relevant information was demonstrated to be indirectly associated with less 
favorable motivational attribution, as well as with less favorable evaluation of the CEO. These 
findings were in line with the predictions, and confirmed the assertion that claiming cognitive 
spontaneity will lead to improved sincerity-perceptions up to a certain point. Claiming complete 
spontaneity in one’s cognitive account produced overall less perception of sincerity, compared to the 
willful deliberation condition. This lack of perceived sincerity was found to be indirectly associated 
with unfortunate motivational attribution, and worse evaluation of the CEO. 
 
9. Overall contributions and implications 
The main research question of this dissertation was how the perception of CSR initiatives is 
influenced by variables relating to properties of the message itself, the life circumstances of the 
leader, and the perceived decision style of the leader. This overarching research question was 
addressed along three Papers, all comprising of two specific research questions each. Taken 
together, the presented conclusions to all the specific research questions offer some common 
contributions. Firstly, the results indicate that the same set of CSR initiatives can elicit very different 
reactions, based on how they are communicated. This highlights the crucial role of CSR 
communication in the relationship between the initiatives and the publics reactions to them (Du, et 
al., 2010). Secondly, all three papers underline the notion that attributions, both regarding 
communicative intention and behavioral motives are the mechanisms through which CSR 
communication is processed (Beckman, et al., 2009; de Vries, et al., 2013; Groza, et al., 2011; 
McShane & Cunningham, 2012). People do not merely judge actions based on their consequences, 
but are also concerned with the intentions of the observed agent (Critcher, et al., in prep; Gray, et al., 
2012; Reeder & Trafimow, 2005). A third overall take home message from the three papers 
combined, is that dispositional traits matter. In compliance gaining scenarios, the participants 
psychological reactance (Hong & Page, 1989) may determine the efficacy of a given persuasive 
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approach. In mass-audience persuasion scenarios, wherein the attribution of motives is a central 
mediator, a given participants dispositional cynicism (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989) was found to determine 
the outcome of a certain communicative tactics. Finally, it is also important to note that although the 
present research was conducted in a CSR setting, the conclusions are not necessarily confined to CSR 
communication alone. Organizational life is replete with positively and negatively framed persuasion, 
as well as ambiguously motivated decisions. Peripheral cues related to how behaviors and decisions 
are communicated may influence how the decisions are interpreted, which in turn may influence the 
general sense-making process conducted by consumers and employees (Weick, 1995).  
There are also notable theoretical and managerial implications that are idiosyncratic to the specific 
research questions. As the manipulated variable in the reported experiments differed substantially, 
and in order to ensure clarity, these contributions will be presented separately.  
9.1. Framing, number, quality and sincerity 
The conclusions to RQ1 and RQ2 suggested that the number of claims played a different role in 
positive persuasion than in negative persuasion. In positive persuasion, across multiple outcome 
measures, more variance was observed when changing the persuasion attempt from one that 
includes two positive claims to one that includes three or four positive claims, compared with the 
corresponding manipulation of amount of negative claims. This finding resonates with the 
aforementioned literature on the asymmetry of positive and negative framing (Baumeister, et al., 
2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The studies reported in Paper 1 are among the few to investigate 
persuasion in both positive and negative directions. Whereas the psychological and perceptual 
effects of positive and negative framing is fairly well understood in judgement and decision making, 
the implications for persuasion and corporate communication are not yet equally well understood. 
The exploration of RQ1 and RQ2 increased this understanding, by assessing in particular how 
persuasion knowledge is elicited by positive vs negative persuasion. Our main finding, that positive 
framing of one’s employers’ environmental activities generates far less persuasion knowledge than 
negative framing of competing firms irresponsibility, is of both theoretical and managerial value, as it 
deepens our understanding of the interaction between the number of claims, dilution effect, and the 
negativity bias.  
 
9.2. Mortality awareness and sincerity  
Taken together, the results from RQ3 and RQ4 confirm that communicating mortality awareness 
when justifying ambiguously motivated CSR initiatives alleviates suspicions of extrinsic motivation, 
and may leave observers with a stronger perception that the decision is motivated by sincerely held 
values. This attributional effect holds true even in cases where the observed decision maker is known 
to place a high priority on the pursuit of financial goal attainment. 
 
Both experiments demonstrated that ambiguously motivated CSR measures were met with more 
favorable attribution when the CEO explained that the decision was preceded by a mortality 
reminder. The results indicate that people suspect behaviors to be less motivated by extrinsic and 
financial factors, when the person they evaluate attributes her decision to a recent mortality 
reminder. This change in attribution is likely not due to pity alone, as the active control condition, 
which presumably also induces pity, produced attributions more similar to that of the passive control 
condition than that of the mortality awareness condition. Furthermore, the improved motivational 
attribution is demonstrated to be indirectly associated with evaluation of decision maker and 
willingness to pay. This finding highlights the importance of perceived sincerity of motives when 
communicating CSR policies, which resonates concordantly with other findings in CSR communication 
(de Vries, et al., 2013; Du, et al., 2010; Groza, et al., 2011). 
 
The results also offered some careful practical implications. Motivational ambiguity is ubiquitous in 
both general management and marketing. The main result from this study is that mortality 
awareness can function as a factor that alleviates some of that ambiguity, and induces a sense of 
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sincerity on behalf of the observed decision maker. Perhaps other ways of conveying mortality 
awareness, other than recapping one’s own recent mortality reminders, can produce similar 
attributional patterns.  
 
9.3. Cognitive decision style and sincerity  
The findings presented in RQ5 and RQ6 suggest that different decision styles may influence the level 
of perceived sincerity in CSR communication. Claiming a partially spontaneous decision style made 
the participants less aware that they were subject to a persuasion attempt. The reduction in 
persuasion knowledge was found to be associated with more favorable motivational attribution, 
which was further associated with a more positive evaluation of the CEO. The CEO who claimed 
complete spontaneity of thought, however, was perceived as less sincere than her deliberative 
counterpart. The seemingly implausible cognitive account produced significantly lower levels of 
perceived informational intent, and generally a worse evaluation of the CEO. This suggests that the 
participants in this condition felt that the CEO was not attempting to give them valid information, on 
the basis of which they could make their decisions. The results demonstrated that cognitive decision 
style can serve as a mind-reading cue, and influence these evaluations favorably, but also adversely, 
if the account of the decision making process comes across as unrealistic. The findings may also offer 
general support for past research suggesting that people see spontaneous thoughts as revealing 
sincerely held values and beliefs (Inbar, et al., 2010; Merritt & Monin, 2011; Morewedge, et al., 
2014). While willful deliberation may be perceived as a more strategic and filtered form of cognition, 
a spontaneous thoughts may seen as indicative of sincerity. The reported findings also fit the 
literature on CSR communication, where perceived sincere caring has been identified as a key 
success factor (Beckman, et al., 2009; de Vries, et al., 2013; Du, et al., 2010; McShane & Cunningham, 
2012).  
 
9.4. Limitations and future research 
There are several limitations to the studies that make up this dissertation. As is the case for almost all 
lab-experiments in social sciences, the results stem from hypothetical scenarios, and are therefore 
free from circumstantial factors that may be crucial to any real-life scenario. Even though the 
experiments made use of vivid, realistic and motivationally congruent vignettes and/or video-stimuli, 
with the aim of increasing ecological validity, the generalizability of the conclusions can nevertheless 
be questioned.  
There is a noteworthy theoretical limitation pertaining to the conceptualization of sincerity in this 
dissertation. Sincerity perceptions was measured as a “cold” construct, consisting of attributional 
inferences regarding the intentions of an observed person or organization. One could easily make the 
case that perception of sincerity may also be a “hot” construct, consisting of emotions or intuitions 
regarding something or someone coming across as genuine and true. The same criticism is relevant 
when assessing how the measurement of persuasion knowledge maps onto its ontological construct. 
While persuasion knowledge was measured as a type of factual realization, real-life sense of 
persuasive intent and the coping dynamics thereof may be better described as an intuitive sense or 
feeling. According to the social-intuitionist viewpoint, sincerity perceptions arise initially as intuitive, 
non-verbal, gut feelings about the truthfulness of another person, and the cognitive inferences about 
intentions are post-hoc rationalizations of that intuition (see Haidt, 2001). According to such an 
approach, the hereby presented conceptualization of sincerity perception, and the corresponding 
measures of different perceived communicative intentions and perceived motives only captures the 
cognitive consequences of the ontological construct. However, measuring non-verbal emotions and 
intuitions directly, and in a reliable manner, poses a challenge in all behavioral science (Bradley & 
Lang, 2002). The development of more reliable measures of intuitions and emotions may aid in the 
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development of our understanding of the concept of sincerity, from a strictly cognitive concept to a 
socio-emotional concept.  
 
Paper 1 suffered from some specific limitations that offer directions for future research. The most 
powerful finding in this study was the large difference in the amount of persuasion knowledge 
generated by negative claims, relative to positive claims. This finding was reported as being 
theoretically interesting, as past research on the effects of negative persuasion is limited. However, 
the design of the experiments exploring RQ1 and RQ2 did not allow for certain interpretation 
regarding the mechanism through which negative persuasion lead to higher levels of persuasion 
knowledge. We interpreted the finding in the light of negativity effect. A different but valid 
interpretation would be that the positioning of the persuasive agent caused the observed differences 
in persuasion knowledge between positive and negative persuasion. We could only conclude that 
positive claims made from someone within a company generates far less persuasion knowledge than 
negative claims made from someone at a competing company. Although we were unable to pinpoint 
the cause of this difference, the finding is nevertheless theoretically and pragmatically interesting, as 
it arose from a motivationally congruent description of events. I recommend that future research 
should attempt to further explore the reported positive-negative asymmetry in persuasion 
knowledge, while maintaining realism in the design of stimuli. 
 
The results from RQ3 through RQ6 also offered some further directions for future research. Firstly, 
neither of the ultimate outcome variables differed directly between the groups in any of the 
experiments, even though the attributional patterns differed significantly between the groups. This 
finding goes against the importance placed on motivational attribution in past research, both in CSR 
communication (see de Vries, et al., 2013; Du, et al., 2010; Groza, et al., 2011; McShane & 
Cunningham, 2012; Yoon, et al., 2006), and in moral psychology (see Fedotova, et al., 2011; Gray, et 
al., 2012). The results thus seem to indicate that while attributions matter, they are not all that 
matters. A possible explanation for why the changes is motivational attribution were not 
accompanied by direct changes in evaluation of decision maker, support for decision, or willingness 
to pay, may be that the described scenario involved removing hedonic value for the customer. Past 
research has indicated that consumers often dislike CSR measures that impedes the organizations 
ability to deliver value to the consumer (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). As 
such, it may be that the participants responses to the question of whether or not they liked the 
decision was primarily focused on the removal of hedonic value. Another explanation for the lack of 
direct effects may be that other mediating variables, not measured in the experiments, may also 
have influenced the outcomes. One non-measured variable that may have been affecting the 
outcome in all three studies is perceptions of norm-violation. It is possible that some of the 
participants perceived the negatively framed persuasion attempt in RQ1 and RQ2 as a norm-
violation. It is even more plausible that referencing personal health issues, or testifying to unusual 
cognitive decision styles may be seen as a norm-violation. The mediated findings from RQ3 and RQ5 
suggest that a suppressor variable may be opposing the demonstrated relationships, as only the 
mediated effects are statistically significant, while the direct effects are not (see Hayes, 2009). It may 
be the case that mortality awareness and partially spontaneous decision style improved attributions, 
while violating supposed social or professional norms. The combined indirect effect of attributions 
and norm violation may be the reason why the manipulated variables in RQ3, RQ5 and RQ6 had no 
direct effect on liking the decision or CEO. This interpretation may also explain why low-cynicism 
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participants in the experiment that addressed RQ5 liked the partial spontaneity CEO less than the 
control CEOs. If individuals low in cynicism are less concerned with sincerity of motivation, but 
equally concerned with the presumed norm-violation of claiming to have come up with an executive 
decision partially via spontaneous thinking, they may have perceived the partially spontaneously 
thinking CEO as worse than the control conditions. However, these are merely speculative 
interpretations, and more research is needed in order to better understand the antecedents of 
consumer support for CSR initiatives. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the issues related to the measure of dispositional cynicism used that was 
used to explore RQ5. Although Kanter and Mirvis’ (1989) analysis suggest that cynicism, both as a 
state and trait, have profound influences on choices and behavior, the validity and reliability of their 
measurement scale is somewhat underexplored. Even though this threat to construct validity was 
mitigated somewhat by the use of factor analysis and reliability tests, it remains a noteworthy 
limitation to the moderation analysis conducted in RQ5. Among 321 listed citations of Kanter and 
Mirvis (1989), I found no peer reviewed papers that tested the scale. However, competing scales 
related to the same construct also would have carried inherent threats to the construct validity. The 
organizational cynicism scale (Wanous, Reichers, & Austin, 1994) measures cynicism in organizations 
specifically, not as a global trait. Niederhoffers Police Cynicism scale (1967) has been tested 
rigorously (Anson, Mann, & Sherman, 1986). However, it does not measure cynicism as a global trait, 
but rather attitudes particularly relevant for law enforcement. Future studies may consider testing 
the reliability and convergent validity of Kanter and Mirvis (1989) measure of dispositional cynicism.   
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10. Conclusion 
The dissertation consist of three papers, all demonstrating that different ways to communicate CSR 
initiatives can lead to different sincerity perceptions, which in turn affects the overall evaluation of 
the CSR initiatives and organization that implements them. Overall, the three papers represent 
attempts at combining novel findings from social-, and moral psychology into the applied setting of 
CSR communication. A common conclusion from all three papers is that attributions, both regarding 
communicative intention and behavioral motives are the mechanisms through which CSR 
communication is processed. The results carry managerial implications for individuals and 
organizations that wish to portray themselves as socially responsible and morally virtuous, while still 
being motivated by financial gain. The results also have theoretical implications for social psychology, 
moral psychology, and marketing research. 
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Appendix A 
This section provides a description of the process of designing and validating experimental stimuli. In 
order to answer RQ1 and RQ2, we needed to pre-test different positive and negative claims, so that 
we could compare and contrast the effects of using different amounts of them in a valid manner. 
Conducting the experiment without pre-testing how relevant and strong the claims were would have 
rendered quality of claims as a potential confounding variable in our experiments. For example, if we 
had discovered that the inclusion of a third positive claim led to significant increase in persuasion, 
but we did not pre-test the claims out of context, we would not be able to pinpoint whether it was 
the number of claims, or the quality of that third claim, that led to the observed increase in 
persuasion. In order to avoid this confounding variable, it was thus necessary to come up with two 
sets of claims that were a) similar in terms of subjective quality, and b) substantial in subjective 
quality. We used CSR-related claims pertaining to an ocean-farming company as setting. Ocean-
farming has been both hailed as one of the industries that may potentially be part of the solution to 
global warming (Asche & Khatun, 2006), as well as criticized for being unsustainable in its current 
form (Folke & Kautsky, 1992). Our setting thus provides the basis for a plausible and realistic 
persuasion-attempt, both in favor and against the actions of a company. The participants in the pre-
test were exposed to a list of either ten claims in favor of an ocean-farming corporations’ social 
responsibility (positive claims), or ten claims in favor of an ocean-farming corporations’ social 
irresponsibility (negative claims). Participants were told that all the claims were candidates to be 
used in a persuasion setting, but that it was up to the participant to rate how strong they felt each 
claim was. The participants were instructed to allocate 100 points selectively among the claims. 
Claims perceived as strong were to be awarded more points, and claims perceived as weak were to 
be awarded few or no points. All 100 points had to be allocated by each participant. The rank order 
of the presentation of the claims were randomized across trials, to ensure that primacy-, and recency 
effects did not affect the outcome of the test. A total of  32 student participants rated the positive 
claims, and 29 student participants rated the negative claims. The four positive and four negative 
claims with the highest score were chosen to be used in the experiments. Tables 5 and 6 display 
these claims (translated to English by the author), and their mean and median rating. 
Table 5. Evaluation of positive claims 
Claim: The company has 
paid to restore 10 
km2 of destroyed 
ocean-floor 
The company has 
switched to solar-
powered energy 
Without reducing 
the quality in the 
end-product, the 
company only 
uses recycled 
materials in 
fodder-production  
The company has 
committed itself 
to invest 20 % of 
all earnings in 
technology that 
will help protect 
wild salmon and 
trout 
Mean points: 13.43 17.22 13.25 22.78 
Median points: 12.5 15 14.5 22.5 
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Table 6. Evaluation of negative claims 
Claim: The companys’ 
activities has 
destroyed 10 km2 
of ocean-floor 
The company 
emits over 100 
metric tonnes of 
CO2 each year 
The company is 
unwilling to invest 
in new facilities. 
As a 
consequence, 
many of the 
farmed fish 
escape, increasing 
the spread of lice, 
and harming the 
wild salmon in 
nearby areas 
The farming 
activities cause 
the emission of 
nutrient salts and 
organic matter, 
which increase 
the algae-growth 
and 
eutrophication in 
the inner fjords 
Mean: 16.37 12.66 17.23 18.17 
Median: 20 10 15 20 
The purpose of this pre-test was not to answer RQ1, but to construct a set of stimuli that could be 
used in the experiment that was designed to answer RQ1. The four positive and four negative claims 
were chosen because they were given substantial ratings in the pre-test. The difference in median 
between the strongest and weakest claim was also found to be the same (10 points). This brought us 
even closer to being able to pinpoint the effect of different numbers of claims while controlling for 
the strength/quality of the claims. In order to answer RQ2 we also needed pre-tested diluting claims. 
Based on the results from the mentioned pre-test, two positive and one negative claim were chosen 
as moderately diluting claims, to be used in order to answer RQ2. Two different diluters of positive 
persuasion were used, and one diluter of negative persuasion. The negative diluter used was that the 
company car-fleet consisted of only high-emission SUV’s. This claim was selected because results 
from the pre-test indicated that this was the one that best fitted the purpose of being a moderately 
diluting claim. The two positive diluters were chosen on different grounds; the “lightbulb”-claim was 
chosen because the results from the pre-test indicated that it received a score almost identical to the 
negative diluter. The “electric cars” claim was chosen because it represents a semantic comparable 
contrast to the negative diluter; “high emission SUV’s”. Table 7 displays the diluting claims used to 
answer RQ2. 
Table 7. Moderately diluting claims 
Claim: The company has 
switched to slightly 
costlier but more eco-
friendly lightbulbs in 
all offices 
The company has 
replaced all its cars 
with electric cars 
The entire company 
car-fleet consists of 
high-emission SUV’s 
Mean: 2,44 4,28 2,77 
Median: ,5 1 0 
 
In order to maintain a high degree of vividness and realism, participants in studies that explored RQ3 
through 6 were shown video footage of an actress portraying a CEO in an interview setting. The 
actress was instructed to portray her character in a realistic manner, while maintain identical 
postures, facial expressions and tone of voice in all recordings. The video started with a rolling text 
stating: “Ellen Hansen is the CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has just approved a new plan to 
make the hotels more environmentally friendly. Among the measures are reducing the size of plates 
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and glasses at the breakfast buffet with 20 percent, in order to reduce waste of food. Furthermore, 
the hotels have been equipped with water-saving showers. Additionally, the hotels have adopted a 
more restrictive policy on changing of towels and linens on shorter stays. [New paragraph] In an 
interview, Ellen explained the background for the decision:” Here, the video continued to a fictitious 
interview, wherein the actress portraying the CEO, stated: “We are now taking measures in order to 
become more socially responsible. The climate threat is one of the biggest challenges that humanity 
has ever faced, and our chain has to be a part of the solution”. This part of the video constituted the 
passive control condition, and was identical for all conditions in both studies. The independent 
variable was the subsequent explanation of the psychological circumstances under which the idea for 
these ambiguously motivated CSR initiatives came about. These differed in accordance with their 
respective research question. As such, they are described in the presentation of results of RQ3 
through RQ6. 
Before the experiments were performed, all video stimuli was pre-tested on a student sample. A 
total of 11 participants saw all versions of the video, in random order, producing a total of 55 
observations. The purpose of the pre-test was not to answer RQ3-6, but to validate the stimuli that 
would be used in the experiments that were designed to test these research questions. If the 
different versions of the videos produced very different reactions in the pre-test, this difference 
would represent a confounding variable in the subsequent experiment. The pre-test examined how 
the actress was perceived in each video in terms of how enthusiastic and interpersonally warm she 
was found to be. Across the observations, no significant differences between the versions were 
found. After the test, the participants were told how the stimuli were to be used, and asked if any of 
the videos stood out as different from the other, aside from the different words the actress 
conveyed. None of the participants indicated that any of the videos differed from the others in such a 
way. 
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Appendix B 
This section provides a description of outcome measures. Persuasion was mainly measured as 
attitudes in the experiments that make up this dissertation. This approach carries advantages, as well 
as disadvantages. Conceptualizing persuasion as attitudes allows for standardized measures that are 
resource efficient to apply. This approach poses a threat to the constructs validity (see Cook & 
Campbell, 1979), as these variables are imperfectly related to the construct of interest. However, 
every operationalization is flawed relative to the construct on which it is based (Shadish, et al., 2002). 
The goal of most CSR initiatives is to achieve sustained competitive advantage by attracting and 
retaining support from consumers and other stakeholders. Such support could be measured more 
directly through behavioral outcomes, such as actual consumer behavior and actual organizational 
behavior. However, measuring choices in a real life setting often precludes randomized controlled 
experiments, which would reduce the ability to infer causal relationships. In order to maximize 
construct validity, persuasion was measured as with multiple survey items, detailing support for 
decision and support for decision maker. In cases where the experiment group and control group 
differed in these attitudes, it is logical to infer that the approach to persuasion in one of the 
treatments was found to be superior to its counterpart. As past research has demonstrated that 
measures of attitudes alone has limited predictive value on actual behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), 
I attempted to also measure behavioral intentions and attitude strength, as these constructs seem to 
be more directly related to behavior (Barden & Tormala, 2014). Specifically, I included measures of 
willingness to pay, as this, together with the other measures of persuasion, may have increased the 
construct validity of the ultimate outcome variables. 
Communicative intention was measured as a twofold construct consisting of persuasion knowledge 
and perceived informational intent. Despite having been an important construct in marketing and 
consumer psychology for over two decades, a clear consensus on how to measure persuasion 
knowledge has yet to emerge (Ham, et al., 2015; Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998). The concept is 
typically measured as a state in surveys and experiments. The exact wording in the measurement 
items are often tailored to the research-specific context. In the studies that make up this 
dissertation, persuasion knowledge was measured by two items, consisting of ‘behavioral persuasion 
knowledge’ (i.e. I feel that the person is attempting to influence my future choices), and ‘attitudinal 
persuasion knowledge’ (i.e. I feel that the person is attempting to influence my attitudes). A single 
item measure of ‘perceived informational intent’ was also used (i.e. I feel the person is attempting to 
provide me with information).  
 
Measures of motivational attribution were only used in order to explore RQ3-6. The main 
measurement scale applied in these studies was the Perceived Organizational motives scale from 
Groza, et al. (2011). As the data collection progressed, we learned that motivational attribution 
seemed very central as a psychological mechanism. We also learned that the items making up the 
scale often failed to conform to expectations in factor analyses. As such, some of the later studies 
made use of additional measurement items intended to capture participants’ attributions regarding 
perception of motive.  
As mentioned, we also suspected that dispositional differences could affect the relationships we 
uncovered. We therefore had each participant in Paper 1 complete the 11 item Hong reactance scale 
(see Hong & Faedda, 1996; Hong & Page, 1989). As Papers 2 and 3 were more concerned with 
motivational attribution, and less with compliance, we opted to measure participants dispositional 
cynicism, using Kanter and Mirvis (1989) Cynicism Scale. This is a seven item scale originally derived 
from Wrightsman Jr (1964). The scale measures dispositional cynicism, defined as a tendency to 
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distrust the underlying motives of others, and expect selfishness to be the most influential factor in 
individual and organizational decision making.  
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Part II: Papers 
The papers are displayed in accordance with the time of submission to publication. Paper 1 was the 
first to be submitted, and Paper 3 was the last to be submitted. This rank order of presentation of 
papers also capture some of the logic between papers. The first paper was set in a different setting 
than Papers 2 and 3, and as such, it represents a different conceptualization of perceived sincerity, 
consisting only of measures of communicative intention. On the other hand, Papers 2 and 3 build on 
the same internal logic, even though they explore relatively dissimilar independent variables. The 
two published papers are presented in their published form, whereas the submitted paper is 
appended in the format required by the journal to which it was submitted 
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The asymmetrical force of
persuasive knowledge across
the positive–negative divide
Mads Nordmo* and Marcus Selart*
Department of Strategy and Management, The Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
In two experimental studies we explore to what extent the general effects of positive and
negative framing also apply to positive and negative persuasion. Our results reveal that
negative persuasion induces substantially higher levels of skepticism and awareness of
being subjected to a persuasion attempt. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in positive
persuasion, more claims lead to stronger persuasion, while in negative persuasion, the
numerosity of claims carries no significant effect. We interpret this finding along the
lines of a satiety-model of persuasion. Finally, using diluted, or low strength claims in a
persuasion attempt, we reveal a significant interaction between dispositional reactance
and dilution of claims on persuasion knowledge. The interaction states that diluted
claims increase the awareness of being subjected to a persuasion attempt, but only
for those with a high dispositional level of reactance.
Keywords: persuasion, resistance, CSR, negativity bias, persuasion knowledge, attribute framing, numerosity,
dilution effect
Introduction
The purpose of this research is threefold: Firstly, it demonstrates that resistance and skepticism to
persuasion is not symmetrical across the positive–negative divide. Secondly, it demonstrates that
the number of claims have diﬀerent eﬀects in positive and negative persuasion. Thirdly, it brings
about important managerial implications for corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication
in particular, and persuasion in general. The main research-question addressed by this paper is:
What are the eﬀects of diﬀerent numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion? The second,
related research-question is: how do diﬀerent qualities of claims aﬀect the outcomes in positive and
negative persuasion? These questions are explored in two experiments, using CSR communications
as stimuli.
In CSR research in particular, and in psychology in general, there is a heightened need to
better understand the evaluative artifacts of positive and negative persuasion. Corporations today
are commonly considered to have social responsibility to serve the people, communities, society,
and the environment in ways that go above and beyond what is legally required (Wood, 1991;
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Lockett et al., 2006). As a consequence, corporations now face the
opportunity to communicate all their socially and environmentally laudable eﬀorts in order to
increase their likeability. However, they also face the risk of negative attention reaching their less
prize-worthy activities. Individuals and organizations thus face a perilous and delicate situation.
By under-communicating CSR activities, one faces the risk of people never learning about the
activities, and possibly assuming that no CSR initiatives have been made. By over-communicating
CSR activities, one faces the risk of skepticism and cynicism on behalf of weary consumers, who
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1324
Nordmo and Selart Positive and negative persuasion
disbelieve the accuracy and sincerity of the claims. There is a
far-reaching string of literature regarding how the number of
claims, or arguments, aﬀect the outcome of persuasion. The
idea that additional positive information increases liking has
been largely supported in psychological research on attribution
and impression formation. Stewart (1965) found that the when
participants are presented with a description of a person
consisting of one, two, three or four positive traits, and
subsequently four negative traits, the liking of the person
increased monotonically with each positive trait. This ﬁnding
and others led to the conclusion that the impression of a
person becomes more favorable with each new positive trait.
Anderson (1967) referred to this eﬀect as the “set-size eﬀect.”
Broadening the scope from impression formation to general
persuasion, further research on the eﬀect of amount of persuasive
information has generally conﬁrmed the ﬁnding made by Stewart
(1965) and Anderson (1967). Pelham et al. (1994) refer to
the broad positive correlation between amount of persuasive
information and persuasion as the numerosity eﬀect. The
numerosity eﬀect states that as a default, the more persuasive
information a message contains, up to some reasonable limit,
the more persuaded people tend to be (see Calder et al.,
1974; Norman, 1976; Calder, 1978; Chaiken, 1980; Maddux and
Rogers, 1980). Thus, the numerosity eﬀect, whereby presenting
more persuasive information leads to more persuasion is quite
pervasive (see also Tormala and Petty, 2007). We refer to the
inﬂection-point, after which more information of the same
valence no longer causes changes in attitude, as the point of
“satiety.” A key question in the research on the optimal number
of claims in persuasion is how many claims are needed before
informational satiety is achieved.
Recently, the numerosity eﬀect has been related to the
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a,b)
such that participants’ judgments based on the number of
considered arguments are observed to diﬀer between high and
low elaboration conditions (Tormala et al., 2002). The point
of “satiety” might thus diﬀer depending on the cognitive load
connected to the attribute information. Elaboration might also
impact on the point of “satiety” in that attribute numerosity has
been observed to beneﬁt hedonic more than utilitarian options
(Sela and Berger, 2012).
An important caveat to the set-size eﬀect or numerosity eﬀect
lies in the diﬀerence between communication with perceived
informational intention, and communication with perceived
persuasive intention. There is a crucial diﬀerence between
the research demonstrating the set size-eﬀect, and marketing
studies. In the impression formation literature, the source of
the communication, typically referred to as “agent,” has no
persuasive intention, only informational intent. The degree to
which a target is aware of the agents persuasive intention is
referred to as the targets persuasion knowledge (Friestad and
Wright, 1994). As consumers have gotten more accustomed to
marketers persuasion-intention, they have developed a slightly
diﬀerent way of dealing with information with persuasive intent
(Campbell and Kirmani, 2008). Speciﬁcally, when dealing with
information from a source that has a perceived persuasive intent,
subjects will engage in coping-cognitions, in an attempt to
maintain a sense of independent and dissuaded view of the
product, service or person they are evaluating. The persuasion
knowledge model (Friestad and Wright, 1994) is important in
this respect, as it changes the focus from message design to
message receiver. In doing so, it conveys the notion that the
perception of the message is more important than its objective
design. The model states that all targets will attempt to hold
valid product-, or service-attitudes when faced with a persuasion
attempt. In order to maintain a valid attitude toward the product,
the target will analyze the persuasion tactics, the eﬀectiveness
and the appropriateness of the persuasive agent, and adjust their
impression accordingly. Put in terms of CSR marketing, this
entails that the perceived social responsibility is more important
than the actual or objective social responsibility. Eﬀective CSR
communication can be achieved only when the coping eﬀorts
of the target is taken into account. It is also important to
note that individual diﬀerences in skepticism and reactance are
likely to induce diﬀerent levels and styles of coping-cognitions
(Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Hong and Page, 1989; Campbell and
Kirmani, 2000). Friestad andWright (1994) call for more research
exploring these persuasion dynamics: “An important part of
a complete theory of persuasion is, therefore, an explanation
of [. . .] aspects of an agents overall behavior that disguise
a tactic or that makes its execution seem heavy-handed or
transparent to targets.” There are many identiﬁed factors in the
execution of a persuasion attempt that may make the eﬀort
seem heavy-handed or transparent, and thus elicit and increase
persuasion knowledge and coping. For instance, prevention-
focus or regulation focus in the framing of the message (Kirmani
and Zhu, 2007), forced exposure (Edwards et al., 2002), attention-
getting tactics (Campbell, 1995), advertising repetition (Kirmani,
1997), and others, have all been identiﬁed as factors that increase
persuasion knowledge in targets. Increasing the number of claims
in a persuasion attempt is another factor that may induce
increased persuasion knowledge, as the persuasion-attempt is
perceived as more transparent or heavy-handed if the number
of claims is perceived as too high (Campbell and Kirmani,
2000; DeCarlo, 2005). It is not all together clear how many
claims are optimal for persuasion. Recent research on the
optimal number of claims in motivated persuasion has shown
that the persuasive eﬀect increases only up to three claims
(Shu and Carlson, 2014). Including a fourth claim was shown
to increase skepticism and persuasion knowledge rather than
persuasion, when consumers know that the message source has
a persuasion motive. Through several experiments, Shu and
Carlson (2014) demonstrate that three claims produced a more
favorable evaluation than two or four claims. They also suggest
that coping is the cause of the fall in persuasiveness when a
fourth claim is presented, by demonstrating that respondents
under high cognitive strain show increased persuasion when
being presented with a fourth claim, whereas the non-strained
control-group show most favorable evaluation after only three
claims. By depleting cognitive resources from the research-
subjects, the ability to cope with the persuasive content was
reduced.
Part of the reason why over-communication sometimes
hampers persuasion may be that when more claims are added,
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some of the claims are perceived as weaker, or less relevant
than the others. Including weak or irrelevant information
has been proven to reduce the persuasiveness of a message.
Nisbett et al. (1981) refer to this phenomenon as dilution-eﬀect.
Dilution-eﬀect is deﬁned as: “A judgment bias in which the
presence of non-diagnostic cues, when processed along with
diagnostic cues, causes a judge to under-weigh the diagnostic
cues” (Waller and Zimbelman, 2003, p. 254). Dilution eﬀects have
been documented across many disciplines and research-settings
(see Ettenson et al., 1987; Tetlock and Boettger, 1989; Smith
et al., 1998; Meyvis and Janiszewski, 2002). Field experiments
in economics have documented similar phenomena, referred to
as “less is better” or “more is less” eﬀects (Hsee, 1998; List,
2002). In these experiments, bundles of high-quality objects
elicit higher willingness to pay than the same bundles, with the
addition of some lower quality objects. The use of relatively
low quality/low importance claims in conjunction with high
quality claims thus appears to be one factor that makes persuasive
intent seem more heavy-handed and transparent, which in
turn may increase coping, and thus reduce persuasive eﬀect.
De Vries et al. (2014) conducted three experiments to explore
the role of dilution-eﬀects in communication for and against
carbon dioxide capture and storage. They used combinations
of highly relevant, moderately relevant and irrelevant claims.
Dilution eﬀects were only manifest in positive persuasion, and
only when combining highly relevant and irrelevant information.
However, interesting, these experiments did not includemeasures
of persuasion knowledge. Experiment 2 in the present research
thus represents a partial replication and attempted exploration of
the mechanisms behind the ﬁndings presented in De Vries et al.
(2014).
Summarized, the literature on the number of claims in
persuasion suggests four main ﬁndings: (a) Increasing the
number of claims leads to incremental increase in persuasion, up
to a point of satiety. (b) The point of satiety, after which further
claims no longer increases persuasion, is reached earlier when the
target perceives the agent as having persuasive intent, and later
when elaboration and scrutiny is low. (c) Increasing the number
of claims can increase the likelihood that the agent is perceived
as having persuasive intent. (d) Adding weak claims to bundles
of strong claims can dilute the overall persuasiveness of the
communication. An important gap in this research is that almost
all these ﬁndings stem from experiments in positive persuasion,
i.e., persuading others to believe that something or someone
is good. Whether the same eﬀects would emerge in negative
persuasion, i.e., persuading others to believe that something or
someone is bad, is largely unknown. This gap is not only of
theoretical relevance to psychology. As CSR is becoming an
increasingly important part of brand strategy, it is of tantamount
importance to understand how consumers perceive diﬀerent
CSR-strategies, how they cope with the persuasive intent of
CSR communication, and what evaluative artifacts these coping
processes produce (Olsen et al., 2014).
Considering the body of research on good vs. bad perception
and judgments (see Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman,
2001), there is good reason to suspect that the dynamics of
evaluating negative claims are qualitatively diﬀerent from those
of positive claims. For instance, individuals who spend less time
and require less information in order to classify an event, person,
or object as bad may have an adaptive advantage. Thus, the
consequences of type 2 errors (failing to detect a pattern) in
this domain are often more severe than the consequence of
type 1 errors (perceiving a pattern where there is none). In
literature-studies, the “tragic ﬂaw”, or Hamartia, has been a
familiar concept since the Greek dramas. A tragic ﬂaw typically
consists of a single failing or transgression that brings about
ruin to the otherwise admirable character (Sherman, 1992). Social
anthropologist studying purity and contamination in Hindu
cultures have noted a negativity bias in that purity is diﬃcult
to reach and maintain, while a single act of contagion (like
touching a person of lower caste) will instantly contaminate the
entire person (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). In social and moral
psychology, the negativity eﬀect states that evaluative negative
information is weighted more heavily than evaluative positive
information in overall evaluations (Kanouse and Hanson, 1971).
This eﬀect, sometimes referred to as the positive–negative
asymmetry or negativity bias, is considered especially relevant
when evaluations entail aﬀective reactions (Lewicka et al., 1992).
In judgment and decision-making research, the prospect theory
demonstrates that people are more aversive toward small losses
than they are positive toward corresponding gains (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). This eﬀect implies that people tend to be
risk-averse over prospects involving gains, while they are risk-
seeking when it comes to prospects involving losses (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985; Frazzini, 2006). Another consequence of the
eﬀect is the tendency of people to sell assets whose price has
increased, while keeping assets that have decreased in value.
The implication is that people are less willing to recognize
losses, but are more willing to recognize gains (Odean, 1998;
Weber and Camerer, 1998; Camerer, 2000; Barberis and Xiong,
2009).
Continuing the general ‘bad is stronger than good’ ﬁnding into
corporate ethics research, Creyer (1997) found that consumers
are willing to purchase from unethical companies, but they expect
a substantial reduction in prices. The consumers expect ethical
corporate behavior as a norm, and are willing to pay a slightly
higher price for products from companies who go above and
beyond the expected level of ethical behavior. The willingness to
pay for products from unethical, normal and ethical companies,
respectively, correspond to the curve of prospect theory, in
which minor ethical violations are weighted more heavily than
corresponding minor ethical advances.
Taken together, the evidence from the ‘bad is stronger than
good’-literature, suggests that the number of claims used in a
persuasion setting should play a larger role in positive persuasion
than negative persuasion. As negative information is processed
more thoroughly, the psychological point of satiety should be
reached sooner in negative persuasion than positive persuasion.
Thus, a positive–negative asymmetry is to be expected, in which
the number of claims cause signiﬁcant changes in the positive
domain, whereas the reaction to negative persuasion should be
less aﬀected by the numerosity of claims. Borrowing the terms
from the Persuasion Knowledge model (Friestad and Wright,
1994), we further theorize that the level persuasion knowledge
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an individual experiences when being persuaded into believing
that something or someone is good, increases as the number
of claims increases. As a contrast, the amount of claims used
in negative persuasion should not elicit changes in persuasion
knowledge, as the point of satiety is reached sooner. There are
several reasons to expect that numerosity of claims will fail to
elicit diﬀerences in persuasion and persuasion knowledge when
subjects are dealing with negative claims. Firstly, high coping
with negative claims may be evolutionarily maladaptive, as the
consequences of adherence and defecting are asymmetrical. As an
example, consider an individual in a pre-historic society, being
subjected to claims favoring the abolishment of certain foods.
Adhering to the advice would take out one of the sources of
food from his diet, which is presumably unfortunate but not
directly life-threatening. Defecting from the advice may result
in much more direct and dire consequences, both in terms of
health and social status. Coping when faced with claims saying
that something or someone is bad, has presumably been less
evolutionarily advantageous than coping when faced with claims
saying that something or someone is good. Secondly, modern
day consumers are presumably more experienced with positive
persuasion, from a lifetime of dealing with marketers (Boush
et al., 1994; John, 1999). Negative persuasion is rarely used
in marketing, with the notable exceptions of health-behavior
ads and political attack ads. Consequently, consumers may
activate their persuasion-knowledge and coping schemas more
eﬀectively and with greater sensitivity when faced with a positive
persuasion attempt, rather than a negative persuasion attempt.
Including diluting (weak) claims into sets of strong claims is
also theorized to produce asymmetrical dilution-eﬀects across
positive and negative persuasion. The subjects being persuaded
into believing that a company is good (environmentally friendly),
are expected to display a higher readiness to perceive the
inclusion of a weak claim as heavy-handed or transparent,
alerting them to the persuasion-attempt they are being subjected
to. The subjects being persuaded to believe that the company is
bad (environmentally aversive), should have a lower readiness
to perceive the inclusion of a weaker claim as heavy-handed
or transparent, and therefore not utilize the same coping
mechanisms.
To summarize, the two related research-questions that stand
to be answered in this thesis are; (1) What are the eﬀects of
diﬀerent numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion?
and (2) How does diﬀerent qualities of claims eﬀect the outcomes
in positive and negative persuasion? Based on these research-
questions, we state the following four hypotheses:
(1) The number of claims will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
perception of the company in positive persuasion, but not
in negative persuasion.
(2) The number of claims will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on persuasion knowledge and skepticism in positive
persuasion, but not in negative persuasion.
(3) Dilution-eﬀects will emerge in positive persuasion, but not
in negative persuasion.
(4) Dilution-eﬀects on persuasion knowledge will be moderated
by dispositional reactance.
Materials and Pre-Testing
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Research Council of Norway, The
National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences
and the Humanities, with electronically written informed consent
from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Before running the
experiment, various claims were tested in a population similar
to the one used in the experiment. We used CSR-related claims
pertaining to an ocean-farming company as setting. There are
two main motivations behind this choice. Firstly, CSR persuasion
has been studied less extensively than traditional persuasion,
even though it is becoming an increasingly important part of
branding (Boulstridge and Carrigan, 2000; Sen and Bhattacharya,
2001; Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Aburdene, 2007; Costa and
Menichini, 2013). Secondly, ocean-farming has been both hailed
as one of the industries that may potentially be part of the
solution to global warming (Asche and Khatun, 2006), as well as
criticized for being unsustainable in its current form (Folke and
Kautsky, 1992). Our setting thus provides the basis for a plausible
and realistic persuasion-attempt, both in favor and against the
actions of a company. The participants in the pre-test were
exposed to a list of either 10 claims in favor of an ocean-farming
corporations’ social responsibility (positive claims), or 10 claims
in favor of an ocean-farming corporations’ social irresponsibility
(negative claims). Participants were told that all the claims were
candidates to be used in a persuasion setting, but that it was
up to the participant to rate how strong they felt each claim
was. The participants were instructed to allocate 100 points
selectively among the claims. Claims perceived as strong were to
be awarded more points, and claims perceived as weak were to
be awarded few or no points. All 100 points had to be allocated
by each participant. The rank order of the presentation of the
claims were randomized across trials, to ensure that primacy-,
and recency eﬀects did not aﬀect the outcome of the test. A total
of 32 student participants rated the positive claims, and 29
student participants rated the negative claims. The four positive
and four negative claims with the highest score were chosen
to be used in the experiments. Tables 1 and 2 display these
claims (translated to English by the authors), and their mean and
median rating.
Additionally, two positive and one negative claim were
chosen as moderately diluting claims, to be used in the second
experiment. These claims were selected because they fulﬁlled the
criteria of having been evaluated as weak but similar in strength,
across subjects. Table 3 displays the diluting claims used in
Experiment 2.
Procedure and Results
Experiment 1: The Role of Numerosity
The ﬁrst experiment was designed to explore the role of diﬀerent
numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion. Hundred
and ninety eight students from a large Norwegian business-
school were recruited to the experiment. The participants in the
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TABLE 1 | Evaluation of positive claims.
Claim The
company
has
paid to
restore
10 km2
of
destroyed
ocean-
floor
The
company
has
switched
to solar-
powered
energy
Without reducing
the quality in the
end-product, the
company only
uses recycled
materials in
fodder-
production
The company has
committed itself
to invest 20% of
all earnings in
technology that
will help protect
wild salmon and
trout
Mean 13,43 17,22 13,25 22,78
Median 12,5 15 14,5 22,5
TABLE 2 | Evaluation of negative claims.
Claim The
companys’
activities
has
destroyed
10 km2
of
ocean-
floor
The
company
emits
over
100
metric
tons of
CO2
each
year
The company is
unwilling to invest
in new facilities. As
a consequence,
many of the farmed
fish escape,
increasing the
spread of lice, and
harming the wild
salmon in nearby
areas
The farming
activities cause
the emission of
nutrient salts and
organic matter,
which increase
the algae-growth
and
eutrophication in
the inner fjords
Mean 16,37 12,66 17,23 18,17
Median 20 10 15 20
TABLE 3 | Diluting claims.
Claim The company has
switched to slightly
costlier but more
eco-friendly
lightbulbs in all
offices
The company has
replaced all its cars
with electric cars
The entire
company
car-fleet consists
of high-emission
SUV’s
Mean 2,44 4,28 2,77
Median 0,5 1 0
pre-test could not participate in the experiment. Participation was
incentivized by lottery of smartphone and serving of pizza. The
experiment was done in an auditorium, and subjects used their
smartphone, tablet, or pc/mac to read instructions and indicate
responses. Web-based experiment-software ensured an even and
random distribution of subjects to either positive or negative
persuasion. In the positive persuasion setting, participants were
exposed to the following vignette (translated by authors):
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate
environmental care is of great importance to you. You consider
applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company.
A friend of yours already works at the company. In order to
convince you that Marine Farming is environmentally friendly,
your friend presents the following claims:.”
To ensure validity, the vignette had a 30 s forced exposure
setting. The software further randomized these subjects into three
subgroups; Group A was exposed to two of the strong positive
claims, Group B to three strong positive claims, and Group C to
four strong positive claims. The claims were all drawn from the
pool of four positive claims presented in Table 1. The software
ensured that which claims, and the rank order of presentation
of claims, was randomized across subjects (except for Group C,
in which all four claims were used, and only the rank order of
presentation was randomized).
The other half of the sample was randomly allocated to the
negative persuasion setting. They were ﬁrstly presented with the
following vignette:
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate
environmental care is of great importance to you. You consider
applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company.
A friend of yours works at a competing company. In order to
convince you that Marine Farming is environmentally harmful,
your friend presents the following claims:.”
This vignette also had a 30 s forced exposure setting. The
software further randomized these subjects into three subgroups;
Group Dwas exposed to two of the strong negative claims, Group
E to three strong negative claims, and Group F to four strong
negative claims. The claims were all drawn from the pool of four
negative claims presented in Table 2. The software ensured that
which claims, and the rank order of presentation of claims, was
randomized across subjects (except for Group F, in which all
four claims were used, and only the rank order of presentation
was randomized). Both vignettes described a source (friend) who
spoke of the company in a manner that is congruent with her
motives, as we expect that subjects assume that the friend would
prefer that the target applies for a job at the same company as the
agent.
After having been exposed to both the vignette and the
claims, each participant indicated how much they liked the
company, how certain they felt about their liking of the company,
how believable the claims were perceived, and how relevant
they felt the claims were. The participants also gave scores
on persuasion knowledge and perceived informational intent
by indicating their level of agreement with the statements;
“I felt my friend was attempting to inﬂuence my choice of
employer,” and “I felt my friend wanted to give me information,”
respectively. All these outcome-measures were given on 7-point
likert-scales. Additionally, each subject completed the 11-item
Hong reactance-scale (see Hong and Page, 1989; Hong and
Faedda, 1996).
Results from Experiment 1
Manipulation checks revealed that positive and negative
persuasion lead to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the perceived
likeability of the company, F(1,172) = 178,26, p < 0.001. There
were no overall-eﬀects of amount of claims used. Figure 1 shows
the level of liking of the company among groups who were
exposed to either two, three, or four positive claims, or two, three,
or four negative claims.
Hypothesis 1 states that there should be signiﬁcant diﬀerences
among the diﬀerent conditions within positive persuasion, not
an overall eﬀect of amount of claims. So in order to test
Hypothesis 1, we performed planned contrasts between each
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FIGURE 1 | Single item response of how much the subjects like the company, across experimental conditions.
of the groups in positive persuasion, and each of the groups
in negative persuasion, with level of liking the company as the
dependent variable. In positive persuasion, univariate analysis of
variance revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two and four
claims, F(1,5) = 7,32, p = 0.009, as well as borderline signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between three and four claims, F(1,2)= 2,97, p= 0.09.
Surprisingly, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two
and three positive claims. In negative persuasion, liking of
company increased marginally with each added negative claim.
However, when running the same planned contrasts between
diﬀerent amounts of negative claims, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
levels of liking the company were found. Based on these ﬁndings,
we partially conﬁrm Hypothesis 1. It seems that presenting two
positive claims “leaves room” formore persuasion, if more claims
are added. In negative persuasion, however, a satiety-like ﬁnding
emerges, in which the level of liking is not aﬀected by the presence
or absence of more than two claims.
Previous studies have indicated that behavioral outcomes are
seldom predicted by the valence of an attitude alone, but rather
by the valence combined with certainty or attitude-strength
(Tormala and Petty, 2004). In order to increase our ability
to make predictions of behavioral outcomes, subjects in our
experiments were asked not only to indicate how much they
liked the company, based on the information they had received,
but also how certain they felt about that feeling. In order to
include both valence and certainty in our analysis, we computed
a variable that captures the likeability of the company, multiplied
by the certainty-score the subjects gave. Manipulation check of
certainty-adjusted liking showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
positive and negative persuasion F(1,3312) = 59,64, p < 0.001.
There was also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of the amount of claims
F(2,273) = 4,93, p = 0.008. Planned contrasts between the
diﬀerent subgroups revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two
and four claims in positive persuasion, F(1,350)= 4,82, p= 0.032.
Similar diﬀerences were found between three and four positive
claims, F(1,367) = 6,03, p = 0.017. No diﬀerences were found
amongst the groups in negative persuasion. This ﬁnding further
supports Hypothesis 1.
Using persuasion knowledge as outcome-variable,
manipulation checks again revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between positive and negative persuasion F(1,20) = 13,35,
p < 0.001. The number of claims also carried a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect F(2,5) = 3,69, p = 0.027. Figure 2 shows the level of
persuasion knowledge among groups who were exposed to either
two, three or four positive claims, or two, three or four negative
claims.
An interesting ﬁrst observation from the analysis is that
persuasion-knowledge in negative persuasion is much higher
than in positive persuasion. This ﬁnding is addressed in larger
detail in the discussion part of the article. In order to test
Hypothesis 2, we performed planned contrasts between the
diﬀerent groups. The results revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited by two and
three positive claims F(1,9) = 5,71, p = 0.020. Going from
two to four positive claims also induced a signiﬁcant shift in
the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited F(1,9) = 4,44,
p= 0.039. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between three and
four claims. When performing the same planned contrasts for
diﬀerent amounts of negative claims, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
were found. Performing the same analyses with skepticism as
outcome variable, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant asymmetry between
positive and negative persuasion, in that negative persuasion
elicits more skepticism in general F(1,42) = 26,31, p < 0.001.
Figure 3 displays the mean rating of credibility or believability
across groups.
The stark asymmetry in credibility between positive and
negative persuasion is also elaborated on in the discussion.
Moving on to the planned contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
variance in skepticism with regards to diﬀerent numbers of
claims, in positive or negative persuasion. We further tested
whether or not the reported ﬁndings could be due to variance
in the strength of claims, rather than the numerosity of claims.
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FIGURE 2 | Single item response of persuasion knowledge, across experimental conditions.
FIGURE 3 | Single item response of credibility-perception, across experimental conditions.
We computed variables consisting of the sum of strength of
claims, based on the pre-test mean and median evaluation of the
strength of the claims (see Table 1). These variables were used in
standard multiple regression models. All the reported signiﬁcant
ﬁndings remained, even when controlling for the strength of
claims, while none of the reported insigniﬁcant ﬁndings were
explained by strength of claims. Hypothesis 2 thus stand as
partially conﬁrmed.
Experiment 2: Dilution Effects
The purpose of the second experiment was to explore the
role of diﬀerent quality or subjective strength of claims in
positive and negative persuasion. Eighty-six students from a large
Norwegian business-school was recruited to the experiment.
Participation-incentives and practical procedure were identical
to Experiment 1. Web-based experiment-software ensured that
the participants were randomly distributed to either positive or
negative persuasion, in which two of the claims were randomly
collected from the list of four claims used in Experiment 1, and
one of the claims came from the list of diluting claims presented
in Table 3. Two diﬀerent diluters of positive persuasion were
used, and one diluter of negative persuasion. The negative diluter
used was that the company car-ﬂeet consisted of only high-
emission SUV’s. This claim was selected because results from
the pre-test indicated that it best ﬁtted the purpose of being a
moderately diluting claim. The two positive diluters were chosen
on diﬀerent grounds; the “lightbulb”-claim was chosen because
the results from the pre-test indicated that it received a score
almost identical to the negative diluter. The “electric cars” claim
was chosen because it represents a semantic comparable contrast
to the negative diluter. The vignettes and instructions given to the
subjects were otherwise identical to Experiment 1.
After exposure to both the vignette and the claims, consisting
of one diluting claim and two strong claims, each participant
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indicated their responses on the same outcome-variables as in
Experiment 1. Here as well, each subject completed the Hong
reactance-scale (see Hong and Page, 1989; Hong and Faedda,
1996).
Results from Experiment 2
Preliminary analysis of the results from Experiment 2 revealed no
diﬀerences between the two positive diluting claim conditions.
To ensure statistical power and symmetry, these groups were
combined to a joint diluted positive persuasion group (N = 44).
All further analysis in this experiment was done with this
combined group. No diﬀerent results were obtained when
keeping these groups separate.
To test for dilution-eﬀect, we performed independent samples
t-tests, where the three strong claims groups were run against
their corresponding diluted groups. According to the theoretical
predictions, dilution eﬀects were expected to manifest in the
positive persuasion domain, but not in the negative domain.
However, the ﬁndings from the t-tests showed that across all
outcome variables, in both positive and negative persuasion, no
dilution eﬀects were present. This suggests that the presence
of a claim with low quality or low subjective strength, in
conjunction with two strong claims, has scarce eﬀect on the
total persuasion. This ﬁnding is similar to the one obtained
by De Vries et al. (2014), where only completely irrelevant
information produced dilution-eﬀects, and moderately diluting
information produced no dilution-eﬀect. Hypothesis 3 is thus
rejected.
Diluted claims were expected to bring about an increased
sense of being subject to a persuasion-attempt, as the total pitch
would come across as more heavy-handed. This eﬀect was not
manifest in our results, as we found no diﬀerence in persuasion
knowledge or skepticism between the groups who were exposed
to three strong claims compared to the groups exposed to
diluted sets of claims. However, both theory and past research
on resistance to persuasion suggests that dispositional reactance
should give a person a heightened awareness of being subject to
a persuasion-attempt. Hypothesis 4 is based on this assertion.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we conducted moderator analyses
(see Hayes, 2013), using dilution as independent variable,
persuasion-knowledge as outcome variable, and dispositional
reactance as moderator-variable. Figure 4 presents the model
described.
The results revealed no interaction when using positive claims.
This indicated that diﬀerent levels of reactance had little or
no eﬀect on the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited by
including a diluted claim. In negative persuasion, however, a
signiﬁcant interaction was revealed. The eﬀect of dilution of
claims, on persuasion knowledge, is dependent upon another
predictor, dispositional reactance. Table 4 shows the values of the
model.
Plotting the graphs for level of persuasion knowledge,
conditional on dispositional level of reactance, and dilution
of claims, it is clear that high-reactance subjects exposed to
diluted negative claims showed higher persuasion knowledge,
while low-reactance individuals did not. Figure 5 displays the
interaction
FIGURE 4 | Moderation model.
TABLE 4 | Interaction values.
Coefficient SE t p LLCI ULCI
Constant 13,06 3,80 3,44 0,0011 5,46 20,66
Reactance –2,04 1,19 –1,72 0,0903 –4,43 0,3313
Dilution –1,12 0,46 –2,43 0,0179 –2,04 –0,20
Int 0,33 0,15 2,27 0,0264 0,04 0,62
Discussion
Direct Effects
Our most powerful ﬁnding is the large diﬀerence in the amount
of persuasion-knowledge and skepticism generated by negative
claims, relative to positive claims. Our theorizing from the point
of evolutionary psychology and consumers past experience with
similar persuasion episodes is contradicted by this ﬁnding. This
is theoretically interesting, as past research on the eﬀects of
negative persuasion is limited. We interpret the ﬁnding in the
light of negativity eﬀect, stating that negative events are given
more attention, and weighted more heavily than positive claims.
As negative claims receive more attention and elaboration,
they also induce an elevated amount of scrutiny in the targets
interpretation of the claims. The target who gives more attention
and performs a deeper elaboration of the claims is more likely
to make attributional inferences into the motivation of the
agent, resulting in an increase in their awareness that they
are being subjected to a persuasion-attempt. Put diﬀerently,
they increase their persuasion knowledge. The heightened level
of scrutiny also induces a higher level of skepticism, making
the target perceive the claims as less believable. The high
levels of persuasion knowledge and skepticism revealed in the
negative persuasion groups correspond well with the limited
eﬀect negative persuasion had on overall likeability of the
company. The positive persuasion induced a mean liking that
was higher than the one for negative persuasion. Given that the
neutral point on this outcome variable is four, the results clearly
indicate that the impact on likeability generated by positive
persuasion was far greater than that of negative persuasion. The
reason for this diﬀerence seems to lie in the increased coping
in negative persuasion relative to positive persuasion. However,
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FIGURE 5 | Interaction.
the limitations of the current study leaves room for alternative,
or supplemental interpretations. In the current study, the target
was presented as “considering applying at Marine Farming.” This
may be perceived as stating that the target already held a positive
view of the company, and a behavioral intention that leaned
more toward applying than not applying. Subjects may have
interpreted the vignettes as saying that the positive persuasion
agent tried to enhance or aﬃrm a behavioral intention that
was present to begin with, while the negative persuasion agent
tried to stop and alter a behavioral intention. As such, it may
be the case that arguing against the application is perceived as
a more invasive or heavy-handed action than arguing for it.
However, as both vignettes described the target as “considering
applying,” another interpretation may be that the target already
has a slightly negative view of the company, hence the need for
consideration. In line with this interpretation, negative claims
would be conceived of as more aﬃrming of an attitude that
is already present, while positive claims are perceived as a
more invasive attempt at attitude-change. We therefore disregard
this potential interpretation. Another confounding element in
the present study may be that the person arguing for the
company is currently working there, while the person arguing
against the company works at a competing ﬁrm. The diﬀerent
positions of the sources may be considered a confounding
variable, which might explain the heightened skepticism and
persuasion knowledge among the subjects exposed to negative
persuasion. The vignettes were designed in this way to secure
a sense of motivation on behalf of the source in both the
negative and positive persuasion setting. Future experiments
should attempt to remove this confounding variable, while
maintaining realism in the congruency of source and motivation.
The present study described a typical scenario for positive and
negative persuasion, in which a representative of a company
speaks well of her employer, or ill of a competing company. We
consider the opposite scenario, in which someone speaks well of
the competition, and ill of one’s own company, as less realistic.
Indeed, De Vries et al. (2014), attempted to use claims that were
incongruent with the motives the organization in question is
assumed to act upon (an industrial organization that spoke well
of CO2 capture and storage). They found that this breach of
realism in the design of stimuli made the subjects confused, to
the extent that their responses failed to pass the manipulation
check. In our experiment, the source of the message is positioned
in a way that allows for congruency between her motivations
and the content of her claims. On this basis, we can conclude
that positive claims made from someone within a company
generates far less skepticism and persuasion knowledge than
negative claims made from someone at a competing company.
Although we are unable to pinpoint whether this eﬀect stems
primarily from negativity bias or the relative position of the
source of the claims, the ﬁnding is nevertheless theoretically and
pragmatically interesting, as it arose from a realistic description
of events.
Our secondary sets of ﬁndings show that the eﬀects of diﬀerent
amounts of claims in persuasion are asymmetrical across the
positive–negative divide. This ﬁnding resonates well with the
theoretical predictions from negativity eﬀect and numerosity
eﬀect. More speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that the amount of
claims induce quite small variances in outcomes overall, but the
signiﬁcant changes are all within positive persuasion. This ﬁnding
also corresponds well to the predictions made by past work
on positive–negative asymmetry. We assert that receiving more
and more information about how environmentally responsible
or irresponsible a company is, will aﬀect ones perception of
the company, up to a certain point. Past this point, more
information of the same valence will no longer produce changes
in the impression of the company. We refer to this theoretical
inﬂection point as a satiety point, as there is no longer any
eﬀect of additional information of the same valence. The
ﬁnding that more information elicits changes in the eﬀect of
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positive persuasion, but not in negative persuasion, is interpreted
in the light of this satiety-model of persuasion. Our ﬁnding
demonstrates that the psychological level of satiety is reached
sooner in negative persuasion than in positive persuasion. The
reason for this is that negative claims are weighted more heavily,
given more attention, and elaborated on more thoroughly, than
positive claims. Consequently, less information is needed before
the point of satiety is reached. This ﬁnding resonates well with
prospect-theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in that the slope
on the graph is steeper in the area of negative information
(losses) than in the area of positive information (gains). It
also corresponds well with the notion of contagion, put forth
by Rozin and Royzman (2001), in that perceived virtue stems
from many, consistently positive behaviors, while a single act
of immorality elicits immediate contagion, and further acts of
immorality are superﬂuous in changing the impression for the
worse. Here as well, it is possible to argue that the position
of the source plays a confounding role in the interpretation
of the claims. However, even though the claims presented in
negative persuasion are perceived as less believable than the
ones presented in positive persuasion, they are still perceived
as more believable than neutral (mean believability rating >4).
Another possible confounding aspect to our design is the fact that
the claims used are semantically diﬀerent, and were evaluated
diﬀerently in the pre-test. However, the variance in strength
within the four positive and four negative claims is very similar.
The diﬀerence in median score from the weakest to most
powerful claim is 10 points, in both sets of claims. And as
the list of two, three, or four claims were randomly generated
for each research-subject, we believe that it is unlikely, but
not impossible, that the results could be caused by diﬀerences
in the strength of the claims. Within positive persuasion, our
ﬁndings show support for the numerosity eﬀect (see Pelham
et al., 1994). Our ﬁndings contradict the “charm of three”
ﬁnding, demonstrated by Shu and Carlson (2014), in which three
claims consistently generated more liking and less persuasion
knowledge than four or two claims. Instead, we ﬁnd that four
claims signiﬁcantly outperforms two and three claims, even
though persuasion knowledge is increased. One of the diﬀerences
between our design and that of Shu and Carlson may be
that we assess persuasion in a CSR setting, rather than in a
traditional marketing setting. The claims we therefore use are
more speciﬁc in nature than the claims used by Shu and Carlson
(2014).
Interaction Effects
Finally, we demonstrate that including moderately diluting
claims in bundles of claims give no direct eﬀect on the outcomes
of persuasion. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous research on
moderately diluting claims (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989; De Vries
et al., 2014). The implication of this ﬁnding is that the subjective
quality of the claims used in CSR communication has less eﬀect
on the outcome than one would intuitively imagine.We interpret
this ﬁnding as being fairly consistent with the phenomenon
of scope insensitivity or scope neglect (see Desvousges et al.,
1992). This eﬀect states that, in lieu of available reference-points,
diﬀerent levels of positive and negative impact on the wellbeing
of people and ecosystems are unconducive to persuasion. This
eﬀect has been studied experimentally in philanthropy and
environmentalism. For instance, when asked how much they
would be willing to pay to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000migratory
birds from uncovered oilponds, the respondents average answers
were 80, 78, and 88$, respectively. Similar experiments showed
that residents would pay little more to clean up all polluted lakes
in Ontario than polluted lakes in a particular region of Ontario
(Kahneman, 2004). Furthermore, residents of four western US
states would pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness
areas in those states than to protect a single area (McFadden
and Leonard, 1993). One proposed explanation for scope neglect
is the “valuation by prototype”-hypothesis, suggesting that the
mental representation of the diﬀerent options usually consists of
single, representative and emotionally charged exemplars (such
as a single bird drenched in oil), rather than numerical variables
(Kahneman et al., 2000). The results from our experiment are
compatible with scope neglect, as the subjects responses indicate
that the attitude toward the company is unaﬀected by the scope
of the claims, and more aﬀected by the prototypical direction
those claims point (good/bad). Only when adding dispositional
reactance as another predictor variable were we able to identify
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of dilution. Based on available theory, it is
easy to understand why the level of dispositional reactance is
associated with the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited
by diluted claims. However, it is diﬃcult to interpret, based on
available theory, why this phenomenon is asymmetrical across
the positive–negative divide, and only manifest within negative
persuasion. Hence, we report it here as a singular ﬁnding, and
leave the interpretation for future research.
Contribution, Implication, and Future Research
The present study is one of the few studies to investigate
persuasion in both positive and negative directions. Recently,
Rozin and Royzman (2001) found that negative information
was more powerful than parallel positive information. Based
on this and other ﬁndings, loss-framed appeals have been
launched as more persuasive than gain-framed appeals (e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2005). However, negative frames have proven
to be more persuasive than positive ones predominantly when
participants’ processing of the information is in-depth (Block and
Keller, 1995). The impact of negative message framing is thus
dependent on degree of elaboration, it seems (Jones et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, negative framing not only requires deep processing
in order to have a greater impact than positive framing, it also
stimulates more eﬀortful and thorough information processing
in itself (Kuvaas and Selart, 2004).
The present study adds to this literature by assessing in
particular how persuasion knowledge and skepticism are elicited
by positive vs negative persuasion. Ourmain ﬁnding, thatmorally
motivated positive framing of one’s employers’ green activities
generates far less skepticism and persuasion knowledge than
negative framing of competing ﬁrms harmful activities, is of both
theoretical and managerial value. The value of the ﬁnding comes
largely from the fact that the design of the study is realistic and
motivationally congruent. From a managerial point of view, the
results of this study imply that word-of-mouth accusations on
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behalf of a competitor are largely inadvisable, as they not only
face the risk of being condemned as inappropriate, but that the
entire persuasion-attempt risks coming across as heavy-handed
or transparent, as well as less believable. Highlighting one’s own
laudable eﬀorts seems to be a better persuasion tactic. From a
theoretical point of view, our results indicate that there seems
to be a positive–negative asymmetry in persuasion, not only
concerning the consequences of the persuasion per se, but also
the consequences using diﬀerent numbers of claims. This deepens
our understanding of the interaction between the numerosity
eﬀect and the negativity bias. However, as with most persuasion-
experiments, we cannot assert with certainty that these results
can be generalized to any persuasion setting. We recommend
that future research should attempt to isolate the mechanisms
behind the positive–negative asymmetry documented here, while
maintaining ecological realism and congruency in the design of
stimuli.
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The questions addressed in this paper are whether and how reported mortality
reminders can function as an indication of sincerity when communicating ambiguously
motivated decisions. In two experiments, participants were exposed to a fictitious
CEO who announced a decision to implement new organizational measures that were
both environmentally and financially beneficial. In the experimental condition, the CEO
attributed her new ideas to a recent mortality reminder. In the active control condition,
the CEO attributed her decision to a non-lethal dentistry health scare, and in the passive
control condition the CEO did not give any account of events preceding her decision.
When a CEO implemented new corporate initiatives after a mortality reminder, her
motivation for doing so was perceived as somewhat more motivated by intrinsic values,
and significantly less motivated by financial gains. This change in attribution patterns
was demonstrated to be indirectly related to a positive evaluation of the CEO, as well as
an increased willingness to pay for the organization’s services. The second experiment
further demonstrated that the reduced attribution to financial motivation associated
with mortality awareness persisted even when the CEO in question was known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment. The findings underscore
the importance of perceived value-oriented motivation when communicating climate
change mitigating policies, and the role of mortality awareness as one of many ways
to induce such attributions.
Keywords: mortality salience, terror management, CSR communication, attribution, value-orientation
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus that corporations have a social responsibility to serve communities,
society, and the environment in ways that go above and beyond what is legally required (Wood,
1991; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Lockett et al., 2006). This form of social responsibility is
typically referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The goal of most CSR initiatives is to
achieve sustained competitive advantage by attracting and retaining support from consumers and
other stakeholders (Waddock, 2008; Devinney, 2009; Porter and Kramer, 2011). CSR measures
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frequently involve activities and goals that appear to go against
the corporate logic of profit, such as philanthropy, community
development, environmental conservation, or social justice (Van
Marrewijk, 2003). In many cases, however, the CSR goals neatly
overlap with the ordinary corporate goals, such as reducing costly
waste and conserving energy.
Organizations and individuals face a dilemma regarding how
to communicate their CSR policies to the public. In general,
most consumers want corporations to act as good corporate
citizens. However, consumers are often also quite skeptical of
corporations that promote their good citizenship (Brønn and
Vrioni, 2001; Morsing et al., 2008; Lii and Lee, 2012). Yoon
et al. (2006) found that in cases where a company was perceived
as insincere, CSR communications actually hurt the company
image. Similarly, psychological research has demonstrated that
perceived intentions and motivations are crucial when labeling
actions morally good or bad. For a behavior to be considered
morally praiseworthy, the agent must not only have intended
and brought about the action and its consequences, she must
also have performed the act for reasons that are themselves
praiseworthy (Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012; Critcher
et al., in preparation). Organizations thus face a perilous and
delicate situation. By under-communicating CSR activities, one
faces the risk of people never learning about the activities, and
possibly assuming that no CSR initiatives have been made. By
failing to communicate CSR messages in a sincere and believable
fashion, one faces the risk of skepticism and cynicism among
of weary consumers, who disbelieve the accuracy and sincerity
of the claims, and the efficacy of the policies (Morsing et al.,
2008). This danger of perceived insincerity is also relevant when
corporations engage in environmentally friendly activities. Even
though communicating environmentally oriented CSR policies
and activities could elicit positive reactions, it may also lead
to adverse motivational attributions (see Groza et al., 2011). In
cases where the sustainability initiatives are seen as primarily
motivated by financial gain, people often respond negatively
(Morsing and Schultz, 2006). Previous research has demonstrated
that people easily suspect ulterior motives when they hear of
corporate activities that are both environmentally and financially
beneficial (de Vries et al., 2013; Windsor, 2013). As perceived
sincerity of motivation has been identified as a key success factor
for CSR communication, and as CSR is becoming an increasingly
important part of brand strategy, it is important to understand
how consumers perceive the motivation behind different CSR
strategies, and identify the antecedents to favorable motivational
attribution (Du et al., 2010; Debeljak et al., 2011; Olsen et al.,
2014).
In this paper, we explored how justifying ambiguously
motivated CSR initiatives with a recent mortality reminder
can mitigate suspicion of extrinsic motivation. The overarching
research question was whether people recently exposed to a
mortality reminder are perceived as more value-oriented. By
perceived value-orientation, we mean a combination of more
attribution to intrinsic moral or ideological convictions, and
less attribution to extrinsic factors, such as financial gains, and
external expectations on behalf of consumers and stakeholders.
The research question is particularly interesting in order to
understand how people perceive individuals and organizations
who attempt to portray themselves as morally motivated, while
obviously also being motivated by financial gain. It is also of
immediate concern for research on how to increase favorable
evaluation of climate change mitigating CSR initiatives in the
population at large, as cynical motivational attribution may be
a barrier against positive evaluations of such initiatives. While
previous research has speculated that mortality awareness can
aid people into more environmentally friendly attitudes and
behaviors (Vail et al., 2012), we extend the investigation into how
a motivational attribution can be altered when we know that the
observed person is in a state of elevated mortality awareness.
Mortality Salience
The psychological and behavioral consequences of thinking about
death, and the mortality of the self and others, have been studied
extensively (Burke et al., 2010). Most of this research has been
conducted within the framework of terror management theory
(Greenberg et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Typical terror
management has been studied in experiments where one group is
exposed to a mortality prime, e.g., an instruction to describe what
happens to the physical body after death, while a control group
is exposed to a control prime, e.g., an instruction to describe
a painful dentistry treatment (Burke et al., 2010). After an
initial priming manipulation, participants then go on to indicate
their attitudes, or perform behaviors that are hypothesized to
be affected by the presence of mortality awareness. According
to TMT, people have an innate existential motivation to turn
to meaning-providing structures to cope with the knowledge
of inevitable mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990; Routledge et al.,
2008). The most commonly observed coping mechanisms are
increased investments in-, and defense of, own cultural world
views, and self-esteem (Baumeister, 1991). Subsequent increase
in self-esteem and an increased defense of one’s own cultural
world views have been observed as a reaction to mortality primes
in a vast number of studies (Burke et al., 2010), while a slight
shift toward political conservatism has been observed in others
(Jost et al., 2003). These reactions are typically referred to as
‘distal defenses’, meaning that the process by which they arise
as a response to the mortality prime is typically not consciously
accessible (Greenberg et al., 2000). Terror management studies
using attributions as outcome measure have yielded findings in
line with the theoretical framework, demonstrating that mortality
primes increase the tendency for self serving attributions and
imbuing everyday actions with meaning (Mikulincer and Florian,
2002; Landau et al., 2010).
Mortality Salience and Different
Motivations
The idea that awareness of one’s own mortality may be related
to changes in the priority of extrinsic pursuits is not new. All
five major religions present recurrent reminders of how material
riches are rendered empty in the face of mortality. Works
of literature and philosophy further echo the notion that the
thought of one’s inevitable death can make efforts to obtain
superfluous material value seem inauthentic and meaningless.
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The existential psychologists Yalom (1980, 2008), as well as
classic literary characters like Dickens’s Ebenezer Scrooge, have
illustrated how intimations of mortality make strivings for wealth
and social status seem vacuous and void of meaning. Councilors
working with terminal patients, or people who have had near-
death experiences, report that a typical reaction is to devaluate
the meaning of material possessions and ego-enhancement
(Kinnier et al., 2001; Ware, 2011). The effects of mortality
primes on materialism and extrinsic vs. value-driven motivation
have been researched quite extensively. While philosophy and
literature point solely toward a decrease in extrinsic motivation
as consequence of mortality reminders, TMT experiments offer
more complex results. Kosloff and Greenberg (2009) found that
participants who were asked how much importance they placed
on extrinsic pursuits tended to trivialize their importance if
asked directly after the mortality prime. However, when given
a distractor task between the presentation of the mortality
prime and the subsequent questionnaire, participants gave higher
importance ratings for a high priority extrinsic goal. The authors
argued that such effects may arise because the affirmation of
personally important extrinsic goals can lead to higher self-
esteem and defense of the sources of meaning in life. Across
most TMT experiments, the delay and distraction between the
mortality prime and outcome measure is used to allow for
mortality cognitions to fade from consciousness, as the distal
defenses are theorized to only manifest after the thought has
faded from consciousness (Burke et al., 2010). Increase in self-
esteem and embracement of one’s cultural world views are the
two well-known distal defenses, and as such, it is in line with
TMT that the increased investment in extrinsic goals after a
mortality prime is only present when a distractor task is used,
and the extrinsic goal considered culturally and/or personally
important (Arndt et al., 2004). Support for pro-environmental
attitudes can be increased as a reaction to a mortality prime,
but only in cases where people are already imbued with pro-
environmental attitudes (Vess and Arndt, 2008; Fritsche and
Häfner, 2012), or when pro-environmental norms are a salient
part of the environment (Fritsche et al., 2010). Taken together,
these findings suggest that the predictable reaction toward a
mortality prime is increased defense of one’s cultural worldview
and self-esteem. Provided that extrinsic pursuits are the central
theme in one’s cultural worldview, and/or the prominent source
of positive self-esteem, mortality primes should induce an
increased investment in those extrinsic pursuits. If morally
motivated pro-environmentalism is an important part of one’s
cultural world view, and/or important source of self-esteem,
mortality primes should reliably induce increased engagement in
those pursuits.
While some research has focused on the link between
mortality salience, extrinsic motivation, and environmental
attitudes and behavior, less is known about howmortality salience
can affect the motivational attribution of other people’s behavior.
Even though the presented paper draws upon TMT research,
it departs from the terror management tradition in one crucial
aspect. Whereas most TMT research focuses on how people
respond when primed with reminders of their own mortality,
this study explores how an observed decision maker is perceived,
when that decision maker claims to have been made more
acutely aware of her own mortality. To the very best of our
knowledge, people’s lay-theories about the nature of motivation
under mortality awareness have not previously been described
in the literature. However, past research has demonstrated that
people often infer that the motivational processes they experience
are present in the minds of others as well (Reeder and Trafimow,
2005). This is why we chose to base the direction of our
hypotheses on TMT research. The experiments presented here
were designed to test if and how a decision makers’ claimed
mortality awareness can eschew motivational attribution from
financial and extrinsic to value-oriented. The experiments tested
perceptions of behaviors and decisions made by an executive in a
corporate setting.
Research Outline: Mortality Awareness
and Perceived Value-Orientation
The independent variable (IV) in TMT research is the presence
or absence of a psychological prime that makes the issue of
mortality more or less salient in the experiment situation. As
the present research in more concerned with social perception
(i.e., the perception of others), the IV in this study was
termed morality awareness, referring to the extent to which
the decision maker claimed to have been acutely aware of her
own mortality. According to Critcher et al. (in preparation),
people engage in social-cognitive mind reading when assessing
how morally praiseworthy an observed behavior is. This mind
reading entails picking up cues that indicate the extent to
which the observed person seems to appreciate the underlying
moral principle behind their behavior. We hypothesized that
mortality awareness may serve as such a cue, highlighting that the
demonstrated behavior is more motivated by moral values such
as a sincere appreciation for the importance of sustainability and
environmental protection, and less by financial gains and external
expectations. The setting of the experiment was a description of
a fictitious company that had recently decided to implement CSR
measures that were not only environmentally beneficial, but also
cost saving for the company, as the customers would bear the cost
of the initiatives. In this particular case, the setting is a hotel chain
manager who decided to reduce the size of plates and glasses
at the buffet, install water saving showers, and adopt a more
restrictive policy regarding changing of towels and linens. These
initiatives are all clearly environmentally friendly, as they will lead
to reduced waste of food and drink, reduced energy consumption,
and reduced use of detergents and emission of wastewater. They
are also certainly financially beneficial, as they will reduce costs
on behalf of the hotel. The CEO in question claimed that the
new initiatives were motivated by her sincere appreciation for the
importance of environmental care and climate changemitigation.
However, as all these cost-saving measures are ultimately carried
by the consumer, and directly and positively influencing the
company cash flow, the sincerity of the CEO’s motivation was
clearly questionable. Our first prediction, derived from TMT,
was that the CEO who decided to implement these measures
would be presumed to be more motivated by her intrinsic values,
and less motivated by extrinsic factors, if she was perceived as
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having been acutely aware of her own mortality when she made
the decision. Our second prediction was that this relationship
would be reversed, if the observed decision maker was known
to put a strong personal priority on financial goal attainment.
Two experiments were designed to test each of the predictions,
respectively.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was designed to explore if a person’s ambiguously
motivated decision is attributed to different motivations,
depending on whether, or not the decision maker has recently
been reminded of her own mortality. The IV was the
circumstances that led the CEO to come up with the new
initiatives. The three experimental conditions only differed in
how the CEO answered to a question of how these ideas
came about, one of which involves mortality awareness. In the
mortality awareness condition, the CEO claimed to have had
a mortality reminder, and subsequently decided to implement
the aforementioned CSR initiatives. We predicted that this set
of events would lead to more value-based attributions, and
less attributions to extrinsic factors, compared to the control
conditions, which do not involve mortality awareness. As value-
based attributions were expected to be associated with support
for CSR initiatives, the first hypothesis predicted a direct effect
between mortality awareness as justification, and favorable
evaluation of the CSR initiatives.
H1: Reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision
to implement environmentally friendly policies will lead to (a)
more positive evaluation of decision maker and (b) higher
willingness to pay, compared to active, and passive control.
We further predicted that the participants would expect a
decision maker who was highly aware of her own mortality to
be more inclined to make decisions that were motivated by her
ideology, morality and values, compared to a decision maker who
did not come across as acutely aware of her own mortality. More
specifically, we predicted that the mortality awareness would
lead to an increase in value-based motivational attribution, and
reduction in attribution to extrinsic motivations. The second
hypothesis was thus:
H2: Reporting that amortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement ambiguously motivated policies will lead to (a) more
attribution to value-based motivation, and (b) less attribution to
extrinsic factors, compared to both control conditions.
Past research in moral psychology has demonstrated that
perceptions of underlying intentions are crucial in determining
whether or not a behavior is morally praiseworthy (Fedotova
et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012), and CSR research has demonstrated
that perceived sincerity of motivation is a crucial success factor
for CSR communication (Du et al., 2010; de Vries et al., 2013).
Our final prediction was therefore that the positive perceptual
outcomes generated by using mortality reminder as justification
would bemediated by a higher tendency to attribute themeasures
to value-based motivation. The third and final hypothesis was
therefore:
H3: The relationship between presence of mortality awareness in
justification and (a) more positive evaluation of decision maker
and (b) higher willingness to pay, will be mediated by degree of
value-based attributions.
Figure 1 displays the conceptual model for Experiment 1, with
predicted paths in accordance with the hypotheses.
Materials and Pre-Test
Both experiments used video footage of an actress portraying a
CEO in an interview setting. The actress was instructed to portray
her character in a realistic manner, while maintain identical
postures, facial expressions, and tone of voice in all recordings.
The video started with a rolling text stating: “Ellen Hansen is the
CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has just approved a new
plan to make the hotels more environmentally friendly. Among
the measures are reducing the size of plates and glasses at the
breakfast buffet with 20 percent, in order to reduce waste of food.
Furthermore, the hotels have been equipped with water-saving
showers. Additionally, the hotels have adopted a more restrictive
policy on changing of towels and linens on shorter stays. [New
paragraph] In an interview, Ellen explained the background for
the decision:” Here, the video continued to a fictitious interview,
wherein the actress portraying the CEO, stated: “We are now
taking measures in order to become more socially responsible. The
climate threat is one of the biggest challenges that humanity has
ever faced, and our chain has to be a part of the solution”. This
part of the video constituted the passive control condition, and
was identical for all conditions. The independent variable, i.e.,
the justification for the decision, was introduced at the end of
this video. The screen showed the text: “When asked how she got
the idea for these measures, she replied:”. The mortality awareness
video showed that the CEO attributed her decision to a recent
mortality reminder: “A while ago I discovered a lump in my
armpit. I contacted the doctor, who informed me that he couldn’t
say for certain what this was, but that it could be the early form of
a lethal and incurable form of cancer. They took a sample of the
cells, and sent it to a lab for analysis. I had to wait 2 weeks for the
results to arrive. The waiting was very demanding, and it got me
thinking about what really matters in life. That’s when I decided to
run the company in a more sustainable direction. The results came
back negative, and the lump disappeared, but the motivation stayed
with me”. In accordance with past TMT research (see Burke et al.,
2010), the active control video displayed the same CEO, who
attributed her decision to a recent non-lethal dental health scare:
“A while ago I got a terrible oral infection. I contacted the dentist,
who told me that it was either something that would pass away by
itself, or an infection of the gums, in which case I would have to
undergo a harmless but painful operation. He took some samples,
and told me to wait a couple of weeks for the results. The waiting
period was very demanding, and it got me thinking about what
really matters in life. That’s when I decided to run the company
in a more sustainable direction. The results came back negative,
and the pain went away, but the motivation stayed with me”. This
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model.
active control condition contained many of the same elements
as the mortality awareness condition, in that they both entailed
insecurity, loss of control, physical pain, and personal health
problems. Both conditions were liable to induce pity on behalf
of the observer, and both could be seen as candid and forthright
accounts of a private matter. The significant difference between
the experiment condition and the active control condition was
the mortality reminder referenced in the experiment condition,
pitted against the explicit non-lethality of the dentistry condition.
Before the experiments, all video stimuli was pre-tested on a
student sample. A total of 11 participants saw both versions of the
video, in random order, producing a total of 22 observations. The
pre-test examined how the actress was perceived in each video in
terms of how enthusiastic and interpersonally warm the CEOwas
rated. Across the observations, no significant differences between
the groups were found. After the test, the participants were told
how the stimuli were to be used, and asked if any of the videos
stood out as different from the other, aside from the different
words the actress conveyed. None of the participants indicated
that any of the videos differed from the others in such a way.
Sample and Procedure
Participants (N = 87) were recruited from a Norwegian
university law school (40 female, mean age 22). Participation
was compensated with a 60 NOK (∼11 $) gift card to the
student cafeteria. Before the experiment, participants were told
that the experiment would be about communication, business,
and environmental care. The participants were guaranteed
anonymity, and allowed to discontinue the study at any time.
All participants indicated informed consent electronically, in
accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. The study was
approved by the Vice-Rector of Research at The Norwegian
School of Economics.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental groups and one passive control group. The
participants assembled in different classrooms. Before the
experiment started, they were given instructions on how to
respond during the experiment via their smartphones, tablets,
or computers. The participants were furthermore instructed to
give responses individually, and maintain silence throughout
the experiment. The participants first responded to Kanter and
Mirvis’ (1989) dispositional cynicism scale, and Milfont and
Duckitt’s (2010) environmental attitude scale. They were then
exposed to one of three different videos, as described in the
section above. The video was displayed on a big screen in the
classroom. Participants in the passive control condition (N = 27)
saw the video wherein no justification was asked for, and went on
to complete the survey. The second group saw the active control
dentistry video (N = 29), and continued to give their responses
on the outcome measures. The third group saw the mortality
awareness video (N = 31), and continued to give their responses
on the outcome measures. All participants had to view the entire
designated video before they could move on in the experiment.
Figure 2 illustrates the experimental procedure.
Dependent Measures
Having seen their respective video, all participants were
instructed to complete a survey, detailing their attitudes toward
the decision and the decision maker, as well as perceived
communicative intention, and motivational attributions
pertaining to the decision (see Appendix for a complete overview
of all). All outcome measures were entered into a principle
components factor analysis, with direct oblim rotation. The
analyses extracted four factors with an eigenvalue above 1.00.
According to Singh (1991), deviations from the normative use
of one as eigenvalue cut-off score is permissible in cases where
adherence to the norm would produce redundancy in constructs.
Using scree plot analyses of the eigenvalues (see Hair et al.,
1998) a drop in eigenvalue between the fifth and sixth factors
was identified. This was consistent with the expected factor
structure. As the factor analysis was used mainly to investigate
the internal consistency of my measures, we applied similar
criteria to Rust et al. (2004) (parsimony, managerial usefulness,
and psychological meaningfulness) and applied a five factor
structure in these analyses. Table 1 displays the measurement
model.
Liking decision maker, perceiving decision maker as
professional, perceiving decision maker as competent, and
willingness to endorse decision maker as a member on an
advisory board on ethical investment were all measured on
seven-point Likert scales. These items formed the factor
evaluation of decision maker (factor 4 in Table 1) (Cronbachs
α = 0.84). A single item measuring liking decision had to be
removed due to multicollinearity. The CSR attribution scale from
Groza et al. (2011) was also deployed, but due to cross-loading,
only six of the nine items were included in the analysis. The
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental procedure: Experiment 1.
TABLE 1 | Measurement model in Experiment 1.
Item: Mean SD Factor loadings
1 2 3 4 5
Like decision maker 4,81 1,18 −0.595
Endorse decision maker 4,31 1,55 −0.671
Decision maker is professional 4,95 1,36 −0.918
Decision maker is competent 4,77 1,24 −0.935
Moral motivation 4,92 1,42 0.719
. . . they have a long-term interest in society 3,39 0.94 0.889
. . . they believe in environmental care 3,76 0.96 0.861
... they are trying to give back to society 3,07 1,02 0.817
. . . their customers expect them to do this 3,43 1,14 0.922
. . . society in general expects them to do this 3,56 0.973 0.833
. . . they will retain more customers by doing this 3,38 0.94 0.721
Attitudinal persuasion knowledge 4,06 0.89 0.844
Behavioral persuasion knowledge 3,93 0.89 0.890
Willingness to pay 4,38 0.78 0.944
three items measuring value-driven attribution were combined
with the single item measuring perceived moral motivation to
form the factor value-based attributions (factor 1 in Table 1)
(Cronbachs α = 0.84). The mean score on the three remaining
attribution items was labeled extrinsic attribution (factor 2
in Table 1) (Cronbachs α = 0.72). The concept persuasion
knowledge refers to the extent to which a person feels that the
communicative intention of another person is to manipulate or
persuade them. In this experiment, persuasion knowledge refers
to the extent to which participants felt that the CEO had such
a communicative intention, and was measured with two items
(factor 3 in Table 1). One item assessed attitudinal persuasion
knowledge (i.e., “the CEO is attempting to change my attitudes”)
and another item assessed behavioral persuasion knowledge
(i.e., “the CEO is attempting to influence my future choices”)
(Cronbachs = 0.70). However, the measure was not used in the
further analysis. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their
willingness to pay in reference to a normal price for an equivalent
room at an equivalent hotel, given their new information (factor
5 in Table 1). The participants indicated their willingness to pay
on a seven-point scale, with zero percent as center value, and
10% increases or decreases in price in each direction, with 30%
more and 30% less as extreme values. All standardized scales
used in this study were translated to Norwegian. The following
process assured the quality of the translation: first, three Ph.D.
students working separately produced a translation of each
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item. Secondly, three bilingual professors at the department of
language choose which translation was correct. The professors
provided their votes separately. Across all items, the professors
were unanimous in all but two cases, in which the version with
two out of three votes was selected. This translation procedure
is very similar to the one recommended by Douglas and Craig
(2007).
Results
Correlational findings from this experiment were in line with
past research that has shown that motivational attribution is a
crucial factor for positive evaluation in CSR communication (Du
et al., 2010; Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al., 2013). A high
score on the value-based attribution measure was positively
associated with liking the decision (r = 0.51, p < 0.01), and
a positive overall evaluation of the decision maker (r = 0.58,
p < 0.01). The two first hypotheses predicted between-groups
differences in how the CEO would be perceived and how her
decision would be attributed. In order to test the hypotheses,
we conducted a series of ANOVAs where condition (mortality
awareness vs. active control vs. passive control) was always the
between-subject variable, and where the dependent variables
were evaluation of decision maker, willingness to pay, extrinsic
attribution, and value-based attribution, respectively. As we
were only seeking to address the question of how mortality
awareness can produce differences in evaluation and attribution,
we performed planned contrasts of [mortality awareness] vs.
[active control + passive control]. We also performed planned
contrasts between the two active conditions, i.e., [active control]
vs. [mortality awareness]. According to Hypothesis 1, the
CEO would be perceived more favorably by participants in
the mortality awareness condition than by participants in the
two control groups. The results revealed statistically significant
differences between group means [F(2,84) = 4.13, p = 0.02].
The planned contrast tests indicated that the CEO was given
a more positive evaluation by participants in the mortality
awareness condition compared to the active control condition
CEO [t(83) = −2.16, p = 0.02, d = 0.57, 95% CI from 0.30 to
0.86], but not compared to both control conditions combined
[t(83) = 1.11, p = 0.69, d = 0.25, 95% CI from −0.48 to −0.02].
Hypothesis 1a was thus only partially supported. We further
predicted that the mortality salient CEO would produce a higher
willingness to pay than the control conditions. The ANOVA did
not provide support for this prediction [F(2,84)= 0.88, p= 0.42],
and the planned contrast tests demonstrated no significant
differences in willingness to pay. Hypothesis 2 stated that the
CEO whose justification involved mortality awareness would
produce more value-based attributions, and less attribution
to extrinsic motivations. The ANOVA failed to demonstrate
significant between groups differences [F(2,84)= 2.13, p= 0.09].
However, the planned contrast tests indicated that the mortality
salient CEO came across as significantly more motivated by
intrinsic values, compared with the two control groups combined
[t(84) = 2.18, p = 0.03, d = 0.49, 95% CI from 0.31 to
0.68], but not when compared solely with the active control
group [t(84) = −1.66, p = 0.10, d = 0.43, 95% CI from 0.23
to.61]. Hypothesis 2a thus only received partial support. Finally,
the groups were found to differ significantly, in line with the
hypothesis, with regards to attributing the decision to extrinsic
motivation [F(2,84) = 4.20, p = 0.02]. The planned contrast test
showed that the mortality aware CEO came across as significantly
less motivated by extrinsic factors, compared to the two control
conditions combined [t(84) = −2.89, p < 0.01, d = −0.63, 95%
CI from −0.82 to −0.50], and compared to only active control
[t(84) = 2.42, p = 0.01, d = −0.53, 95% CI from −0.82 to
−0.43]. This finding supported Hypothesis 2b. Figure 3 displays
the mean evaluations between the groups in perceptual outcomes
and motivational attribution.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, two simple mediation analyses
were conducted. Across the analysis of differences between the
groups, the active control group and passive control group did
not differ significantly on any dispositional measures or outcome
measure except evaluation of decision maker. While hypotheses
1 and 2 predict direct effects of mortality awareness compared
to both passive and active control stimuli, hypotheses 3a and
3b represent attempts at exploring the mediating factors that
are affected by the presence or absence of mortality awareness.
As such, and in order to increase the validity and power of the
mediation analysis necessitated by Hypothesis 3, the results from
the active and passive control groups were combined into a single
group. The tested models are illustrated in Figure 4.
We employed Preacher and Hayes’s (2004, 2008) PROCESS
macro for SPSS. The proposed mediation models revealed
no significant direct effect on any of the perceptual outcome
measures. Although the direct effects are absent, it is still
possible and useful to test and report the indirect relationships
in the proposed model (see Hayes, 2009). In such analyses,
where a direct effect between X and Y is absent, the proposed
mediators are better referred to as indirect relationships, rather
than mediated relationships (Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). The
first predicted relationship was between presence or absence
of mortality awareness, value-based attribution, and evaluation
of decision maker. The analysis revealed a significant indirect
effect. A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the
indirect effect based on 10,000 bootstrap samples was entirely
above zero (from 0.0524 to 0.6469). The coefficients revealed
that presence of mortality awareness led to significantly higher
levels of value-based attribution, which in turn was significantly
positively associated with positive evaluation of decision maker.
Hypothesis 3a was thus supported. Figure 5 displays the model,
with coefficients.
In order to test Hypothesis 3b, the same analysis was repeated,
but with willingness to pay as outcome measure. Once again,
the indirect effect proved significant, with confidence intervals
entirely above zero (from 0.0249 to 0.2887). As predicted, the
coefficients revealed that the presence of mortality awareness
led to higher levels of value-based attribution, which in turn
was found to be significantly positively related to higher
willingness to pay. These findings underscore the importance
of value-based attribution as antecedent to favorable outcomes
in strategic CSR communication. In as much as the predicted
mechanisms were proven significant, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Figure 6 displays the mediation model with corresponding
coefficients.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 233
fpsyg-07-00233 February 29, 2016 Time: 16:26 # 8
Nordmo and Norman Mortality Awareness and Value-Orientation
FIGURE 3 | Mean evaluation between groups. ∗ Difference between mortality awareness and passive control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗ Difference between
mortality awareness and active control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗∗ Differences between mortality awareness and both control groups are significant at p < 0.05.
FIGURE 4 | Predicted mediated relationship.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that the decision
maker who had recently suffered a mortality reminder was seen
as more motivated by moral values, and significantly less by
extrinsic or instrumental factors. Furthermore, the support of
Hypothesis 3 demonstrates that this difference in attribution is
a relevant factor when participants evaluate the decision maker,
and when they determine their willingness to pay. However,
having recently been reminded of her own mortality did not
change evaluation of the decision maker or willingness to pay
directly. Nevertheless, the results offer support for the notion
that ambiguously motivated decisions made by a decision maker
who appears aware of her own mortality is seen as less driven
by extrinsic motivation. The first experiment thus demonstrates
that the identified main effect of mortality primes is also
relevant in social perception: people expect a decision maker
to be less motivated by extrinsic factors when she has recently
been exposed to a mortality reminder. This result is allegorical
to the general finding from TMT, which states that people
tend to trivialize the importance of extrinsic pursuits after a
mortality prime (Burke et al., 2010). However, the TMT literature
suggests that the relationship between mortality salience and
motivation for extrinsic pursuits is moderated by the personal
priority placed on the extrinsic pursuit in question (Kosloff
and Greenberg, 2009). The moderated relationship states that
mortality primes remove motivation for low-priority extrinsic
pursuits, but increases the motivation for high-priority extrinsic
pursuits (Arndt et al., 2004). As the importance of this moderator
has been readily demonstrated within the TMT tradition, the aim
of the second experiment in this paper was to explore whether
the same moderated relationship is relevant in perception of
others.
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FIGURE 5 | Indirect effect of mortality awareness on positive evaluation of decision maker, via increased value-based attributions.
FIGURE 6 | Indirect effect of mortality awareness on willingness to pay, via increased value-based attributions.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to explore the extent to
which mortality awareness may serve as an indicator of value-
driven motivation in cases where the observed decision maker
places a high importance on the attainment of financial goals.
As mentioned, TMT research indicates that mortality primes
mainly tend to amplify investments in whatever themes are
personally and/or culturally important to the decision maker
(Burke et al., 2010). Building on the assumption that people’s
perceptions of the motivation of other people largely parallels
their own motivational processes (Reeder and Trafimow, 2005),
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it is reasonable to hypothesize that their lay-theories about
other people’s motivation under mortality awareness would also
encompass this general amplification tendency. If people perceive
others in line with relevant results from TMT research, an
ambiguously motivated decision made by a recently mortality
reminded decision maker who is known to place a high priority
on financial goal attainment should generate the opposite
attributional pattern from the one demonstrated in the first
experiment. More specifically, if the findings from Kosloff and
Greenberg (2009) translate into perception of others, the decision
maker who is both acutely aware of her mortality, and known
for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment, should
be interpreted as being more motivated by the extrinsic gains
associated with the decision, and less by the claimed moral or
value-based motivation for the decision. The first hypothesis was
thus:
H1. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead to more attribution to financial motivation.
Past research on CSR perception and motivational attribution
has demonstrated that endeavors that are perceived as self-
serving in a financial sense are often perceived as less motivated
by morality or intrinsic values (Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al.,
2013). We therefore further predicted that the recently mortality
reminded decision maker would be perceived as less motivated
by intrinsic values and morality. The second hypothesis was
therefore:
H2. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead to less attribution to moral motivation.
Moral psychology has demonstrated that inferences of
motivation are crucial when people make judgments about how
morally praiseworthy a behavior is (Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray
et al., 2012). Similarly, CSR research has demonstrated that the
perceived motivation behind environmental policies influence
peoples’ general perception of those policies, and the companies
that employ them (Windsor, 2013; de Vries et al., 2013; Olsen
et al., 2014). Our last prediction was therefore that the changes
in motivational attribution produced by the stated mortality
reminder would produce overall worse evaluation of the decision
and decision maker. The third and final hypothesis was thus:
H3. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead more negative evaluation of (a) the decision and (b)
the decision maker.
Procedure, Materials, and Sample
One hundred and eighty undergraduate psychology students
(140 female, mean age 20) were recruited to participate
in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and not
compensated. Before the experiment, participants were told
that the experiment would be about communication, business,
and environmental care. The participants were guaranteed
anonymity, and allowed to discontinue the study at any time.
All participants indicated informed consent electronically, in
accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. The study was
approved by the Vice-Rector of Research at The Norwegian
School of Economics.
Again, a between-groups design was applied. Groups to
witch students had been randomly assigned were randomly
assigned to the different conditions, i.e., the passive control
group, the dentistry control group, or the mortality awareness
group. The experiment was conducted on three consecutive days.
The experimental procedure was identical to that of the first
experiment. The participants first indicated their responses to the
dispositional and attitudinal measures. After all participants had
completed these surveys, they were exposed to one of the three
different video stimuli. The only difference between the stimuli
used in this experiment, relative to the stimuli used in the first
experiment, was that the text part of the video contained one
additional piece of information, regarding the emphasis placed
on financial pursuits by the observed decision maker. The text in
the videos in the second experiment read: “Ellen Hansen is the
CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has always had an intense
desire to make her hotel chain the most profitable in Europe. One
of her biggest life-time goals has been to ensure that the company
generates over 100 million NOK in profits in one fiscal year. [new
paragraph] Ellen has just approved a new plan to make the hotels
more environmentally friendly. Among the measures are reducing
the size of plates and glasses at the breakfast buffet with 20%, in
order to reduce waste of food. Furthermore, the hotels have been
equipped with water-saving showers. Additionally, the hotels have
adopted a more restrictive policy on changing of towels and linens
on shorter stays. [new paragraph] In an interview, Ellen explained
the background for the decision:” The passive control condition
participants (N = 57) saw the video wherein no justification is
asked for, and went on to complete the survey. The second group
saw the active control dentistry video (N = 55), and continued to
give their responses on the outcome measures. The third group
saw the mortality salient video (N = 68), and continued to give
their responses on the outcome measures. All participants had to
view the entire designated video before they could move on in the
experiment.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures were identical to those used in Experiment
1. Additionally, in order to better capture the motivational
attributions of interest in this study, the measurement model in
the second experiment was supplemented with more attribution
measures. The additional attribution measures were all in the
form of statements, with which the participants indicated their
agreement on seven-point Lickert scales. The statements all
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started with “It seems like an important goal with these measures
is”. The proposed perceived goals were; please customers, save
money, ensure financial solidity, and reduced climate change. We
also added new items assessing support for the decision itself, as
the single item used in Experiment 1 had to be removed from
analysis due to cross-loading. The new items measures support
for decision from both a consumer and employee perspective,
principled support, an overall support item, and a reversed
support item. All outcome measures were initially entered into a
Principle Components factor analysis, with direct oblim rotation.
The itemsmeasuring level of endorsement for the CEO to serve at
ethics committee, as well as the itemmeasuring willingness to pay
had to be removed due to issues with multicollinearity and cross-
loading. Table 2 displays the final measurement model used in
the experiment.
The results from the factor analysis revealed seven distinct
factors, consistent with the expected factor structure. The factors
are numbered in accordance with their position in Table 2.
The first factor was labeled support for decision (1) (Cronbachs
α = 0.86). The second factor was labeled evaluation of decision
maker (2) (Cronbachs α = 0.83). The third factor was labeled
value-based attribution (3) (Cronbachs α= 0.88). This factor
consisted of the same four items that made up the same factor
in Experiment 1, plus the addition of one item; the purpose
appears to be reduced climate change. The fourth factor was
labeled reactive attribution (4), meaning that the measures are
seen more as motivated by external expectations (see Groza et al.,
2011) (Cronbachs α= 0.86). The sixth factor was labeled financial
attribution (6) (Cronbachs α= 0.85). The fifth and seventh factor
were not utilized in further analysis.
Results
The three hypotheses predicted between-groups differences in
how the CEO would be perceived and how her decision would
be attributed. In order to test the hypotheses, we conducted
a series of ANOVAs where condition (mortality awareness vs.
active control vs. passive control) was always the between-subject
variable, and where the dependent variables were evaluation of
decision maker, support for decision, financial attribution, value-
based attribution, and reactive attribution, respectively. As we
were only seeking to address the question of how mortality
awareness can produce differences in evaluation and attribution,
we performed planned contrasts of [mortality awareness] vs.
[active control + passive control]. We also performed planned
contrasts between the two active conditions, i.e., [active control]
vs. [mortality awareness]. The degree of financial attribution
evoked differed significantly between the groups, but not in line
with Hypothesis 1 [F(2,177) = 4.81, p < 0.01]. The planned
contrast test showed that the mortality aware CEO induced lower
levels of financial attribution than the CEO presented in the
two control conditions combined [t(177) = −2.96, p < 0.01,
d = −0.45, 95% CI from −0.61 to −0.31], and active control
in isolation [t(177) = 2.05, p = 0.042, d = −0.36, 95% CI
from −0.55 to −0.17]. These findings failed to provide support
for the first hypothesis, which stated that the decision made
under mortality awareness would be more attributed to financial
motivation. Furthermore, the analyses showed no significant
group differences in value-based attribution [F(2,172) = 1.00,
p = 0.37]. The planned contrast test revealed no significant
difference between themortality awareness condition and the two
controls combined [t(172) = 1.41, p = 0.16, d = 0.22, 95% CI
from 0.09 to 0.36], and no difference when compared only against
active control [t(172) = −1.28 p = 0.20, d = 0.24, 95% CI from
0.08 to 0.40]. This finding did not offer support for theHypothesis
2, which predicted that the mortality awareness CEO would
produce less value-driven attributions, compared to the control
conditions. Finally, the ANOVA revealed no significant group
differences in support for the decision [F(2,177)= 0.48, p= 0.62].
Neither of the planned contrasts showed significant differences.
However, the analysis did reveal a significant difference in
evaluation of decision maker [F(2,177) = 5.88, p < 0.01].
The planned contrast test showed a non-significant difference
between the mortality awareness condition and the two controls
combined [t(177)= 0.55, p= 0.58, d = 0.08, 95% CI from−0.11
to 0.26]. However, there were significant differences between
the mortality awareness CEO and the active control, in terms
of evaluation of decision maker [t(177) = −2.23, p = 0.03,
d = 0.38, 95% CI from 0.16 to 0.61]. These findings failed to
provide support for the third hypothesis, which stated that the
mortality awareness CEO would produce the lowest support for
her decision, and lowest levels of evaluation of decision maker.
Aside from testing the hypotheses, we also explored between
groups differences in reactive attributions. The groups were
found to differ significantly in terms of reactive attributions
[F(2,177) = 3.10, p = 0.04]. The actions of the mortality aware
CEO were perceived to a lesser degree to be a reaction to
external expectations, compared with the two control conditions
combined [t(177) = −2.56, p = 0.01, d = −0.39, 95% CI
from −0.54 to −0.26], and compared only to the active control
condition [t(177) = 2.23, p = 0.027, d = −0.42, 95% CI
from−0.59 to−0.26]. Figure 7 displays the mean evaluations and
attributions between groups.
Discussion
According to Kosloff and Greenberg (2009), as well as Arndt et al.
(2004), the decision maker portrayed in this experiment should
be expected to be more motivated by financial goal attainment as
a consequence of her recent mortality reminder, combined with
her life-long ambitions of financial goal attainment. However, the
results clearly indicate that participants did not perceive the CEO
in this manner. Even though TMT studies have demonstrated
the moderating role of personal importance of financial pursuits,
the present results indicate that people’s attributions of others
are not sensitive to the presence of this moderator. The lack
of support for any of the hypotheses, can be interpreted in
terms of the observed decision makers’ priority of financial gains
being less relevant in social perception and attribution. Much
like in Experiment 1, the decision maker who explained that
she had recently been exposed to a real life mortality reminder
was perceived as less motivated by financial gain and external
expectations, even though it was clearly stated that financial
goal attainment had long been a guiding goal for the decision
maker in question. Put in less technical terms, the participants’
attributions fell more along the lines of what one would predict
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TABLE 2 | Measurement model in Experiment 2.
Item: Mean SD Factor loadings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
As an employee, support for decision 6,28 1,1 −0.745
As a customer, support for decision 5,93 1,27 −0.669
The decision is good 4,33 0.761 −0.755
Principled support for decision 4,54 0.712 −0.952
Disagree with decision (reversed) 4,52 0.758 0.886
Like decision maker 4,49 1,48 0.650
Decision maker seems professional 4,85 1,49 0.950
Decision maker seems competent 5,00 1,37 0.784
Perceived moral motivation 5,02 1,49 0.666
Goal appears to be reduced climate change 3,84 1,05 0.670
. . .they have a long term interest in society 3,55 1,06 0.740
. . . they believe in environmental care 3,77 1,04 0.886
. . . they are trying to give back to society 3,15 1,05 0.795
. . . they think their customers expect them to do this 3,17 1,15 0.816
. . . they think society in general expects them to do this 3,48 1,13 0.929
. . . they think their owners and other stakeholders expect them to do this 3,12 1,05 0.815
. . . they think they will retain more customers by doing this 3,60 0.992 −0.902
. . . they think they will get more customers by doing this 3,62 1,06 −0.856
Goal appears to be to please customers 3,71 1,02 −0.564
Perceived financial motivation 4,43 1,70 0.742
Goal appears to be to save money 3,31 1,14 0.878
Goal appears to be to ensure financial solidity 3,37 1,04 0.839
. . . they think they will earn/save more money by doing this 3,93 1,03 0.825
Attitudinal persuasion knowledge 4,02 0.948 0.898
Behavioral persuasion knowledge 3,86 1,04 0.892
after reading about Dickens Ebenezer Scrooge, and less in line
with the predictions one would make after reading TMT research
on how financially oriented people actually tend to respond to
mortality reminders. The only notable difference between the
results from Experiments 1 and 2 was that the former produced a
significant difference in value-based attributions, while the latter
did not. It would thus seem that mortality awareness increases
value-based attribution in cases where the decision maker is
unknown, but not in cases where the decision maker is known
for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment. However,
external and financial attributions were reduced as a consequence
of mortality awareness, regardless of the personal priorities of the
observed decision maker.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the results confirm that communicatingmortality
awareness when justifying ambiguouslymotivated CSR initiatives
alleviates suspicions of extrinsic motivation, and may leave
observers with a stronger perception that the decision is
motivated by sincerely held values. This attributional effect holds
true even in cases where the observed decision maker is known to
place a high priority on the pursuit of financial goal attainment.
Both experiments demonstrated that ambiguously motivated
CSR measures are met with more favorable attribution when
the CEO explains that the motivation came after a mortality
reminder. There are several direct implications from this result.
Firstly, it demonstrates that the same set of CSR measures can
induce very different motivational attributions among observers,
based on how those CSR measures are presented. Secondly, the
results indicate that people suspect behaviors to be less motivated
by extrinsic and financial factors, when the person they evaluate
attributes her decision to a recent mortality reminder. This
change in attribution is likely not due to pity alone, as the active
control condition, which presumably also induces pity, produced
attributions more similar to that of the passive control condition
than that of the mortality awareness condition. Furthermore,
the improved motivational attribution is demonstrated to be
indirectly associated with evaluation of decision maker and
willingness to pay. This finding highlights the importance
of perceived sincerity of motives when communicating CSR
policies, which resonates concordantly with other findings in CSR
communication (Du et al., 2010; Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al.,
2013).
The results offer some careful practical implications.
Motivational ambiguity is ubiquitous in both general
management and marketing. The main result from this
study is that mortality awareness can function as a factor that
alleviates some of that ambiguity, and induces a sense of sincerity
on behalf of the observed decision maker. Presumably, other
ways of conveying mortality awareness, other than recapping
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FIGURE 7 | Mean evaluation between groups, when decision maker is known for prioritizing financial goal attainment. ∗ Difference between mortality
awareness and passive control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗ Difference between mortality awareness and active control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗∗ Differences
between mortality awareness and both control groups are significant at p < 0.05.
one’s own recent mortality reminders, can produce similar
benefits. Invoking a life-death narrative when communicating
ambiguously motivated CSR measures might produce similar
results, in that peoples tendency to attribute the initiatives to
extrinsic factors decreases. The results further indicate that
people expect a drop in the priority of financial gains as a
consequence of mortality salient experiences. This finding gives
further practical implications. When faced with suspicion of
beingmotivated by greed, rather than virtue, invoking amortality
salient narrative behind one’s decisions can give an indication
of authenticity, thus reducing cynical attributions and creating
more engagement and approval for the decision.
The experiment made use of vivid and realistic video-stimuli,
in order to increase ecological validity. Nevertheless, we want to
highlight some potential limitations. As is the case for almost
all lab-experiments in social sciences, the results stem from
hypothetical scenarios, and are therefore free from circumstantial
factors that may be crucial to any real-life scenario involving
the role of mortality primes in eliciting different attributions.
Furthermore, the distinction between the active control condition
(dentistry) and experimental manipulation (mortality reminder)
has been subject to some criticism (Burke et al., 2010). TMT
research has typically suggested that the threat of mortality
produces qualitatively different consequences than similar non-
mortality control primes. Indeed, the premises and conclusion
of this paper partially rely on the same assertion. However,
it cannot be definitely concluded that the distinction between
mortality primes and other negative events are qualitative, and
not quantitative. If the only real difference between the active
control and the mortality awareness manipulation is the level
of pity induced in the participants, a theoretical implication
would be that sufficiently elevated levels of pity, not perceived
mortality awareness, might produce a similar effect. In both
the active control condition and mortality awareness condition,
the CEO links her account of health problems to the CSR
decision by the sentence fragment “[...] it got me thinking
about what really matters in life”. This sentence was necessary
in order for the CEO’s statements to be meaningful in their
given context. However, we cannot rule out that this statement
comes across as more plausible and sincere when stated as a
consequence to a potentially lethal health-scare, than a non-
lethal health scare. We recommend that future studies of
perceptions of motivation under mortality awareness should
attempt to continue to explore these processes in ecologically
valid manners, while attempting to keep the experimental
condition and the active control condition as similar as possible.
The presented research was primarily concerned with between-
groups differences in evaluation and attribution, based on
the CEO’s reported mortality awareness. In order to explore
this effect, other factors pertaining to the CEO were held
constant across conditions. There is thus a possibility that
the reported tendencies are the result of interaction effects
betweenmortality awareness and unique factors pertaining to the
CEO, such as gender, age, physical appearance or other visible
factors.
The results offer some further directions for future research.
First, the degree of liking the decision to implement the CSR
initiatives, evaluation of decision maker and willingness to pay,
did not differ between the groups in any of the experiments,
even though the attributional patterns differed significantly
between the groups. This finding goes against the importance
placed on motivational attribution in past research, both in CSR
communication (see Yoon et al., 2006; Du et al., 2010; Groza et al.,
2011; McShane and Cunningham, 2012; de Vries et al., 2013),
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and in moral psychology (see Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray et al.,
2012). A possible explanation for why the changes is motivational
attribution were not accompanied by direct changes in evaluation
of decision maker, support for decision or willingness to pay, may
be that the described scenario entailed removing hedonic value
for the customer. Past research has indicated that consumers
often dislike CSRmeasures that impedes the organizations ability
to deliver value to the consumer (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001;
Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). As such, it may be that the
participants responses to the question of whether or not they
liked the decision was overly focused on the removal of hedonic
value, making the issue of motivational attribution less salient.
Other mediating variables, not measured in the experiments, may
also have influenced the outcomes. However, these are merely
speculative interpretations, and more research is needed in order
to better understand the antecedents of consumer support for
CSR measures.
CONCLUSION
The problem of negative motivational attribution hinders the
endorsement of effective CSR measures that can mitigate climate
change. The presented research explored the role of mortality
awareness on attribution of environmentally friendly behaviors.
The first experiment demonstrated that when a CEO implements
environmentally friendly corporate measures after a mortality
reminder, her motivation for doing so was perceived as more
value-oriented, meaning that it was attributed more to intrinsic
values, and less to extrinsic factors. This attributional pattern
was indirectly linked to an increase in positive evaluation of
decision maker and increased willingness to pay, even though
the CSR measures entailed removing hedonic value at the
customers’ expense. The second experiment demonstrated that
the reduction in extrinsic and financial attribution observed in
the first experiment persisted, also when the decision maker was
known for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment.
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1 
Decision style and perceived sincerity in CSR communication 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on how different managerial decision styles are perceived in CSR communication. 
More specifically, we explore (a) how different managerial decision styles induces different levels of 
perceived sincerity, and (b) how perceptions of sincerity are linked to overall evaluation of new 
sustainability initiatives. In two experiments (N=148), we examined how a leader claiming to have 
made a CSR decision through different levels of cognitive spontaneity affected the evaluation of that 
decision, the evaluation of the leader, the motivation attributed to the leader, and communicative 
intentions attributed to the leader. The setting of the experiments was a video-recorded interview 
where the leader presented ambiguously motivated sustainability initiatives. Results indicated that 
the leader who exhibited a partially spontaneous decision style was perceived as more sincere than a 
leader who used willful deliberation. However, a leader who claimed complete spontaneity of 
thought as decision style was perceived as less sincere than the leader who used willful deliberation. 
Differences in sincerity were found to be indirectly related to the evaluation of the leader and the 
evaluation of the CSR initiatives. The results have managerial implications for CSR communication, as 
well as general implications for management and social psychology. 
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The secret of success is sincerity. Once you can fake that you've got it made.  
Jean Giraudoux (1882-1944) 
 
Successfully communicating sustainability initiatives is one of the most important ways by which 
leaders can create and sustain CSR in organizations. This act of communication often involves 
explaining the central motivation behind these initiatives. From the corporations’ point of view, the 
goal of most CSR initiatives is to achieve sustained competitive advantage by attracting and retaining 
support from consumers, employees and other stakeholders (Devinney, 2009; McShane & 
Cunningham, 2012; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Waddock, 2008). CSR initiatives frequently involve 
activities and goals that appear to be counterintuitive to the corporate logic of profit, such as 
philanthropy, community development, environmental conservation or social justice (Van Marrewijk, 
2003). In many cases, however, the CSR goals neatly overlap with the ordinary corporate goals, such 
as reducing costly waste, ensuring employees health and wellbeing, and conserving energy. In such 
cases, when the CSR goals overlap with the ordinary corporate goals, the task of coming across as 
motivated by sincere caring poses a communicative challenge. Avoiding perceptions of insincerity is 
an important factor for leaders who attempt to create and sustain CSR support and engagement. 
Although most people want corporations to act as good corporate citizens, people are quite skeptical 
of corporations who promote their good citizenship (Brønn & Vrioni, 2001; Lii & Lee, 2012; Webb & 
Mohr, 1998). In cases where claims of responsibility and citizenship are perceived as insincere, this 
skepticism may have detrimental effects. For instance, Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, and Schwarz (2006) 
found that CSR communications hurt the company image in cases where the company was perceived 
as insincere. The risk of coming across as insincere is also relevant when companies communicate 
environmentally oriented initiatives. If the corporation is perceived as sincerely caring for the 
environment, environmentally oriented CSR initiatives could elicit positive reactions. However, 
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seemingly insincere environmental policies may lead to adverse motivational attributions (see Groza, 
Pronschinske, & Walker, 2011). Previous research has demonstrated that people easily suspect 
ulterior motives, when they hear of corporate activities that are both socially and financially 
beneficial (de Vries, Terwel, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2013; Windsor, 2013). In short, a main finding from 
CSR research thus far is that both the public as well as employees, prefer endeavors that seemingly 
stem from sincere, moral motivation, rooted in intrinsic values (Beckman, Colwell, & Cunningham, 
2009; Debeljak, Krkac, & Bušljeta Banks, 2011; May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003; McShane & 
Cunningham, 2012). That being said, the literature on leadership behavior and perceptions of CSR is 
still very limited (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), and the role of leadership in communicating and 
implementing CSR initiatives remains especially underexplored (Christensen, Mackey, & Whetten, 
2014; Morgeson, Aguinis, Waldman, & Siegel, 2013). As corporate social responsibility is becoming 
an increasingly central part of brand strategy, it is important to understand how people respond to 
different types of CSR communication, and how leaders can come across as sincerely caring about 
their social responsibility (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; Olsen, Slotegraaf, & Chandukala, 2014; 
Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006). 
 
Decision style as psychological signal 
General management literature has noted that leaders often make decisions where the guiding 
motivation may seem ambiguous or mixed (Calder, 1977; Di Norcia & Larkins, 2000). Past research 
has demonstrated that employees often scrutinize the way managerial decisions are communicated, 
in order to understand what the real purpose of the decision may be (Weick, 1995). In some cases, 
peripheral cues related to how the decision is communicated may affect followers’ reactions. One 
such cue may be the leaders’ account of her cognitive decision style, i.e. the thought process that 
preceded the decision. This paper represents an exploration of whether and how decision style can 
function as such a signal. 
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This paper presents an exploration of how the leaders’ account of her decision style can alter 
followers’ perceptions of sincerity. More specifically, we have explored the role of claimed cognitive 
spontaneity in the communication of CSR decisions. Research in cognitive psychology has recently 
begun exploring how different decision styles lead to different decisional outcomes (Giblin, 
Morewedge, & Norton, 2013). In this paper, we explore how different decision styles lead to 
different social-perceptual outcomes. Put differently, we explore the social signaling effects of 
different decision styles, not the cognitive effects. Across two experiments, we have tested whether 
and how a CEO who claimed to have used different cognitive decision styles produced different 
perceptions of sincerity, and how this affected followers evaluation of both the decision and the CEO. 
In the following two paragraphs we present and outline the central constructs of the paper. 
 
Cognitive spontaneity 
The manipulated variable in both experiments was the degree of cognitive spontaneity that a 
fictitious CEO claimed to have experienced when deciding to implement new sustainability initiatives. 
Spontaneously arising forms of cognition, such as dreams, Freudian slips, cognition under 
intoxication, and sudden insights and intuitions are generally considered to be outside conscious 
control (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). As spontaneous thoughts are often considered less 
strategically oriented than willful deliberation, people often perceive them as revealing honest and 
meaningful characteristics (Morewedge, Giblin, & Norton, 2014). This general tendency is reflected in 
naïve folk theories of honesty and sincerity, such as the widespread notions that drunk people, 
children, and angry people are more likely to tell the truth. The empirical truthfulness of these folk-
theories notwithstanding, one common denominator in these examples is that these individuals are 
presumably less capable of strategic deliberation, and thus more likely to speak their mind in an 
uninhibited and unfiltered manner. Morewedge, Giblin and Norton (2014, p. 1742) defined 
spontaneous thoughts as “thoughts produced by a broad category of higher order mental processes 
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that cannot be controlled or accessed by the thinker” (for a more thorough discussion, see Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). According to this definition, spontaneous thoughts are 
characterized primarily by not being deliberately evoked by the thinker, and the process through 
which the thoughts were evoked cannot be controlled or accessed through introspection. 
Morewedge, Giblin and Norton demonstrated that people experience a higher degree of self-insight 
from spontaneous thoughts than from deliberate cognition. The authors theorized that it is precisely 
the lack of control over and access to the processes by which they arise that leads people to perceive 
spontaneous thoughts as revealing meaningful self-insight. The tendency to see spontaneous 
thoughts as indicative of sincerely held values may work similarly in the perception of others as it 
does in self-perception (Merritt & Monin, 2011). Recent research has demonstrated that we think we 
learn more about other peoples’ preferences from their speedy decisions, relative to their slow 
decisions (Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2014). For instance, Critcher, et al. (2013) found 
that when participants observe decision makers, quick decisions are taken as indications of certainty 
in the decision. Perceptions of certainty in decision making led observers to infer that more 
unambiguous motives drove the observed behavior. In a similar vein, Evans, Dillon and Rand 
(2014) found fast responses in economic games to be associated with extremes of motivations, 
whereas slower responses were associated with combinations of motivations. Although these studies 
used decision-time rather than decision style as the manipulated variable, they still inform the 
theoretical basis of this paper. Quick, intuitive and spontaneous decision may come across as more 
revealing of sincere values than slow, rational and deliberative decisions. 
 
Perception of sincerity 
The central outcome variable in both experiments was the perceived level of sincerity in the 
communicating CEO. Perceived sincerity is a key aspect of much adhered-to theories on leadership, 
including transformational leadership (Bass, 1991), and charismatic leadership (Conger & Kanungo, 
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1998; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). Perceptions of honesty and sincerity are also central to 
psychological theories on persuasion (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000). We have operationalized sincerity 
to be a combined construct of two different inferences made by the followers. The first inference is 
motivational attribution, pertaining to the decision itself (see Groza, et al., 2011). Put in plain terms, 
this inference is represented by the implicit question ‘why are they doing this?’. When a leader 
makes a decision that serves multiple ends, aspects pertaining to the leader, setting, medium and 
style of communication may affect the observers tendency to attribute the decision to different 
motivations. Sincerity of motivation will in this sense entail that followers believe that the managerial 
decision is primarily motivated by the reasons that the leader communicates. Perceptions of 
insincerity, on the other hand, is manifest when followers attribute the decision to ulterior motives. 
The other inference that makes up our construct of sincerity is communicative intention. Put in plain 
terms, this inference is represented by the implicit question ‘why are they telling us this?’. When 
faced with a corporate communication, people will often attempt to understand whether or not the 
deliberate intention of the communicator is to persuade them in any direction (Friestad & Wright, 
1994). The belief that a leader’s communicative intention is to persuade, is typically referred to as 
persuasion knowledge. According to the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad & Wright, 1994), 
people will attempt to hold valid attitudes when faced with a persuasion attempt. In order to 
maintain a valid attitude towards the communicated message, people will analyze the persuasion 
tactics, and the effectiveness and the appropriateness of the persuasive agent. They will then adjust 
their overall impression in accordance with their analysis, in an attempt to maintain a sense of 
independent and dissuaded view of the message they are evaluating. This process is typically 
referred to as coping, or coping cognitions (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000). Effective CSR communication 
can be achieved only when the coping efforts of the recipients are taken into account. Low levels of 
persuasion knowledge can be seen as indicative of perceived sincerity, whereas acute feelings of 
being subjected to a persuasion attempt can be seen as indicative of perceived insincerity. The 
higher the awareness of being subjected to a persuasion attempt, i.e. the higher persuasion 
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knowledge the follower reports, the more coping cognitions the followers will engage in. Conversely, 
if the followers perceive mainly informational intent on behalf of the communicating leader, they will 
to a lesser extent engage in coping cognitions. Friestad and Wright (1994) called for more research 
exploring the artifacts which may disguise a persuasion tactic, and which may make its execution 
seem heavy-handed or transparent to the observer. Several different candidates have already been 
identified (see e.g., Campbell, 1995; Edwards, Li, & Lee, 2002; Kirmani, 1997; Kirmani & Zhu, 2007). 
We suggest that a partially spontaneous decision style may be added to the list of factors that can 
disguise a persuasion attempt.  
 
General model 
Our main prediction is that when a leader presents ambiguously motivated CSR initiatives, different 
claims of cognitive spontaneity may increase or decrease followers tendency to attribute the 
decision to different motivations, and perceive different communicative intentions. Although 
academic work in this area limited, it is conceivable that people perceive spontaneous thoughts as 
signaling sincere and unfiltered motivations (Barden & Tormala, 2014; Giblin, Morewedge, & Norton, 
2013; Inbar, Cone, & Gilovich, 2010; Merritt & Monin, 2011; Morewedge, et al., 2014). A naïve and 
premature implication of such a spontaneity-sincerity heuristic would be that the more spontaneous 
the decision style is reported to have been, the more sincere the decision maker comes across. Taken 
to its extreme implication, this heuristic would imply that more claimed cognitive spontaneity would 
produce higher levels of perceived sincerity, ad infinitum. However, this positive linear relationship 
between sincerity and spontaneity seems intuitively implausible. Instead, we therefore propose an 
inverted U-shaped model (see Figure 1). The proposed model depicts the degree of claimed 
spontaneity in cognitive account along the x-axis, and perceived sincerity of the leader on the y-axis. 
Up to a certain point, the more cognitively spontaneous the leader claims to have been, the more 
sincere the leader comes across. However, past a certain point, the account of decision style may 
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become unrealistic, which induces a suspicion of falsehood. Past this point, furthering the claim of 
spontaneity will only further the experience of insincerity. 
Figure 1. Predicted model of relationship between claimed spontaneity and perceived sincerity 
 
Research setting and materials 
Two experiments were designed to explore how different decision styles can influence the 
motivation and communicative intention attributed to the leader. Experiment 1 tested the left-most 
half of the presented graph, which indicated that levels of perceived sincerity would be highest when 
the decision maker reported partial spontaneity as decision style. Experiment 2 tested the right-most 
half of the graph, which indicated that a leader who claimed complete spontaneity as decision style 
would produce the lowest levels of perceived sincerity.  
 
The setting in the experiments was a description of a hypothetical hotel chain, wherein the CEO had 
decided to reduce the size of plates and glasses at the buffet, install water-saving showers, and adopt 
a more restrictive policy regarding changing of towels and linens. These initiatives are clearly 
environmentally friendly, as they will lead to reduced waste of food and drink, reduced energy-
consumption, and reduced usage of detergents and emission of wastewater. They are also financially 
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beneficial, as they will reduce costs on behalf of the hotel. The CEO depicted in the experiments 
claimed that sincere acknowledgement of social responsibility was the central motivation behind the 
new initiatives. However, as all these cost-saving initiatives are ultimately carried by the consumer, 
and directly and positively influencing the company cash-flow, the sincerity of the CEO is likely to be 
regarded as questionable.  
 
To achieve a high degree of vividness and realism in the experimental manipulation, we used video-
footage of an actress portraying a CEO who gave different accounts of the thought-process that 
preceded her decision. The actress was instructed to act naturally, while maintaining identical 
postures, facial expressions and tone of voice across all recordings. The video presented to all 
participants started with a text introducing the CEO and explaining the new CSR initiatives (See 
Appendix A for complete text stimuli). After the text, the video showed a fictitious interview, wherein 
the CEO stated that these initiatives were motivated by sincere environmental care (see Appendix B 
for a screenshot and exact wording). This part of the video was identical across all conditions. After 
this, the manipulated variable was introduced, namely the CEO’s response when asked how she got 
the idea for the new initiatives. The experiments included four different conditions; willful 
deliberation, partial spontaneity, complete spontaneity and passive control. In the willful deliberation 
condition the CEO explained that the idea had come about through deliberate and goal-directed 
cognition. In the partial spontaneity condition, the CEO explained that the idea had come about 
through a spontaneous allegory, whereby the initial idea came about spontaneously, and the 
consequent cognitive work was done deliberately. In the complete spontaneity condition, the CEO 
answered that the entirety of the CSR initiatives came to her completely spontaneously, in an 
unrelated situation. Finally, participants in the passive control condition saw a video that presented 
the same CEO and CSR initiatives, but contained no account of decision style. See Appendix C for 
exact wording in all conditions, and a screenshot of the video. 
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All video stimuli were pre-tested on a student sample. 11 participants (taken from the same sample 
as experimental participants) saw all versions of the video, in random order, producing a total of 33 
observations. The pre-test examined how the actress came across in each video. The measurement 
items were how enthusiastic, and interpersonally warm the CEO was perceived. There were no 
significant differences between the videos. After the test, the students were told how the stimuli was 
to be used, and asked if any of the videos stood out as different from the other, aside from the 
different words the actress conveyed. All participants indicated that none of the videos differed from 
the others in such a way.  
 
Experiment 1: Partial Spontaneity of Thought 
Three experimental conditions were compared, i.e., passive control, willful deliberation, and partial 
spontaneity. The degree of claimed spontaneity ranged from the CEO giving no account of decision 
style (i.e. “passive control”), to willful deliberation, to claiming a partially spontaneous decision style. 
The outcome variables were presumed to reflect how the CEO was evaluated, how the decision was 
received, what motivational attributions were generated, and how much persuasion knowledge was 
produced. Figure 2 presents the conceptual model tested in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual model of Experiment 1 
 
 
We proposed a multiple mediation model, in which the degree of claimed spontaneity was the 
manipulated variable, and the degree of liking the decision to implement these CSR initiatives, and 
evaluation of CEO were ultimate outcome variables. Motivational attribution and perceived 
communicative intention were the proposed mediators. Each predicted relationship in the model is 
numbered in accordance with its respective hypothesis.  
 
Recent psychological research has demonstrated that for a behavior to be considered morally 
praiseworthy, the agent must have not only intended and brought about the action and its 
consequence, she must also have performed the act for reasons that are themselves praiseworthy 
(Fedotova, Fincher, Goodwin, & Rozin, 2011; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Critcher, Helzer, 
Tannebaum and Pizarro (in prep) proposed a mindreading moral principles account of evaluating 
moral character. The authors demonstrated that people attempt to mind-read agents’ moral 
principles by evaluating the mental antecedents that precede a morally motivated action. In their 
study, the amount of praise the agents received for their decisions was mediated by the extent to 
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which the agents were assumed to appreciate the moral principle that would justify that choice. 
Taken together with the emphasis placed on sincerity in CSR research, these findings provide 
direction to the hypotheses in this experiment. If a partially spontaneous decision style signals a 
clearer understanding of the moral principle that justifies the choice, while a deliberative decision 
style signals a clearer understanding of the strategic and financial benefits of the same choice, then 
participants would be expected to approve more of a decision that was preceded by spontaneous 
thoughts. The first hypothesis is therefore:  
 
H1: Claiming to have come up with the CSR initiatives via a partially spontaneous decision style will 
lead to a more positive evaluation of a) the decision and b) the CEO, compared to the condition where 
the CSR initiatives came about through willful deliberation or when no cognitive account was given. 
 
We further assumed that spontaneous thoughts signal sincere, intrinsic values, and that deliberate 
cognition signal more strategic, and potentially self-serving factors. Therefore the CEO who used a 
partially spontaneous decision style should come across as more forthright and candid. This would 
produce less of an impression that she was deliberately attempting to persuade her audience in any 
direction. We predicted that this reduction in persuasion knowledge would be a relevant 
psychological mechanism through which the partially spontaneous decision style would lead to more 
positive reactions. The second hypothesis was thus: 
 
H2: The increase in liking of (a) the decision and (b) the CEO, associated with claiming partial 
spontaneity of thought, will be mediated by a reduction in persuasion knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, we predicted the two proposed mediators to have a combined indirect effect. Coming 
across as having less persuasive intent was expected to be associated with more value-based 
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attributions. This combined relationship would in turn be predicted to be associated with higher 
levels of liking the decision and CEO. The third hypothesis was thus: 
 
H3. The increase in liking (a) the decision and (b) the decision maker, associated with claiming partial 
spontaneity of thought, will be mediated by both persuasion knowledge and value-based attribution. 
 
We also predicted differences in how the different decision styles would elicit different reactions, 
based on the participants dispositional levels of cynicism. High-cynicism individuals have a tendency 
to suspect ulterior motivations to be driving other people’s behavior (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). We 
therefore proposed that individuals with a high score on dispositional cynicism would prove more 
likely to perceive deliberate thinking individuals as being less sincere. If the CEO seemed rehearsed 
and strategic, these individuals were expected to infer that the CEO was strategizing her 
communication. In contrast, a seemingly less rehearsed and somewhat untraditional decision style, 
was expected to make high-cynicism individuals less skeptical towards the CEO, as her seemingly 
unrehearsed account could make her come across as more sincere. We expected that highly cynical 
participants would be very concerned with perceptions of sincerity when evaluating the CEO. For less 
cynical individuals, however, the attribution conflict associated the decision would presumably be a 
less important factor. As such, the level of perceived sincerity of motivation and intention was 
expected to have less impact on the evaluation of the CEO, compared to that of the highly cynical 
participants. The fourth hypothesis was thus: 
 
H4: A partially spontaneous decision style will lead high-cynicism participants, but not low-cynicism 
participants, to more positive evaluation of the CEO. 
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Sample and procedure 
A convenience sample of 81 law school students at a large Norwegian University (46 female, mean 
age 23) were recruited. Participation was compensated with a 60 NOK (aprox 11 $) gift card. The 
participants were told that the experiment would be about communication, business and the 
environment. All participants were informed that their responses were given in complete anonymity, 
and indicated informed consent electronically, in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to three groups, each of which represented a test condition in a 
between-groups design. The groups assembled in three separate classrooms. After indicating their 
responses on dispositional measures, the participants were presented with one of three different 
versions of the video. The video was displayed on large screen at the front of the classroom. The 
video shown to the passive control group (N=27) ended before the CEO was asked about her decision 
style. The willful deliberation group (N=27) saw the same video, with the addition of the decision 
style indicating willful deliberation. The partial spontaneity group (N=27) saw the video wherein the 
CEO’s decision style indicated partial spontaneity of thought. Having seen their respective video, 
participants went on to complete the questionnaire. Figure 3 displays the experiment procedure. 
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Figure 3. Procedure of Experiment 1 
 
 
Measures 
Before seeing the video, all participants indicated their responses on the Cynicism scale (Kanter & 
Mirvis, 1989), which is a seven-item scale originally derived from Wrightsman Jr (1964). The scale 
measures dispositional cynicism, defined as a tendency to disbelieve the accuracy of other people’s 
claims (skepticism), but also the underlying motives of others (Cronbach’s α =.73). A principal 
component factor analysis with direct oblim rotation revealed that the cynicism scale produces two 
distinct factors with an Eigenvalue above 1. The pattern matrix revealed that the first factor included 
four items detailing a general tendency to suspect people to care less about others than they claim. 
We labeled this factor suspicion of lack of caring (Cronbach’s α =.65). The second factor consisted of 
three items measuring participants general tendency to distrust the honesty and integrity of others. 
We labeled the second factor suspicion of dishonesty (Cronbach’s α =.69). This factor consists of the 
two items of the scale that specifically juxtapose money with integrity and honesty, and a third item 
simply stating that people by their very nature are dishonest.  
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Once all participants had completed the dispositional measures, the video was shown on a big 
screen. After seeing their respective video, the participant responded to a survey that contained all 
outcome measures (for an English version of the entire survey, see appendix D). The items presumed 
to be indicative of evaluation of CEO were liking CEO, perceived professionalism, perceived 
competence, and willingness to endorse the CEO to serve as a member on a business-ethics advisory 
board. An additional item measured the degree of liking the decision itself. Perceptions of sincerity 
were measured by two sets of items, one addressing motivational attribution and one addressing 
communicative intention. Motivational attribution was measured using the attribution scale from 
Groza, et al. (2011). Communicative intention was measured by a single item of perceived 
informational intent, as well as two items measuring persuasion knowledge. The principle-
components factor analysis of all outcome measures using direct oblim rotation revealed three 
distinct factors, all with an Eigenvalue above 1. The attribution measure derived from Groza, et al. 
(2011) was found to produce only one distinct factor, consisting of the three items measuring value-
based attribution (Cronbach’s α =.87). Because of issues with multicollinearity and cross-loadings, the 
remaining attribution-items from Groza, et al (2011) had to be excluded from the analysis. The four 
items measuring evaluation of the CEO all loaded onto a discrete factor (Cronbach’s α =.77). The item 
measuring liking of decision loaded onto the same factor as value-based attributions. This measure 
was kept separate from the attribution measure in later analyses, but the cross-loading precluded 
investigations of mediated relationships between these variables. The two items measuring 
persuasion knowledge were combined into a single variable in the analysis, denoted simply as 
persuasion knowledge (Cronbach’s α =.67). The single-item measure of perceived informational 
intent was excluded due to multicollinearity. All standardized scales used in this study were 
translated to Norwegian. The translation process is described under Appendix E. Table 1 displays the 
outcome measurement model. 
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Table 1. Measurement model Experiment 1 
 
Item M H2 Factors 
   Value-based 
attribution 
Persuasion 
Knowledge 
Evaluation of 
CEO 
 
Liking decision 
  
.50 
 
.640 
  
Liking CEO 5.04 .62   -.720 
Endorsing CEO 4.63 .60   -.702 
CEO is professional 5.36 .59   -.699 
CEO is competent 5.16 .67   -.872 
CEO is attempting to 
change my attitudes 
towards the hotels 
 
4.05 .74  .802  
CEO is attempting to 
influence my future 
choice of hotels 
 
3.85 .80  .909  
…they have a long-term 
interest in society 
 
3.35 .82 .915   
…they believe in 
environmental care 
 
3.65 .78 .845   
…they are trying to give 
back to society 
2.91 .68 .852   
Note: All items in italics were preceded by “I believe the company is doing this because…” 
 
Results and discussion 
The correlations between the outcome measures affirmed the notion that perceptions of sincere 
caring is conducive to followers approval of CSR initiatives, as highlighted in past research (Beckman, 
et al., 2009; de Vries, et al., 2013; Du, et al., 2010; Groza, et al., 2011; Windsor, 2013). Value-based 
attribution was found to be positively correlated with positive perception of the decision (r=.47) and 
of the CEO (r=.53). In order to test the hypothesis that the different decision styles would directly 
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influence the outcome measures, the groups were compared by simple t-tests. Only one significant 
difference between the partial spontaneous condition and the others was identified. The mean level 
of persuasion knowledge was significantly lower in the partial spontaneity group, compared to both 
the control group [t(52)=3.05, p<.01, d=.83], and the willful deliberation group [t(52)=2.28, p=.03, 
d=.62]. Reporting partial cognitive spontaneity as decision style significantly reduced participants’ 
awareness of the persuasive intent of the CEO. There were no differences between groups in terms 
of how the decision or the CEO was evaluated. This result does not support Hypothesis 1, which 
stated that the different cognitive accounts would produce different evaluations of both decision and 
CEO.  
 
Even though Hypothesis 1 was not supported, it is still possible and useful to test and report the 
indirect relationships pertaining to Hypotheses 2 and 3. Exploring mediated effects provides 
information regarding whether or not the proposed mediator has a positive or negative denotation, 
and can also suggest directions for future research in terms of identifying suppressing variables that 
are not measured in the presented research (see Hayes, 2009). In mediation analyses where the 
direct effect between X and Y is absent, the proposed mediators are better referred to as indirect 
relationships, rather than mediated relationships (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). We employed Preacher 
and Hayes’ PROCESS macro for SPSS (2004, 2008). In order to increase the statistical power of the 
mediation analysis, the passive control and willful deliberation conditions were combined to a single 
group. As these two groups had near-identical values on all outcome variables, this combination is 
very unlikely to pose a challenge to the validity of the subsequent analyses. We used a bootstrapping 
method with bias-corrected confidence estimates, wherein absence or presence of claimed 
spontaneity was used as manipulated variable (X), degree of liking the decision was the outcome (Y) 
variable, and persuasion knowledge was the mediator. The analysis showed that the indirect path 
from degree of spontaneity, via persuasion knowledge, to level of liking the decision was statistically 
significant, with confidence intervals entirely above zero (from .05to .56). As predicted, the 
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coefficients from the mediation model indicate that claiming partial spontaneity of thought induced 
reduced levels of persuasion knowledge [β=-.32, t=-3.18, p<.01], and persuasion knowledge was in 
turn associated with a reduction in liking the decision [β=-.72, t=-2.25, p=.02]. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 2a. Claiming a partially spontaneous cognitive decision style evoked significantly lower 
levels of persuasion knowledge compared to the conditions where no claim of cognitive spontaneity 
was made. This reduction in persuasion knowledge was further associated with higher levels of liking 
the decision. It is also theoretically possible that the reduction in persuasion knowledge made 
participants generally more susceptible to the influence of the CSR message, as higher levels of 
persuasion knowledge are assumed to evoke coping cognitions (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008; Friestad 
& Wright, 1994).  
 
According to hypotheses 2b, the same mediated relationship should be observed when using 
perception of CEO as outcome variable. In order to test this hypothesis, we employed the same 
analysis as when testing Hypothesis 2a, only substituting the outcome variable from liking the 
decision to evaluation of CEO. There was a significant indirect relationship between degree of 
spontaneity and persuasion knowledge, as the claimed partial spontaneity condition evoked 
significantly lower levels of persuasion knowledge. However, in this model, persuasion knowledge 
alone produced no significant effect on evaluation of CEO. This finding contradicts Hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 2 was therefore only partially supported.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a multiple mediated relationship involving value-based attribution and 
persuasion knowledge on (a) level of liking the decision, and (b) evaluation of the CEO. As the factor 
analysis revealed that the item measuring liking decision and the items measuring value-based 
attributions all loaded onto the same factor, Hypothesis 3a could not be further explored. However, 
Hypothesis 3b was tested by using a bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence 
estimates. The multiple mediation model included both persuasion knowledge and degree of value-
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based attribution as mediators, and evaluation of CEO as an outcome measure. The results revealed 
a significant indirect effect of both mediators combined. Put differently, there was a significant 
indirect effect of presence of spontaneity, via persuasion knowledge, via perceived value-based 
motivation, on evaluation of CEO (confidence intervals from .01 to .18). As noted, the results 
indicated that claiming some spontaneity of thought reduced persuasion knowledge [β=-.65, t=-3.18, 
p<.01]. Persuasion knowledge was found to be negatively associated with degree of perceived value-
based motivation, albeit to a marginally insignificant degree [β=-.23, t=-1.98, p=.05]. Lastly, the 
degree of perceived value-based motivation was significantly positively associated with positive 
evaluation of the CEO [β=.54, t=4.32, p<.01]. On this basis, Hypothesis 3 was supported, in so far as 
the predicted indirect effect was found to be significant. Figure 4 displays the model with 
coefficients.   
Figure 4. Experiment 1 – Results 
 
 
 
 
Finally, dispositional cynicism was examined as a moderator of the relationship between presence of 
claimed spontaneity and positive evaluation of CEO. Degree of claimed spontaneity and dispositional 
cynicism were entered in the first step of the regression analysis. In the second step, the interaction 
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term between the degree of claimed spontaneity and cynicism was entered, and it explained a 
significant increase in variance in liking the CEO [ΔR2=.07, β=.77, F=5.64, p=.02]. Thus, dispositional 
cynicism proved to be a significant moderator of the relationship between degree of claimed 
spontaneity and liking the CEO. Exploring this relationship further, the same statistical operation was 
performed using each of the two identified sub-factors of cynicism, as identified by the exploratory 
factor analysis. The results revealed that the cynicism factor labeled suspicion of dishonesty, did not 
produce a significant interaction. However, the other sub-factor of dispositional cynicism, labeled 
suspicion of lack of caring produced an even more pronounced moderated relationship 
[ΔR2=.08, F=6.75, p=.01]. These results provide support for Hypothesis 4. Highly cynical participants 
in the spontaneous condition were more likely to give a positive evaluation of the CEO, compared to 
less cynical individuals in the same experimental condition. It seems that the partially spontaneous 
decision style curtailed potential negative person perceptions from highly cynical individuals, but 
produced negative evaluations in less cynical individuals. A plausible explanation may be that the 
issue of sincerity is more pronounced when high-cynicism individuals are evaluating a corporate 
executive. Because people generally perceive spontaneous cognitions to reveal more sincere 
motivations (Critcher, et al., 2013; Morewedge, et al., 2014), cynical participants, who otherwise 
typically suspect ulterior motives behind corporate decisions, may have perceived the CEO more 
positively when she conveyed a realistic claim of cognitive spontaneity. As the somewhat 
spontaneously thinking CEO was perceived as more sincere, in as much as she evoked less persuasion 
knowledge, she was altogether perceived more positively by the high-cynicism participants. The less 
cynical participants however, were presumably less concerned with how sincere the executive 
appeared. Figure 5 illustrates the moderating effect of dispositional cynicism on the relationship 
between degree of claimed cognitive spontaneity and perception of CEO.  
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Figure 5. Dispositional Cynicism moderates the relationship between decision style and evaluation of 
decision maker 
 
 
 
Taken together, these results offer support for the first part of the predicted inverse U-shaped 
model, notably the left-most half of the inverse U. The reduction in persuasion knowledge and 
subsequent increase in value-based attributions demonstrate the small but positive effects 
associated with a partially spontaneous decision style, especially when communicating to a cynical 
audience. However, it stands to reason that the potential for increasing perceived sincerity by 
claiming higher levels of cognitive spontaneity cannot be infinite. Past a certain point, the more 
spontaneous the CEO claims the style of decision making was, the less believable she must come 
across, as the account of decision style itself will come across as less and less credible. Claiming to 
have come up with a set of CSR initiatives through complete cognitive spontaneity would presumably 
be seen as implausible. It is reasonable to assume that seemingly implausible accounts of decision 
style would lead to skepticism among observers. Furthermore, if claiming complete spontaneity of 
thought comes across as deceptive in its implausibility, the rest of the communication may also come 
across as less sincere, causing a general negative evaluation. In order to explore the evaluative 
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effects of claiming complete cognitive spontaneity as decision style, we performed a second 
experiment. 
 
Experiment 2: Complete spontaneity of thought 
While Experiment 1 demonstrated the relative gains associated with claiming a somewhat 
spontaneous form decision style, Experiment 2 was set up to explore the consequences of claiming 
complete spontaneity of thought as decision style. The design of Experiment 2 differed from 
Experiment 1 in that it explored the evaluative artefacts produced by claiming complete spontaneity 
of thought, rather than effects of claiming partial spontaneity of thought, which was the focus of 
Experiment 1.   
 
The experimental condition in Experiment 2 was a CEO reporting to have relied completely on 
spontaneous thought as decision style. In this condition, participants saw the CEO who, upon 
questioning from the interviewer, replied that the idea behind the new plan came to her completely 
out of nowhere, and in a situation that was unrelated to the CSR initiative. It is important to note the 
difference between the partial spontaneity condition tested in Experiment 1 and complete 
spontaneity condition tested in Experiment 2. The claim of partial spontaneity is more realistic, as it 
entails getting the initial idea through a spontaneous cognitive process, and then using willful 
deliberation to come up with the rest of the CSR initiatives. By contrast, the complete spontaneity 
claim entails coming up with an entire set of CSR initiatives, which encompass different parts of the 
day-to-day operations of the organization, completely spontaneously. Our main prediction was that 
the claim of complete spontaneity as decision style would come across as implausible, and induce an 
overall negative effect in terms of persuasive appeal. As control condition, we chose willful 
deliberation rather than no account of decision style (i.e. passive control). The willful deliberation 
condition represents a more valid point of comparison than the passive control condition, because it 
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indeed contains a cognitive account, and because this ensures that the videos used are similar in 
length. Furthermore, the results from Experiment 1 suggests that this type of decision style produced 
the same evaluation as absence of explanation of decision style (passive control).  
 
Past research has indicated that when participants sense that a person is deliberately 
misrepresenting the truth, their general skepticism increases (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). The claim 
of complete spontaneity was not expected to alter participants’ sense of strategic and willful 
manipulation or persuasion, as measured by the persuasion knowledge items. Claiming complete 
spontaneity carries little persuasive appeal, and would not be perceived as a typical persuasion 
tactic. Rather, the claim was expected to induce a sense of hiding the truth about how the ideas 
came about. We therefore predicted that the CEO who claimed to have come up with the CSR 
initiatives completely spontaneously would elicit lower levels of perceived informational intent, 
compared to the willful deliberation condition. The first hypothesis was thus: 
 
H1: Claiming complete spontaneity of thought will elicit lower levels of perceived informational 
intent, compared to those of willful deliberation. 
 
As the complete spontaneity CEO comes across as less forthright, her stated motives were expected 
to be subject to increased scrutiny. We therefore predicted that the complete spontaneity condition 
would evoke doubts regarding the motivation behind the CSR initiatives. The second hypothesis was 
thus: 
 
H2: Claiming complete spontaneity of thought will elicit low levels of value-based attributions, 
compared to those of willful deliberation. 
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The predicted drop in perceived informational intent, caused by the implausible account of decision 
style, was predicted to result in lower levels of liking decision and poorer evaluation of the CEO. Put 
differently, the claim of having come up with an entire, multifaceted set of CSR initiatives from thin 
air, would lead to lower levels of perceived informational intent, which in turn would lead to lower 
levels of liking the decision, and worse overall evaluation of the CEO. Hypothesis 3 was therefore: 
 
H3:  Claiming complete spontaneity of thought will elicit a) low levels of liking the decision, and b) 
worse evaluation of the CEO, mediated by level of perceived informational intent. 
 
The fourth hypothesis was that perceived informational intent and value-based attributions would 
have a combined mediating effect. The claim of complete cognitive spontaneity would first and 
foremost produce a drop in perceived informational intent. We expected this drop in perceived 
sincerity in communicative intention to produce a spillover effect of skepticism and cynicism 
regarding the claimed motivation behind the CSR initiatives. This effect was expected because it is 
likely that a CEO who comes across as insincere in her communicative intention, will be perceived as 
someone who is also willing to misrepresent the truth about the motivation behind her decision. 
Moreover, as the perceived level of value-based motivation is lowered, due to a drop in perceived 
informational intent, the overall evaluation of both decision and CEO was expected to worsen. The 
fourth hypothesis was thus: 
 
H4: Claiming complete spontaneity of thought will elicit a) lower levels of liking the decision, and b) 
poorer evaluation of the CEO, mediated by both level of perceived informational intent and level of 
value-based attribution. 
 
Figure 6 displays the models tested in this experiment. The predicted relationships are numbered in 
accordance with their respective hypotheses. 
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Figure 6. Conceptual model of Experiment 2 
 
 
Sample and procedure 
 
67 Students at a large Norwegian university (49 female, mean age 22) were recruited to participate 
in the experiment. Participation was paid with a 60 NOK (approx. 11 $) gift card. Participants were 
told that the experiment would be about communication, business and the environment. All 
participants were informed that their responses were given in complete anonymity, and indicated 
informed consent electronically, in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to two groups, each group representing an experimental 
condition in a between-groups design. The groups assembled in two separate classrooms, completed 
relevant dispositional measures, and saw one of two different versions of the video. The design of 
the videos was identical to Experiment 1, apart from the last part of the film, wherein the CEO 
answered the question of how the ideas to the measures had come about. The willful deliberation 
group (N=33) saw an account identical to the willful deliberation group in experiment 1. The 
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complete spontaneity group (N=34) saw the CEO claiming that the idea had come about completely 
spontaneously (see materials and pre-test section for a more comprehensive description of the video 
stimuli). Having seen their respective video, participants in both conditions moved on to provide 
answers to the outcome measures. Figure 7 displays the experimental procedure. 
Figure 7. Procedure of Experiment 2. 
 
Measures 
The dispositional measures were the same as in Experiment 1. The outcome measures were also the 
same, with the addition of a single-item measure of perceived moral motivation, and a single-item 
measure of perceived financial motivation. These items were included in order to more precisely 
assess the attribution effects that were central to the study. A principal component factor analysis 
with direct oblim rotation was performed to assess the measurement model. Having discarded items 
producing multicollinearity, the analysis revealed four distinct factors with an Eigenvalue above 1. 
Two items formed a factor measuring evaluation of the CEO (Cronbach’s α = .81). The two items 
measuring persuasion knowledge loaded onto a single factor (Cronbach’s α = .74), as did the four 
items measuring value-based attributions (Cronbach’s α = .82). The items measuring level of liking 
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decision, perceived financial motivation and the degree of perceived informational intent all loaded 
onto a single factor. As such, potential mediated relationships between these variables were not 
available for further exploration in this dataset. Table 2 displays the measurement model. 
Table 2. Measurement model of Experiment 2 
 
Item M H2 Factors 
   1 2 3 4 
Liking decision 6.03 .57    -.717 
Perceived financial 
motivation 
 
4.57 .75    .785 
CEO’s intention is to 
give me relevant 
information 
 
3.45 .78    -.774 
CEO is professional 5.43 .85   .800  
CEO is competent 
 
5.19 .86   .918  
CEO is attempting to 
change my attitudes 
towards the hotels 
 
3.90 .80  .889   
CEO is attempting to 
influence my future 
choice of hotels 
 
3.81 .78  .875   
Perceived moral 
motivation 
 
4.57 .75 .671    
…they have a long-
term interest in 
society 
 
3.24 .73 .865    
…they believe in 
environmental care 
 
3.76 .70 .814    
…they are trying to 
give back to society 
3.13 .59 .747    
Note: All items in italics were preceded by “I believe the company is doing this because…” 
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Results and discussion 
 
The correlational results were in line with those of Experiment 1. Attributing the CSR initiatives to 
value-based motivation was positively correlated with liking the decision (r=.41), and positive 
evaluation of the CEO (r=.39). Perceived informational intent was positively correlated with liking the 
decision (r=.47), and with positive evaluation of the CEO (r=.51). Conversely, perceived financial 
motivation was negatively correlated with liking the decision (r=.-52), and perceived informational 
intent (r=.-52). The first hypotheses in the experiment postulated that there would be significant 
between-groups differences in how the CEO was perceived. In order to test these hypotheses, we 
performed simple t-tests. The tests revealed significant differences between the groups, in line with 
the hypotheses. The t-tests demonstrated a significant difference in perception of informational 
intent. The allegedly completely spontaneously thinking CEO gave the impression of having 
significantly less informational intent than her deliberately thinking counterpart [t(65)=2.12, p=.04, 
d=.52]. Hypothesis 1 was thus supported. This finding indicates that in terms of communicative 
intention, the CEO claiming to have come up with the ideas for CSR measures through complete 
cognitive spontaneity was seen as significantly less sincere than her deliberative counterpart. The 
second hypothesis predicted that the complete spontaneity group would generate significantly lower 
levels of value-based attributions. This prediction was not supported [t(65)=1.66, p=.103, d=.40]. 
 
Hypothesis 3 stated that perceived informational intent would significantly mediate the relationship 
between the manipulated variable and a) liking the decision and b) evaluation of the CEO. As the 
factor analysis revealed that perceived informational intent loads onto the same factor as the item 
measuring liking the decision, Hypothesis 3a could not be explored. The potential indirect 
relationship predicted in Hypothesis 3b, however, was explored. We employed Preacher and Hayes’ 
PROCESS macro for SPSS (2004, 2008), using a bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence 
estimates. Willful deliberation vs. complete spontaneity was used as manipulated (X) variable, 
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evaluation of CEO as outcome variable (Y), and perceived informational intent served as mediator. As 
expected, the direct effect between the manipulated variable and outcome variable proved 
significant, with confidence intervals entirely below zero (from -.63 to -.15, p=.002). The coefficient 
for the direct effect indicates that claiming complete spontaneity of thought significantly worsens the 
overall evaluation of the CEO [β=-.73, t=-3.21, p<.01]. The indirect effect via the mediator also 
proved significant, with confidence intervals entirely below zero (from -.31 to -.02). The coefficients 
revealed that claiming complete spontaneity was associated with lower levels of perceived 
informational intent [β=-.55, t=-2.12, p=.04]. Perceived informational intent was in turn positively 
related to positive evaluation of CEO [β=.46, t=4.13 p<.01]. Hypothesis 3b was thus supported. See 
Figure 8 for the mediation model with coefficients.  
 
We continued to explore the multiple mediation model predicted in Hypothesis 4. The model was 
tested using a bootstrapping method with bias-corrected confidence estimates, wherein complete 
spontaneity vs. willful deliberation was used as manipulated variable, perceived informational intent 
as first mediator, value-based attributions as second mediator, and evaluation of CEO as outcome 
variable. The indirect effect through both these mediators proved significant, with confidence 
intervals entirely below zero (from -.10 to -.0002). As noted, the coefficients revealed that claiming 
complete spontaneity was significantly negatively related to perceived informational intent [β=-.55, 
t=-2.12, p=.04]. Perceived informational intent was in turn significantly positively related to value-
based attributions [β=.31, t=3.33, p<.01]. A high score on value-based attributions was in turn 
positively, albeit insignificantly related to a positive evaluation of the CEO [β=.25, t=1.66, p=.10]. 
Although this last path was found to be nonsignificant, the entire path predicted in Hypothesis 4 was 
found to be significant. Hypothesis 4 was thus supported. Figure 8 displays multiple mediation model 
with all coefficients. 
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 - Results 
 
 
 
 
 
The results from Experiment 2 indicates that claiming that complete spontaneity of thought 
preceding a decision leads to overall less perceived sincerity. Crucially, the significant drop in 
perceived informational intent associated with the CEO who claimed to have come up with the CSR 
measures from thin air, indicates that the participants may have suspected that she was not willing 
to give correct and valid information. This sense of hiding or misrepresenting relevant information 
was demonstrated to be indirectly associated with less favorable motivational attribution, as well as 
with less favorable evaluation of the CEO. These findings were in line with the hypotheses, and 
confirmed the right-most half of the predicted inverted U model. Claiming complete spontaneity in 
one’s cognitive account produced overall less perception of sincerity, compared to the willful 
deliberation condition. This lack of sincerity was indirectly associated with unfortunate motivational 
attribution, and worse evaluation of the CEO. 
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General discussion 
Communicating CSR initiatives that serves multiple ends poses a challenge for any leader looking to 
create and sustain CSR in her organization. Coming across as sincerely caring about the moral aspects 
of the activities is a crucial criterion for engagement and support. Our findings suggest that different 
decision styles may influence this level of perceived sincerity in a predictable manner. The results 
from the two experiments generally supported the notion of a sloped, inverted, U-shaped model of 
the effects of spontaneity in cognitive accounts on perceived sincerity. Claiming a partially 
spontaneous decision style made the participants less aware that they were subject to a persuasion 
attempt. The reduction in persuasion knowledge was found to be associated with more favorable 
motivational attribution, which was further associated with a more positive evaluation of the CEO. 
The CEO who claimed complete spontaneity of thought, however, was perceived as less sincere than 
her deliberative counterpart. The seemingly implausible cognitive account produced significantly 
lower levels of perceived informational intent, and generally a worse evaluation of the CEO. This 
suggests that the participants exposed to this condition felt that the CEO was not attempting to give 
them valid information, on the basis of which they could make their decisions.  
 
The results from Experiment 1 resonates with the literature on mindreading in moral psychology 
literature (Critcher, et al., in prep; Gray, et al., 2012). This literature has demonstrated that when 
people judge the moral praiseworthiness of a behavior, they are not only concerned with the 
consequences of the behavior, but also the appreciation of the underlying value or principle that 
guided the behavior. In order to gauge the underlying values guiding a person’s decision, people 
attempt to mind-read the decision maker, using cues such as rationalizations and decision-time. This 
experiment demonstrates that decision style can serve as a mind-reading cue, and influence these 
evaluations positively, but also adversely, if it comes across as implausible. The findings may also 
offer general support for past research suggesting that people see spontaneous thoughts as more 
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indicative for sincerely held values and beliefs (Barden & Tormala, 2014; Inbar, et al., 2010; Merritt & 
Monin, 2011; Morewedge, et al., 2014). While willful deliberation is thought to be a more strategic 
and filtered form of cognition, a credible claim of spontaneity was seen as indicative of sincerity. The 
reported findings also fit the literature on CSR communication, where perceived sincere caring has 
been identified as a key success factor (Beckman, et al., 2009; de Vries, et al., 2013; Du, et al., 2010; 
McShane & Cunningham, 2012).  
 
The mediation analysis in Experiment 1 suggested that a theoretical suppressor variable may be 
associated with a claim of partial cognitive spontaneity. The obtained data offer no certain way of 
determining what this suppressor variable may have been. We speculate that the suppressor in 
question may be the supposed norm-violation associated with claiming to have made executive 
decisions in a somewhat spontaneous cognitive manner. As executive decision making seldom is 
presented as stemming from spontaneous forms of cognition, but rather to result from willful 
deliberation and rationality (Inbar, et al., 2010), it may be considered a norm violation for a CEO to 
admit that the new CSR initiatives came about in a spontaneous manner. The combined indirect 
effect of persuasion knowledge and norm violation may be the reason why the presence or absence 
of claimed spontaneity in the cognitive account had no direct effect on liking the decision or CEO. 
This interpretation may also explain why low-cynicism individuals in the same experiment liked the 
partial spontaneity CEO less than the control CEOs. As low cynicism individuals are less concerned 
with sincerity of motivation, but equally concerned with the presumed norm-violation of claiming to 
have come up with an executive decision partially via spontaneous thinking, they perceive the 
partially spontaneously thinking CEO as worse than the control conditions. According to this logic, 
the CEO who claims some cognitive spontaneity gains the positive effect of reduced persuasion 
knowledge, but suffers the negative effects associated with norm-violation. 
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The reported findings pose some managerial implications. First, it demonstrates that the same set of 
sustainability initiatives may produce different reactions, depending on the claimed decision style. 
Second, the results indicate that a realistic level of claimed cognitive spontaneity induces higher 
levels of perceived sincerity, in that it masks the persuasion attempt, which is associated with a more 
preferable motivational attribution. It may very well be that other ways of conveying realistic levels 
of cognitive spontaneity, other than post-hoc accounts, may produce similar benefits. By coming 
across as less rehearsed, less bound to a script, and more naturalistic, a leader may induce a stronger 
perception of sincerity. However, if the account of decision style becomes unrealistic, a backlash can 
incur. Third, high-cynicism individuals perceived the CEO as more likeable when she claimed her 
ideas had come about in a partially spontaneous fashion. This finding has important managerial 
implications, notably that a moderate level of claimed spontaneity is useful when the target audience 
is expected to be highly cynical, and have a general tendency to distrust the CEO’s communicative 
intention and motivation. The sub-factor labelled suspicion of lack of caring explained even more 
variance as moderator variable. This provides further specificity in terms of managerial implications. 
A partially spontaneous decision style may be especially beneficial when the target audience 
suspects the leader of not really caring about the moral or ethical aspects of a CSR initiatives. 
However, if the target audience is expected to have less cynical dispositions, and perceived sincerity 
is a less salient element in the overall evaluation, a partially spontaneous decision style may 
deteriorate the overall impression of the CEO. 
 
It is important to note that the results may be idiosyncratic to the communication of CSR decisions. 
CSR decisions are unique in that they entail more motivational ambiguity than many other decision 
settings. Presumably, the signalling effect of different decision styles is likely to be more pronounced 
in cases where sincerity of motivation is ambiguous, and less pronounced in cases where the 
motivation is clear-cut, and easily identifiable. In cases where the CEO’s motivation is non-
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ambiguous, the effect of different levels of perceived sincerity will presumably pose a weaker 
influence on the overall perceptual outcomes.  
 
This paper adds to a relatively new stream of applied social-psychological research exploring the 
signaling effects of different decision styles. Although this paper explores a specific domain of 
executive decision making and communication, the experiment reveals that the type of thinking 
preceding the decision has a measurable effect on how the decision and the decision maker are 
perceived. Taken together with other recent publications on the signaling effects of spontaneous 
thoughts and deliberation, the results from this study demonstrate that old assumptions regarding 
the perception of decision making styles may be inadequately nuanced. It is likely that people 
perceive decisions stemming from reasoning and deliberation as better than the ones stemming 
from spontaneous thoughts in most cases, but not necessarily in all cases. Merrit and Monin (2011) 
call for further investigations into peoples’ preferred modes of ethical judgement and decision 
making. The signaling effects of different kinds of thinking is a long ignored variable in social 
cognition, which shows promise for future research, not only in social psychology, but also for 
applied social-sciences such as marketing and management. Future studies should continue to 
explore the evaluative artefacts associated with different decision styles.  
 
Across the CSR literature, perceptions of sincere caring seem to stand out as an important mediator 
between the initiatives deployed by the organization and reactions of the observers. Initiatives that 
are taken as indications of sincere caring and appreciation of responsibility result in positive effects, 
while the opposite is true for initiatives that come across as insincere. However, the CSR literature 
has proposed very few mechanisms through which perceptions of sincerity can be altered. This paper 
represents but one suggested mechanism. Presumably, decision style is not the only psychological 
mechanism through which a leader can signal sincerity. Ideally, future research should endeavor to 
combine knowledge from different fields, in order to gain a fuller comprehension of how perceptions 
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of sincerity can be increased and decreased. This is an important task, as suspicion of ulterior 
motives can hinder support for sustainability initiatives that are necessary in order to mitigate 
climate change. 
Conclusion 
The two reported experiments demonstrate that different decision styles can influence perception of 
new CSR initiatives. Claiming to have engaged in different kinds of cognition in order to reach a CSR 
decision influenced perceptions of sincerity. The results indicated that a partially spontaneous 
decision style produced higher levels of perceived sincerity, while claiming complete spontaneity of 
thought induced lower levels of perceived sincerity. More research is needed in order to gain a full 
comprehension of how to successfully communicate CSR initiatives.  
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Appenix A 
Text stimuli:  
“Ellen Hansen is the CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has just approved a new plan to make the 
hotels more environmentally friendly. Among the measures are reducing the size of plates and glasses 
at the breakfast buffet with 20 percent, in order to reduce waste of food. Furthermore, the hotels 
have been equipped with water-saving showers. Additionally, the hotels have adopted a more 
restrictive policy on changing of towels and linens on shorter stays. In an interview, Ellen explained 
the background for the decision:” 
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Appendix B 
Wording in video:  
“We are now taking measures in order to become more socially responsible. The climate-threat is one 
of the biggest challenges that humanity has ever faced, and our chain has to be a part of the 
solution”. 
 
Screenshot:  
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Appendix C 
 
Willful deliberation manuscript:  
“I got the idea during a strategy-session, wherein many of our hotel-managers tried to come up with 
new ways of improving our business. We ran some analytics, and saw that this approach had a great 
potential”. 
 
Partial spontaneity manuscript:  
“I was eating lunch at the office, I grabbed a big dinner-plate, and made three sandwiches. I could 
only finish two of them. At first I thought, I should have used the smaller breakfast-plates, but then it 
hit me, - this is something we can use in the hotels as well. And then the measures spun on from 
there“. 
 
Complete spontaneity manuscript:  
“The idea just came to me spontaneously. I was at the office, working on something completely 
different, and suddenly it just hit me”. 
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Appendix D 
1. To what extent do you like this decision 
(1. Dislike strongly, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Like strongly) 
 
2. To what extent do you like the CEO 
(1. Dislike strongly, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Like strongly) 
 
3. Leaders who have shown great ethical orientation in their management can be asked to serve as 
members of the Ethics Council, which gives advice to the Norwegian Petroleum Fund regarding 
ethical investments. How would you feel about nominating this CEO? 
(1. Strongly oppose nomination, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Strongly support nomination) 
 
4. To what extent does the CEO come across as professional? 
(1. Very unprofessional, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Very professional) 
 
5. To what extent does the CEO come across as competent? 
(1. Very incompetent, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Very competent) 
 
6. Indicate your agreement with the following claims: 
I believe the company are doing this because…* 
6.1 … They have a long-term interest in society 
6.2 … They believe in environmental care  
6.3 … They are trying to give something back to society 
6.4 … They feel their customers expect it 
6.5 … They feel society in general expects it  
6.6 … They feel their stakeholders expect it 
6.7 … They will get more customers by doing this 
6.8 … They will retain more customers by doing this 
6.9 … They will make more money by doing this 
 
7. What do you think was the CEOs intention for giving this press conference*: 
7.1 I feel the CEO attempts to alter my attitudes towards the hotel chain 
7.2 I feel the CEO attempts to influence my future choice of hotels 
7.3 I feel the CEO wants to give me relevant information 
 
*All items indicated on 5-point Lickert scales from 1. Completely disagree to 5. Completely agree 
Added for Experiment 2: 
8. To what extent do the new initiatives seem to be financially motivated? 
(1. Not at all financially motivated, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Very much financially motivated) 
 
9. To what extent do the new initiatives seem morally motivated? 
(1. Not at all morally motivated, 4. Neutral/I don’t know, 7. Very much morally motivated) 
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Appendix E 
All standardized scales used in this study were translated to Norwegian. The following process 
assured the quality of the translation: First, three PhD students produced one translation each, of 
each item. Secondly, three bilingual professors at the department of language chose which 
translation was correct, for all items. The professors provided their votes separately. Across all items, 
the professors were unanimous in all but two cases, in which the version with two out of three votes 
was included in the study. This translation process is very similar to the one recommended by 
Douglas and Craig (2007). 
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